Operation Mapping: Cartography, Intelligence, and the 3rd Battle of Gaza, 1917 by Radunzel, Joel
Syracuse University 
SURFACE 
Theses - ALL 
5-2015 
Operation Mapping: Cartography, Intelligence, and the 3rd Battle 
of Gaza, 1917 
Joel Radunzel 
Syracuse University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/thesis 
 Part of the Geography Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Radunzel, Joel, "Operation Mapping: Cartography, Intelligence, and the 3rd Battle of Gaza, 1917" (2015). 
Theses - ALL. 113. 
https://surface.syr.edu/thesis/113 
This is brought to you for free and open access by SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses - ALL by an 
authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu. 
Abstract 
World War I sparked numerous innovations in military cartography. In the Palestine theater as 
elsewhere, the British and Dominion forces leveraged new technologies, including aerial 
photography and wireless intercepts, to supplement their use of intelligence to map enemy troop 
positions. The creation and distribution of these position maps by the 7th Field Survey Company 
for the 3rd Battle of Gaza in late 1917 represented an innovative process of intelligence-
gathering, map production, and knowledge distribution. This thesis not only examines the 
Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) along with its subordinate intelligence assets and 
cartographic organizations as a comprehensive mapping system, but also elaborates upon David 
Woodward's cartographic framework to study the creation of the 7th Field Survey Company's 
operation maps. Woodward's framework divides the map production process into four phases: 
information gathering, information processing, document distribution, and document use. 
 Elements of the EEF were involved in each of these phases during the 3rd Battle of Gaza. 
Ground reconnaissance, aerial photography, prisoner interrogation, and wireless intercepts 
contributed to the information gathering phase along with topographic surveys and aerial 
photogrammetry used to produce the base maps on which Turkish positions were plotted. In the 
information processing phase intelligence officers, commanders, and draftsmen analyzed, 
synthesized, and reconciled the gathered information and plotted the results in a series of maps 
on a nearly daily basis spanning more than a month of increasingly mobile military operations. In 
the document distribution phase, the EEF chain of command distributed these maps to 
subordinate headquarters. In the document use phase, these subordinate headquarters used the 
position maps to plan and conduct operations. This system was cyclical insofar as the operations 
that these maps helped to facilitate also gathered further information that fed into the next cycle's 
product. As the condition of the battlefield and the nature of the operations changed, so too did 
the value of various modes of intelligence gathering, with varying effects on the accuracy and 
utility of the position maps.  
 This study relies on primary materials such as unit war diaries, personal diaries and 
memoirs, and intelligence records to connect items of intelligence in these documents to changes 
in the successive position maps. These connections underscore the importance of different types 
of intelligence during various points of the battle's changing conditions: as conditions on the 
battlefield became more fluid the EEF began to rely more on single sources of intelligence rather 
than on a synthesis of multiple sources, with a resulting degradation in accuracy. Even so, the 
success of the position map technique is apparent in its reintroduction prior to the EEF's final 
offensive in 1918. 
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Preface 
Maps are absolutely vital tools for present-day soldiers conducting military operations. Indeed, 
one of the first skills learned by new soldiers and officers in the US Army is how to read and 
navigate with a map (US Army 2009, 3-217 to 3-273). In my experience as an infantry officer in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Haiti, I found myself reaching far more often for my map rather than my 
rifle. Academically, my experience with the intimacy between maps and military operations, as 
well as my interest in the British Empire’s World War I Palestine campaign—an interest that 
began when I was a cadet at West Point—guided me to examine the operation maps produced by 
the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. As such, this thesis, in which I examine the battle maps of 
earlier army on another distant and dusty battlefield, held interest that for me that was not just 
academic, but also professional and personal. 
As I conducted my research I felt a soldier-to-soldier connection to the British, 
Australian, and New Zealander soldiers of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) despite the 
time and technology that separates me from them. I learned quickly that the culture of the 
profession of arms has changed little past century. My own experience as a soldier in combat, 
and my connection to these earlier soldiers, felt through the operation maps and the documents 
that I used to research them, gave me unique insight into this subject, which deepened my 
understanding of the military cartographic system that created these maps. As I examined these 
documents, my experience as an officer who has used maps to plan and conduct a broad range of 
military operations—including counter-insurgency, small scale attacks and defenses, and 
humanitarian relief—allowed me to better discern how the EEF gathered its information, what 
information the EEF cartographers considered relevant for their mapping purposes, and how the 
maps were used by the EEF commanders. 
2 
 
Indeed, the EEF operation maps mirror present-day military maps in both form and 
content. US Army and NATO doctrine defines an operation map as “A map showing the location 
of friendly forces. It may indicate predicted movement and location of enemy forces” (US Army 
2010, 1-115). This definition accurately describes the form and the content of the EEF operation 
maps, though it ignores the end use of both the historical and present day incarnations of these 
products. Based on my research and my experience, I determined that the operation maps were 
used by military staff not just to record data, but also to plan operations at the operational level 
of war (see Chapter 1). Both World War I and present-day operation maps are actually rather 
simple in the selection of information they portray. However, in spite of this (or perhaps because 
of it) the data and symbols that do appear are often quite nuanced. In the case of the Palestine 
maps in particular, the content is such that they must be reproduced and viewed in color to be 
completely understood.
1
  
While my military experience benefitted my research, the research also helped me to 
grow as a soldier. Previously I had mostly interacted with maps as a map-user. This project 
helped me to better understand maps from the perspective of the map-maker, all the more so 
because I benefitted from the advice, guidance, and example of my distinguished academic 
advisor, Dr. Mark Monmonier. This expanded comprehension will benefit me in my subsequent 
staff and command roles in the army, a fact that is particularly important to me; while I cannot 
say that a map has ever saved my life, I can certainly say that maps have helped me to save the 
lives of others over the course of my military career, and I expect maps to increase in importance 
as my own responsibilities expand. Indeed, my next role in that Army after completing a 
teaching assignment at West Point will be to take charge of an infantry battalion’s staff, 
                                                             
1
 As such, in this thesis I have annotated those figures that cannot be fully understood if reproduced in black and 
white or grayscale. These figures should be reproduced in color. 
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including the sections of the headquarters that create and distribute maps to the subordinate 
commanders and soldiers.  As such, this project has been especially fulfilling, because I have 
been able to both bring my professional experience to bear on my academic project, and to take 
away from this thesis skills that will benefit myself and my soldiers in the future.       
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Chapter 1.  Introduction and Context 
Conflict, for better or for worse, has often provided an impetus for technological, organizational, 
and procedural advances. World War I, one of the most destructive wars in human history, was 
no different in this regard. New weapons and processes such as scientific artillery fire, tanks, 
poison gas, and other technological and procedural advances made their debut during this 
conflict. The field of cartography also saw significant innovations in response to the new tactical 
and operational problems created by the conditions and context of World War I battlefields. On 
the Palestine Front—a relatively minor theater in the context of the broader war—the 
cartographic austerity of the theater and its remoteness from the central military and mapping 
systems of the main Western Front prompted the British forces there to develop numerous novel 
cartographic techniques and products including the use of aerial photography for making highly 
accurate large-scale maps, as well as the operation maps
1
 that are the subject of this project. 
 At first glance, these operation maps were relatively simple cartographic products when 
compared to other World War I military maps, but a closer look reveals surprising nuance and 
complexity both in their content and in the processes that created them. They were produced by 
the 7th Field Survey Company (FSC), the cartographic organization of the Egyptian 
Expeditionary Force (EEF), which was the name given to the British army in the Palestine 
theater. The production of this map series occurred during the campaign initiated by the British 
offensive at the 3rd Battle of Gaza in late October 1917. This campaign ended with the fall of 
Jerusalem to British forces in mid-December. During this period the 7th FSC printed an edition 
of the operation maps each day and distributed them to officers within the EEF. These maps 
                                                             
1
 What to call these maps is a more complicated problem than might initially be expected. The maps themselves are marked as 
“situation” maps, but the 7th Field Survey Company referred to them in their war diary as “operation” maps (7th FSC WD), while 
Peter Collier used the term “position” maps in his 2008 article (Collier 2008, 1). Peter Chasseaud, another scholar who has 
studied World War I maps, stated to me that the terms “situation map” and “position map” already denoted other specific map 
types on the Western front, so I accordingly chose to use the term operation map in this thesis. I also believe this term describes 
the actual purpose and use of the maps better than the other two.  
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attempted to distil the tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence arriving at the EEF’s 
General Headquarters (GHQ) into an easily read operational picture that showed with as much 
precision and accuracy as possible the deployments each day of both the British units and those 
of their Turkish opponents. The purpose of these maps was to provide the British command 
structure with a coherent and unified situational awareness of the battlefield. Furthermore, these 
maps were thoroughly modern
2
 in both their purpose and in the mode of their production, both of 
which are analogous to the networked digital moving map displays and attendant intelligence 
systems used by present-day military organizations. 
 This detailed examination of the operation maps seeks an understanding of how and why 
the EEF produced them. For this task I have built on the foundation set by other scholars who 
have studied cartography during this time and in this theater. I have also incorporated the 
research methodologies suggested by David Woodward (1974) and T.C. Chamberlin (1890). For 
my data, I collected from numerous archives in the United Kingdom thousands of pages of 
documents produced by the EEF and its subordinate organizations and also by individuals who 
participated in the operation mapping process. These all provided a rich set of resources that 
allowed me to thoroughly understand these maps and the processes that created them. But, before 
diving in detail into the research methods and data that informed this study, a brief commentary 
on the historical and cartographic context of the operation maps is necessary. 
Historical Context: The Palestine Campaign and the 3rd Battle of Gaza 
 The World War I Palestine campaign grew out of the British Empire’s strategic 
imperative to protect the Suez Canal and with it the lines of communication to British colonies, 
possessions, and dominions in the Orient, most notably India. The decision to carry this 
                                                             
2 I use the term modern in this thesis to differentiate between the scientifically-produced and centrally-regulated maps, which 
have dominated military cartography since World War I, from the largely un-regulated and non-standardized maps that 
characterized military cartography before this conflict. 
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campaign away from the canal and eventually into Palestine and Syria came about through a 
process that today would be called “mission creep,” in which an initially simple mission 
becomes self-justifying and self-expanding because of the large amount of resources devoted to 
accomplishing it. Initially, the British strategy for protecting the Suez Canal involved stationing 
relatively weak forces along the canal itself to deter Turkish aggression against the waterway, 
relying mostly on the geographic buffer of the arid Sinai Peninsula to preclude any large-scale 
Turkish attacks. However, the Turks proved far more capable of crossing the desert terrain than 
the British had anticipated, launching three large raids against the canal in the first two years of 
the war. Though these attacks were unsuccessful—only one ever reached the canal itself—they 
still convinced the British Imperial General Staff that a more forward deployed defense was 
necessary to eliminate the threat to the waterway (Wavell 1938, 14-19, 23-38). 
The Palestine Campaign 
 Accordingly, the newly named Egyptian Expeditionary Force’s British Territorial 
troops
3
, under the command of General Sir Archibald Murray, reinforced by strong and well-
trained Australian and New Zealand (ANZAC) formations that had been recently evacuated from 
the disastrous Gallipoli campaign, began a slow and methodical advance across Sinai that 
matched the pace of the British railroad and water pipeline construction that allowed supplies to 
flow across the peninsula. In general, British Territorial forces constituted the EEF’s infantry and 
artillery, while the ANZACs provided most of the force’s large cavalry component. Other allied 
nations, including France and Italy, also contributed small and largely symbolic formations to the 
campaign with an eye toward pressing their claims to territory and influence in the region after 
the war (Pirie-Gordon 1919, 39-46). By early 1917 this combined force had reached the Ottoman 
Empire’s Palestine frontier at the town of Gaza. 
                                                             
3
 Territorial Forces, or “Territorials,” were and are reserve formations, the British equivalent of the US National Guard. 
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 The EEF’s advance across Sinai was facilitated by an increasing use of aerial 
photography by the British to create accurate maps of the Sinai desert. This was a necessary 
undertaking because Sinai to that point remained either un-mapped or at best covered by charts 
that were insufficient for modern military operations in terms of content, scale, and accuracy 
(Collier 1994, 100-104). The 7th FSC also used airplanes to create large-scale “town maps” of 
settlements along the EEF’s lines of advance in Sinai and Palestine (Gavish and Biger 1985, 38-
44). In fact, by the time the Palestine campaign reached its conclusion in October 1918 the EEF’s 
cartographers had mapped a staggering amount of terrain from the air, far more than they had 
charted by more traditional survey methods such as triangulation (Maule 1919, 28-29). These 
activities indicated an organizational willingness within the EEF to innovate, at least 
cartographically, that would become further evident in the production process of the operation 
maps. 
   Upon arriving at the Palestine frontier the British forces launched an immediate attack 
on the Turkish forces defending Gaza in an engagement that came to be known as the 1st Battle 
of Gaza (26 March 1917). This attack came within figurative inches of succeeding—the British 
had breached the Turkish line and the Turkish command’s wireless station in Gaza had issued 
orders to evacuate the town—when the British commanders called off the attack for fear of a 
counterattack by Turkish reserves arriving from central Palestine. No such reserves were actually 
en route to the battle, but the British ignorance of the location of the entire Turkish order of 
battle
4
 likely highlighted their need for an intelligence product that would prevent a repeat of this 
assault’s failure. As it was, the British offensive would stall in front of Gaza until late October 
(Wavell 1938, 94). 
                                                             
4 The term order of battle is used to denote what subordinate units compose a particular army or military formation, as well as 
how these units are hierarchically organized.  
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 This stalemate rankled the British Imperial General Staff, who were concerned about a 
new combined Turkish and German army assembling in Anatolia. Named the Yilderim 
(Thunderbolt) Force, these troops, under the command of former German Minister of War and 
Chief of Staff General Erich von Falkenhayn, were believed to have the potential to threaten 
British forces either on the Palestine front or on the Mesopotamian front (in what is now modern-
day Iraq). The British General Staff pressured General Murray into launching a second, ill-
conceived and under-strength attack on the Gaza defenses during 17-19 April 1917. This assault 
was doomed from the start and—in the worst tradition of World War I frontal attacks—
accomplished nothing but the infliction of heavy casualties, particular on the British side. This 
episode also marked the demise of Murray’s tenure as EEF commander, though his logistical 
expertise had laid the groundwork for the eventual British triumph in this theater (Wavell 1938, 
95-114).
5
 
 To replace Murray, the Imperial General Staff chose General Sir Edmund Allenby, who 
had been the commander of the British Army’s cavalry arm prior to the start of the war and who 
had competently led both the British Expeditionary Force’s (BEF) cavalry corps in the early days 
of the war and later the British 3rd Army on the Western Front in France, before being chosen to 
command the EEF (Wavell 1940, 127-152). Allenby arrived on the Palestine Front in June and 
immediately breathed new energy into the disheartened troopers of the EEF by moving his own 
headquarters from Murray’s preferred location in the relative comfort of Cairo to within earshot 
of the guns in the Gaza defenses. He also requested and received substantial reinforcements of 
soldiers, artillery, logistics, and airplanes from Britain, which allowed him to reorganize the EEF 
                                                             
5
 This logistical effort was built on the backs of hundreds of thousands of Egyptian workers who formed the Egyptian Labour 
Corps. This organization drafted local Egyptians into its ranks and sent them to the front to perform manual labor, carry supplies, 
and serve the needs of the British army. Many of them were killed alongside the British soldiers, and their contribution to the 
outcome of the campaign deserves far greater attention then it has received. 
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into three complete corps—the XXth, XXIst, and Desert Mounted—and to implement a plan to 
defeat the Turkish defenses that now stretched from Gaza southeast to the crossroads town of 
Beersheba (Figure 1.1). With these expanded resources, Alleby’s commission from London was 
to invade Palestine and capture Jerusalem by Christmas 1917 (Meinertzhagen 1960, 219-220).  
 
 
Figure 1.1. The Palestine front as it was in October 1917. The darker brown shaded areas are elevated terrain, and important 
named features of the front line fortifications are annotated, as are key towns. (This figure is intended to be printed in color) 
 Of vital importance to the operation maps during the summer of 1917, prior to the 3rd 
Gaza offensive, was the arrival in Palestine of Major (later Colonel) Richard Meinertzhagen. 
This highly capable and innovative intelligence officer had already distinguished himself as an 
information-gatherer in the ongoing operations in German East Africa and would continue to do 
so as Allenby’s director of Palestine Intelligence on the EEF GHQ staff. Meinertzhagen appears 
to have been both the driving force and chief advocate behind the production of the operation 
10 
 
 
 
maps, and his influence on their final form was clear throughout the course of the ensuing 
campaign.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.2. The first phase of the 3rd Battle of Gaza saw the EEF (red) first launch a flanking 
attack at the eastern end of the Turkish line (green) around Beersheba with the XX Corps and 
Desert Mounted Corps (DMC) before launching a frontal attack on Gaza itself with the XXI 
Corps. (This figure is intended to be printed in color) 
 
The 3rd Battle of Gaza 
 The British plan for the 3rd Battle of Gaza called for deception and a prolonged artillery 
bombardment to fix the attention of the Turkish command on the British XXI Corps directly in 
front of the defenses around Gaza before a strong mixed cavalry and infantry force consisting of 
the XX Corps and Desert Mounted Corps struck east across the desert to seize Beersheba and its 
vital water wells and turn the Turkish flank (Figure 1.2). Once sufficient numbers of the Turkish 
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reserve forces moved east to counter this attack, the XXI Corps would launch a frontal assault on 
Gaza to breach the Turkish line along the Mediterranean Sea. Ideally, both prongs of the British 
assault would then advance into the Turkish rear areas, surround and destroy their army, and 
leave Turkish Palestine defenseless. Though this second part of the offensive was not nearly as 
successful as the British had hoped, the 3rd Battle of Gaza still represents one of the most 
successful offensives of World War I in terms of ground gained and casualties inflicted on the 
enemy. 
 As it actually unfolded, the campaign initiated by the 3rd Battle of Gaza can be divided 
into three operational phases that also correspond with three distinct phases in the production and 
form of the operation maps. The first phase encompassed the beginning of the British 
bombardment of the Gaza defenses on 28 October, the assault on Beersheba and its dramatic 
seizure by cavalry charge at dusk on 31 October, and the frontal assault on Gaza itself starting on 
2 November (Figure 1.2). While the British attack went generally according to plan, the Turkish 
army led by the capable German General Friedrich Kress von Kressenstein managed to extract 
itself from the closing British trap on the night of 6-7 November and withdraw north, initiating 
the second operational phase of the battle. 
 This second phase was defined by the British pursuit of the retreating Turkish army 
across the relatively flat and open coastal plain of Palestine. It lasted until 14 November, when a 
new front line began to stabilize north of Jaffa along the river Auja and west of Jerusalem 
(Figure 1.3). The operational situation during this phase was rapidly changing and often chaotic, 
with both armies frequently losing contact not just with the enemy but even with their own units. 
British logistical difficulties prevented them from pursuing with their entire army and the Turks 
12 
 
 
 
used multiple rear-guard actions to preserve at least some semblance of cohesion in their force 
despite grievous losses of both soldiers and material.  
 
 With the front stabilized and their logistics improving, the British entered the third phase 
of the campaign on 15 November with a slow and deliberate eastward advance by the EEF’s two 
infantry corps into the Judean hills to capture the final objective of the offensive, the holy city of 
Jerusalem (Figure 1.4). The Turkish army by this point was too weak to counterattack or even to 
effectively parry the strength of the British attack, and Allenby’s forces entered Jerusalem 
without major combat on 9 December, effectively ending the campaign. During the course of 
these operations, the 7th FSC’s operation maps changed with the unique conditions of each of 
Figure 1.3. The second phase of the campaign saw the British XXI Corps and Desert Mounted 
Corps, followed later by the XX Corps, pursue the retreating Turkish army northwards after 
the Turks evacuated their defenses on the night of 6-7 November. (This figure is intended to 
be printed in color) 
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these three phases, sometimes being more useful and sometimes less, but always notable for the 
rigidly metronomic consistency of their daily production schedule.  
 
 
Cartographic Context: The Operation Maps in World War I Cartography 
 The EEF’s operation maps occupied a distinct place within World War I cartography in 
both graphic style and methods of production. Their scope and content were far broader than the 
tactically
6
 oriented trench maps common to the western front, and their purpose must have been 
                                                             
6 I use the terms ‘tactical,’ ‘operational,’ and ‘strategic’ in their modern sense as they relate to scale in US and NATO military 
doctrine. ‘Tactical’ refers to the level of war that involves the specific application of fire and maneuver to defeat enemy forces, 
the smallest scale of warfare. The ‘operational’ level of warfare encompasses the large-scale maneuver of forces within a theater 
to bring about victory in a campaign. The strategic level of war involves the application of national resources to achieve national 
objectives and blends into the realm of geopolitics. While there is significant overlap between each of these levels, I found them 
to be useful terms for analyzing this military subject (FM 101-5-1).  
Figure 1.4. In the 3rd phase of the Gaza campaign the front stabilized once again on a line 
running generally from Jaffa along the Auja River to Jerusalem and then turning southward so 
the Turks could defend the holy city. During this phase the British XX and XXI Corps 
mounted a slow but steady advance eastward to eventually capture Jerusalem. (This figure is 
intended to be printed in color) 
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different as well since the EEF also produced their own detailed trench maps of the Gaza 
defenses (Hare, “Trench Map”). They seem to have been more closely related to the 
operationally oriented ‘order-of-battle’ maps produced by Allied forces in France, which 
graphically broke the front into sectors in an attempt to show which enemy formation was 
responsible for each respective stretch of frontline trench. However, the 7th FSC operation maps 
sought greater precision than these maps by attempting to show the specific deployments of 
discrete enemy formations and not just the general sectors they occupied. The operation maps, 
which failed to depict more than the most basic physical and cultural terrain features, were also 
clearly distinct from both the large- and small-scale topographical maps produced by the 7th FSC 
during this period for navigation, artillery plotting, and tactical planning. 
 Perhaps the defining characteristic that set these maps apart from other World War I 
cartography was the fact that they were produced so consistently and frequently over the course 
of the 3rd Battle of Gaza campaign. Other map series from this conflict generally were produced 
infrequently or on an as-needed basis. By contrast, the six-week-long daily run of the EEF 
operation maps from late-October to mid-December 1917—though some of the individual 
editions suffered from incomplete or inaccurate data—provided at the very least a fascinating 
window into the thinking of Allenby and his staff during the campaign. Evidence suggests that 
these maps were a welcomed and effective tool for the EEF commanders and staff officers who 
used them. 
Research Questions 
 In beginning my inquiry into how these maps were produced I chose to approach them as 
products of the intelligence that they attempted to portray. Why did the operation mapmakers 
place this Turkish unit symbol here and not there? How did they know to do so? How much 
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analysis and speculation by the EEF intelligence officers was required to produce these daily 
maps? These questions eventually boiled down to one overarching research question that guided 
my initial investigation of these maps: what sources of intelligence are represented by the unit 
position symbols on each edition of the operation maps? This question was attractive to me 
because it linked the information-gathering elements of the EEF with the staff officers who 
analyzed the data and the mapmakers who annotated and printed the maps. However, once my 
research began I realized the need for a second, complimentary line of inquiry that treated the 
operation maps as products and sought to determine their purpose and use. My second research 
question thus asked: what was the purpose of the operation maps, and how were they used during 
and after the 3rd Gaza campaign? This question, along with the structure provided by David 
Woodward’s (1974) suggested framework for the study of cartography, allowed me to 
investigate the operation maps and the organizations that produced and used them as a single 
unified system. This particularly fruitful and rewarding method of investigation allowed me to 
paint a far more complete picture of these maps and their role. Before I can present this picture, 
however, I must devote some words to the foundation on which this project rests: the academic 
work of other scholars who have studied World War I cartography, the Palestine campaign, and 
the operation maps themselves.  
 In Chapter 2 I will relate the three historiographies that are relevant to the operation 
maps. The first historiography consists of the work of other scholars who have already examined 
aspects of the operation maps and other cartographic activity conducted by the EEF in World 
War I. The second is the historical examination of World War I military intelligence, particularly 
on the Palestine front. The third historiography I will describe deals with the more traditional 
military history of the Palestine campaign and the interpretations of its conduct and outcome. 
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With this foundation laid, I will move on in Chapter 3 to describe my research methods and 
conceptual framework for this project. These were heavily influenced by David Woodward and 
T.C. Chamberlin, and proved to be particularly effective for my research purposes. In Chapter 4 I 
will relate how I gathered and organized the archival data for this project and I will also describe 
the documents I collected, which included the operation maps and other original documents 
relating to the EEF’s cartography, intelligence-gathering, and tactical operations. Chapter 5 
includes my analysis of these documents. This analysis takes the form of a chronological 
narrative of the operation map production process with my own interpretations—informed by the 
supporting original documents—of the data present on each edition of this series. Finally, in 
Chapter 6 I will present my findings and conclusions regarding the operation maps, the EEF 
cartographic system, and the effectiveness of my research methods.     
 Throughout this entire thesis I have endeavored to maintain a narrative thread that 
emphasizes the human dimension of the EEF’s cartographic process. The operation maps were 
not produced in a vacuum. These maps were a response to operational imperatives and their 
quality usually reflected the changing operational conditions under which they were created. 
Even so, their content usually represented a negotiated construction of reality rather than an 
accurate picture of the facts on the ground. Furthermore, some editions of the operation maps 
were contested, leading to revisions in both the mapmaking process and the end-product maps. In 
broad terms, the progressive changes to the style and content of the operations maps indicated 
not just changing operational conditions, but also a learning process by the officers and soldiers 
whose job it was to communicate those conditions. As such, this thesis tells the story of soldiers 
who learned to effectively leverage maps to accomplish their unit’s mission.    
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Chapter 2. Review of Literature: Three Historiographies 
The foundation for this thesis rests on three different areas of scholarship that have examined the 
World War I Palestine campaign. These scholarly pillars of my research are 1) the military 
cartography of the Palestine campaign, 2) the history of military intelligence on this front, and 3) 
the competing narratives of the campaign’s operational military history. In this chapter I will 
trace the historiographical threads of each of these three topics and how they have influenced my 
conclusions and methods.  
 The scholarly record of cartography and military history began almost immediately after 
the conclusion of the campaign and was often conducted by individuals who had participated in 
the fighting. Mapmaking on this front has received attention from a small group of cartographic 
historians who provide a generally consistent narrative. The military history of the campaign 
contains a much larger body of literature that until recently has not included serious debate. By 
contrast, the study of British military intelligence began much later, due to the British 
government’s slowness in opening up their information-gathering records to public scrutiny. This 
line of examination has proven to be more contentious than the other two fields. My thesis is 
positioned at the intersection of these three areas, but its direct lineage comes from the history of 
cartography via Peter Collier’s work on mapmaking on the Palestine front. 
Historiography 1: Cartography on the Palestine Front 
The most relevant literature to my research examined EEF cartography on the Palestine 
front. These studies began as early as 1919 with W.J. Maule’s Report on the Work of the 7th 
Field Survey Company, R.E. and have continued to the present with work by Collier and others. 
Indeed, Collier’s (2008) initial, cursory description of the 7th FSC operation maps is what drew 
me to this topic in the first place. Overall, the historiography of Palestine front cartography 
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reveals that the pioneering British mapmakers introduced novel methods for improving both the 
form and content of their maps. Examples of their innovation included the operation mapping 
technique as well as their adoption of aerial photography and photogrammetry. 
The paper most immediately relevant to my examination of the EEF’s operation maps 
was presented by Collier at the 2008 Symposium of the Commission on the History of 
Cartography. Collier addressed broadly several innovative mapping techniques that emerged 
during World War I but focused specifically on the 7
th
 FSC operation maps. He contended that 
the operation maps were distinct from other map types common during the war. He further 
argued that the operation maps were innovative because of their content and because of the 
frequency and speed with which they were distributed. Most importantly, Collier called for 
further research into these maps by noting that “a detailed analysis of the maps, in conjunction 
with the surviving intelligence files, may yield a better picture of the relative inputs from the 
different intelligence sources” (Collier 2008, 13). His article echoed an important theme: that 
EEF cartographers were keen to improve both their cartographic processes and the resulting map 
products. Collier’s work was foundational to my own research because it led me to a gap in 
knowledge about these innovative maps.  
Major W.J. Maule initiated the study of British cartographic activities in Palestine with 
his Report on the Work of the 7th Field Survey Company, R.E. in 1919. This report was not only 
a primary source for my thesis but also framed the academic dialogue about World War I Middle 
East mapping. Maule, who commanded the 7th FSC, recorded the activities of the various 
sections of his company and other cartographic organizations within the EEF. His account was 
far more than a simple reciting of dates and activities, however. He analyzed the effectiveness of 
the various tactics, techniques, procedures, and technologies that his unit used. While the report 
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contained large sections of analysis, even the strictly descriptive parts were insightful. For 
example, Maule compared the number of square kilometers his company mapped using aerial 
photography with the same area surveyed by triangulation, thus demonstrating how much the 
British had relied on their flying cartographers. Scattered throughout this document were 
references to the difficult conditions and scarce resources that prompted the EEF mapmakers to 
innovate in numerous ways. Maule also provided details about the 7th FSC's mapmaking 
equipment and procedures, and about how the company liaised with other intelligence 
organizations in the EEF. Overall, Maule’s report laid the foundation for the academic dialogue 
about military mapmaking that followed close on the heels of the end of hostilities in the Middle 
East in November 1918.  
 Captain H. Hamshaw Thomas, who was chief photographic officer for the Royal Flying 
Corps (RFC) in Palestine, elaborated upon Maule’s report with his own “Geographic 
Reconnaissance by Aerial Photography, with Special Reference to the Work Done on the 
Palestine Front,” published by the Royal Geographic Society in 1920. Whereas Maule’s report 
provided a broad overview of the cartographic activities of the EEF, Thomas focused on the 
specific contributions of aerial photography. Leveraging Maule’s statistics, Thomas explained 
how the flyers used new technologies to create highly accurate topographic maps for the EEF. 
His article described many of the techniques used by the EEF’s aerial cartographers and analyzed 
their relative advantages. He also addressed briefly the role of aerial reconnaissance in gathering 
the operational intelligence plotted on the operation maps. Although Thomas’s account was a 
narrow technical analysis of the aerial component of the EEF’s mapping activities, he used it to 
argue that aerial photography and cartography on the Palestine front evolved independently from 
its counterpart on the Western front in France.  
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 Both Maule’s and Thomas’s manuscripts addressed the 7th FSC's position maps only 
obliquely. Maule described many details about how the operation maps were printed and 
distributed while Thomas briefly acknowledged the role of aerial photography in gathering the 
data that the operation maps displayed. Although neither author focused on the operation maps, 
they described key elements of the EEF cartographic system and demonstrated how this 
mapmaking organization innovated under austere circumstances. All subsequent scholarship 
pertaining to the operation maps and the broader cartography of the Palestine front built upon 
their work. 
 The next scholars to examine the cartographic dimension of the Palestine campaign were 
Dov Gavish and Gideon Biger (1985), who published “Innovative Cartography in Palestine, 
1917-1918.” Their article recounted how the EEF employed aerial photographs to create town 
maps and artillery maps—including maps of locations central to the Palestine campaign like 
Gaza, Beersheba, and Rafa—that were sufficiently detailed for military planning and scientific 
artillery fires. Gavish and Biger built explicitly upon the work of Thomas to argue that the EEF’s 
techniques were not only innovative but developed separately from similar techniques on the 
Western front. Indeed, they argued that the town maps produced on the Palestine front were 
substantially more refined than similar maps produced in France. As such, this article reinforced 
the narrative of independent thinking and novel ideas flourishing within the EEF cartographic 
system. Though their article dealt only obliquely with the operation maps, Gavish and Biger 
were very much a part of the dialogue about the 7th FSC and the EEF cartographic system. 
 From Gavish and Biger, the historiography of Palestine Front cartography moves to Peter 
Collier’s early examination of the EEF’s use of aerial photography to produce highly accurate 
topographic maps. In his 1994 article “Innovative military mapping using aerial photography in 
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the First World War: Sinai, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, 1914-1919,” Collier built explicitly 
upon Maule (1919), Thomas (1920), and Gavish and Biger (1985) to highlight both the 
importance of the aerial cartographic work in Palestine and its distinctiveness from other 
theaters. Collier relied especially heavily on Maule’s report to describe many of the techniques 
employed by the EEF’s fliers and mapmakers to overcome challenges like primitive equipment, 
hostile environments, scant resources, and operational imperatives. He argued that these 
conditions produced an environment in the British Middle Eastern commands that was more 
amenable to novel techniques than traditional cartographic establishments in England and 
France. Like previous scholars, Collier focused on the systems and processes that created the 
operation maps. Although he reinforced the broader narrative that the EEF's cartographers were 
employing new and innovative techniques—often without the benefit of outside help or insight—
to create useful and novel products, his detailed examination of operation maps would wait for 
his 2008 paper (mentioned earlier in this chapter) (Collier 1994, 101-104). My thesis, by 
examining the operation maps even more closely, sheds light on a previously overlooked aspect 
of Palestine front cartography.  
Historiography 2: Military Intelligence on the Palestine Front 
 The historiography of military intelligence operations on the Palestine front has generally 
followed a narrative that emphasizes the contribution of technical intelligence-gathering means 
over more traditional human sources. This narrative has tended to focus on the act of 
information-gathering at the expense of analysis and distribution. Scholars who have engaged the 
history of intelligence in Palestine have been thorough in their research but also generally narrow 
in their scope. One exception to the narrow view of Palestine front intelligence is the field’s most 
prodigious scholar, Yigal Sheffy. He provided the most complete overview of the intelligence-
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gathering activities of this campaign, in contrast to most other researchers, who focused narrowly 
on a single technical source of information. Admittedly, the process that created and distributed 
the operation maps was intimately tied to information-gathering, but it also relied heavily upon 
analysis and interpretation. Because the operation maps were a vehicle for accumulating large 
amounts of operational intelligence and communicating findings to people who could use them, 
my thesis helps to flesh out the historical narrative by analyzing how the gathered intelligence 
was actually transmitted, analyzed, and used. 
Almost all contemporary discussion of Palestine front intelligence supports Sheffy. 
Scholars who have engaged with Sheffy’s work include Roger Owen (2011), John Ferris (1992), 
Peter Mead (1983), and Michael Occleshaw (1989). These historians focused on the various 
methods of intelligence-gathering in the EEF, including wireless intercepts (Ferris), aerial 
reconnaissance (Mead), and human sources (Sheffy and Occleshaw). Some, particularly Sheffy 
and Owen, have treated the Palestine campaign as their primary theater for study, while the rest 
devoted only a portion of their narratives to this geographical area. Although each of these 
authors argued for the relative importance of the different forms of intelligence gathering, only 
Sheffy (1998) analyzed carefully how the information, once gathered, was communicated and 
used by the troops at the front.  
Yigal Sheffy’s (2010) article, “British intelligence and the Middle East, 1900–1918: how 
much do we know?” set the limits for what a scholar can expect to find in the primary documents 
relating to intelligence in the Palestine campaign. He argued that available archival material 
limits researchers in three ways: 1) only the products of the intelligence (such as operation maps) 
are available for study, 2) these products allow informed speculation only about what sources of 
information they represent, and 3) this speculation allows only partial reconstruction of the 
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intelligence processes involved in the creation of the products (Sheffy 2010, 33). Sheffy noted 
that many documents relating to wireless and human intelligence operations in the Middle East 
either remain classified, have been lost at some point over the past century, or simply do not 
exist because of the nature of intelligence-gathering activity and communication. On the other 
hand, aerial reconnaissance and routine patrols by units at the front are relatively well-
documented in unit war diaries and personal memoirs (Sheffy 2010, 39-44, 49). My thesis fits 
neatly into Sheffy's structure because I am studying an available intelligence product (the 
operation maps) and trying to partially reconstruct what organizational systems and sources of 
information produced them. Although my research confirms Sheffy’s apprehension about the 
limitations of the archival sources, I found the data were more than sufficient to create an 
informed reconstruction of the operation mapping system.   
Sheffy’s (1998) comprehensive book about military intelligence in Palestine, British 
Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign, 1914-1918, is the richest and most relevant 
work relating to the intelligence historiography of this front. Sheffy charted the course of 
military intelligence-gathering during the conflict by describing the development of various 
methods for acquiring data, including wireless intercepts, aerial photography, networks of 
agents, prisoner interrogations, and ground reconnaissance. He argued that the more technical 
modes of intelligence gathering, such as wireless intercepts and aircraft reconnaissance, were far 
more reliable and useful than human agents or accounts from prisoners, which he also discussed 
in detail. Sheffy minimized the importance of the reconnaissance abilities of the ground forces in 
the EEF, such as cavalry patrols or personal reconnaissance by officers, who contributed 
important information to the intelligence picture available to the 7th FSC cartographers. My 
thesis, by highlighting this human aspect of tactical information-gathering, builds on Sheffy’s 
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research by emphasizing these overlooked sources. It also compliments Sheffy’s work by 
reconstructing how the gathered information was analyzed and used. 
A more technologically focused study of intelligence-gathering on the Palestine front was 
John Ferris’s (1992) book The British Army and Signals Intelligence During the First World 
War. Ferris recounted the development of wireless intelligence-gathering from its birth before 
the war through the increasingly sophisticated techniques for interception, decryption, and 
analysis that prevailed later. The book largely consists of transcriptions of important or 
illustrative intercepts from different fronts. Ferris’s analysis made an argument for the prime 
importance of signals intelligence, particularly in the Middle East. He described how lax 
encryption procedures on the part of the Turks, along with a higher appreciation for this sort of 
intelligence by British commanders in the Middle East, amplified the effect of the relatively 
limited resources that the British could devote to these efforts. Ferris did not address the 
Palestine front exclusively, nor did he specifically address operation maps or other modes of 
communicating intelligence. However, the extent of Ferris’s examination underscores the vital 
role of signals intelligence on the Palestine front. His emphasis on technology and its implication 
is in agreement with Sheffy (1994) but disputed somewhat by Roger Owen (2011). Also, Ferris 
presented insufficient analysis for the large amount of data transcribed in his book. As such, 
Ferris’s research presented an insufficiently detailed description of how the data gathered 
through wireless intercepts influenced and moved within the EEF. 
Another book devoted to a technical means of intelligence gathering was Peter Mead’s 
(1984) The Eye in the Air: History of Air Observation and Reconnaissance for the Army, 1785-
1945. Though broad in approach both historically and geographically, Mead brought valuable 
insight to the study of the development of aerial reconnaissance during World War I by 
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discussing the specific tactics, limitations, and organizations employed by the Royal Flying 
Corps (later the Royal Air Force). He addressed the Palestine front only briefly, choosing instead 
to focus on the larger aerial efforts in France. This shift in emphasis contrasts markedly with the 
large body of literature—much of it already discussed above—that has highlighted the major 
contributions of the EFF air component to the campaign. Like other writers, Mead looked largely 
at information at its point of capture, and did not follow it through the process of compilation, 
analysis, and communication. Nonetheless, his thorough descriptions of the RFC’s capabilities, 
tactics, and equipment have shaped the narrative about the contribution of aerial reconnaissance 
to intelligence-gathering in Palestine. My thesis compliments Mead’s research by describing in 
detail some of the ways that aerial reconnaissance contributed to the operational intelligence 
picture on this front. 
Michael Occleshaw’s (1989) Armour Against Fate: British Military Intelligence in the 
First World War was a more comprehensive treatment of British military intelligence-gathering. 
While Occleshaw sought to tell the story of military intelligence on all the British fronts of the 
war, his emphasis on the Palestine campaign indicated the importance and success of 
information-gathering there. Occleshaw devoted significant attention to some of the less 
technical methods for gathering tactical data, namely, trench raids and ground reconnaissance. 
He also relied very heavily on the diaries of an individual who was central to synthesizing 
cartography, military intelligence, and military operations in the EEF: the capable and 
fascinating Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen. Occleshaw’s book was refreshing in its emphasis on 
the inter-dependence of different forms of intelligence-gathering and also for its focus on human 
reconnaissance assets. Despite these strengths, it was a broad study that could not provide much 
detail about any one theater or technique. The operation maps were absent from his discussion, 
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though still obliquely addressed through his focus on Meinertzhagen, who was instrumental in 
their production. Overall, Occleshaw has given intelligence on the Palestine front a treatment 
second only to Sheffy (1998) in its comprehensiveness. 
Roger Owen, in a lecture given to the British Society on Middle Eastern Studies in 2011 
entitled “British and French Military Intelligence in Syria and Palestine, 1914-1918: Myths and 
Reality,” critiqued the historiography of this field by noting that the literature suffers from 
several dubious assumptions. For example, he charged that many scholars assume that the 
Turkish forces were inept at gathering intelligence and concealing their own activities, and that 
British intelligence in the Middle East was uniformly superior to that of its opponents. My own 
research indicates that these criticisms are valid. Owen also noted that the different groups of 
scholars who studied the Palestine campaign—cartographic historians, intelligence historians, 
and military historians—often did not read each other's work or publish in journals that scholars 
with similar interests were likely to read. In sum, he argued that the scholarship about the 
Palestine campaign—and its intelligence dimension in particular—is disjointed and suffers from 
inappropriate prejudices. While my thesis may not directly correct the latter concern, it does help 
to unify some of the inter-disciplinary scholarship about this campaign by treating the entire EEF 
as a cartographic system that gathered, analyzed, communicated, and used intelligence. 
Historiography 3: Military History of the Palestine Campaign 
 A comprehensive historiography of the military history of the Palestine campaign would 
be a massive undertaking far beyond the scope of this thesis. As such, I have chosen to highlight 
only a few examples of the large body of literature that has described this conflict.
1
 The 
historical narrative of the Palestine front was defined shortly after the end of the war in the 
lavishly heroic prose of Harry Pirie-Gordon’s (1919) history of the EEF’s campaign and 
                                                             
1 For a more comprehensive listing of military histories of the Palestine campaign that I have referenced, see Appendix A. 
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somewhat later in Archibald Wavell’s less overt and more academic examination; both likened 
the conflict to a modern-day crusade.
2
 This triumphal narrative went generally unchallenged 
until recent decades, when some scholars began to examine the British command’s conduct of 
the campaign with a more critical eye. In a competing narrative, other recent historical research 
has focused on telling the stories of the individual soldiers who participated in the campaign. My 
thesis contributes to the dialogue about the history of the Palestine campaign not by refuting one 
narrative or the other, but by clarifying what information was available to the British 
commanders and by unifying this knowledge with a detailed understanding of how information 
was gathered and transmitted. Furthermore, my thesis reveals how significantly the operation 
maps shaped the historical perceptions of how this conflict unfolded. 
 The historical narrative of the Palestine campaign began almost immediately after war’s 
conclusion with Pirie-Gordon’s (1919) history, A Brief Record Of The Advance Of The Egyptian 
Expeditionary Force Under The Command Of General Sir Edmund H. H. Allenby, July 1917 to 
October 1918. This work relied on official documents produced by the EEF to tell the 
chronological story of each of the army’s subordinate units. Similar to a school yearbook, each 
unit in the EEF was allocated pages that lauded their accomplishments with little criticism or 
analysis.
3
 One notable aspect of this book was that it was the first to use copies of the 7
th
 FSC’s 
operation maps as a visual aids to organize the narrative. These maps in Pirie-Gordon’s book are 
unmistakably reproductions of the original operation maps, though they have been modified to 
show slightly more detail, including the locations of British and Turkish airfields and artillery 
positions. Although Pirie-Gordon set the tone for the romantic narrative that would dominate 
                                                             
2 The first edition of Wavell’s book was published in 1928. I have referenced the third and final edition, published in 1938. 
3 Pirie-Gordon’s book was not intended to be an academic history. It was printed by the Palestine News, the internal newspaper 
of the EEF, for distribution as a memento to the participants of the Palestine campaign. However, nearly every subsequent history 
of the campaign has cited this book as a major source. 
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histories of this campaign in the coming decades, he was the first to demonstrate the historical 
value of the operation maps by reproducing them in his literature. 
 Wavell, a British historian and officer
4
 who served on General Allenby’s staff, penned a 
more balanced and scholarly history of the campaign. The Palestine Campaigns (1938) fostered 
the romantic narrative by lauding the abilities of Allenby and praising the pluckiness of the 
EEF’s Turkish and German opponents. Wavell relied upon the operation maps as well to aid his 
narrative of the campaign, though he approached them with more skepticism than Pirie-Gordon. 
Wavell was an admirer of Allenby and was also his official biographer (Allenby: A Study in 
Greatness, 1940), and while his research was thorough, it was also presented through the lens of 
a romantic crusade to reach the Holy Land. Wavell often ignored or explained away mistakes 
committed by the British side rather than attempting to understand them. Even so, his 
comprehensive history of the Palestine Front defined the field for future scholarship. While his 
analysis of the campaign may have been biased, his facts were thorough and reliable. 
 In more recent years, the historical narrative of Allenby’s Palestine offensives has drawn 
more critical attention, though his ultimate success relative to other World War I generals is hard 
to dismiss. These scholars wondered why Allenby was not in fact more successful, given the 
circumstances. In one example of this more critical approach, Geronimo Nuno published a book 
in 2012, Incomplete Victory: General Allenby and Mission Command In Palestine, 1917-1918, 
that charged previous historians with perpetuating a “mythology” regarding the narrative of this 
campaign. Nuno argued that the EEF’s flawed performance in the 3rd Battle of Gaza allowed the 
Turkish forces to escape to fight another day. He devoted great detail to analyzing the mistakes 
made by Allenby and the EEF’s commanders, though he was less thorough in explaining why 
                                                             
4 Wavell’s military career was long and distinguished. In World War II he attained the rank of Field Marshal and served as the 
British commander-in-chief of the North Africa theater against the Germans and then of the India theater fighting the Japanese. 
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they acted as they did. My research explains the validity of some of Nuno’s assertions by 
highlighting how some inaccurate editions of the operation maps informed poor decision-making 
at the EEF GHQ. Nuno also argued that the officers of the EEF were adept at learning from their 
failures during the campaign, another conclusion that confirms my research.     
 Finally, another narrative has focused on the experience of ordinary British soldiers on 
the Palestine front. Exemplars of this theme are David R. Woodward’s (2006) book Hell in the 
Holy Land: World War I in the Middle East, and Edward Woodfin’s (2012) Camp and Combat 
on the Sinai and Palestine Front. Woodward (2006) and Woodfin (2012) recounted the stories of 
individual soldiers by describing diverse experiences like leave taken in Cairo, training, combat, 
and the difficulties of desert marches and malaria. While these books and others like them are 
not directly related to the 7
th
 FSC’s operation maps, such ground-level narratives are important to 
my thesis because they help to flesh out the actual procedures by which information was gained 
and communicated within the EEF. In my research I found that such information was vital to 
understanding how intelligence flowed up the chain of command in the form of raw data and 
reports and then back down the chain of command as operation maps. 
The Operation Maps in the Context of World War I Cartography 
 Existing research indicates that the 7
th
 FSC operation maps were distinct and under-
studied products and shows that operational level mapping in general is an overlooked topic 
within the history of World War I cartography. Mostly, scholarship in this area has consisted of 
technical studies regarding how the various belligerents surveyed terrain to create more accurate 
maps. This is certainly true for Gavish and Biger, and to an extent for Collier as well. The 
surveying for these maps was a strategic activity, but the uses for the resulting products were 
usually for tactical trench maps and artillery maps. Peter Chasseaud (2013) exemplified this 
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dichotomy in his book Mapping the First World War. This book contained numerous facsimiles 
of these scientifically surveyed maps and demonstrated the tactical uses to which they were put. 
Despite the book’s title, Chasseaud wrote very little about the process of mapmaking but chose 
instead to use the maps as a narrative vehicle to tell a broad military history of the war, limiting 
the book’s utility for my research. In his other work, Chasseaud continued to emphasize the 
tactical level of cartography, as exemplified by his 1998 atlas of British trench maps on the 
Western Front, Topography of Armageddon. 
  Research about operational level mapmaking is conspicuously absent from World War I 
cartographic scholarship, with the exception of Collier’s (2008) article. Chasseaud’s (2013) book 
contains some excellent reproductions of both the 7th FSC’s operation maps and similar 
operational level maps produced by the British on the Western front, but no analysis about how 
these maps were produced and used. Such analysis would be useful, as the similar “order of 
battle” or “situation” maps that were produced on the Western front seem to be the products most 
closely related to the 7th FSC’s operation maps, although even these maps were distinct in 
content and form from those produced in Palestine (Chasseaud 2013, 107, 170, 182, 229, 240, 
and 243). My thesis begins to fill this gap in the scholarship by focusing on operational level 
products and analyzing how they were produced and used. Research into similar products in 
France would help to round out the field of World War I cartography by ensuring that the maps 
serving all three levels of war-making received study.   
 While my thesis is set squarely in the history of cartography, its subject matter also falls 
at the intersection of two other historical sub-fields: the history of military intelligence and 
operational military history. The scholars who have studied these intersecting subjects have 
significantly influenced the direction, structure, and content of my research. The operation maps 
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were cartographic products, but their symbols represented intelligence gathered from numerous 
sources. Furthermore, these maps were not simply filed away once they were printed. They 
influenced the decision-making of high-level commanders in the EEF and thus helped shaped the 
course of the Palestine campaign. The bearing of these diverse fields upon my thesis convinced 
me of the need for a conceptual framework that combined these various factors. I found this 
structure in David Woodward’s (1974) suggested framework for studying the history of 
cartography, as I will relate in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3. Research Methodology: Conceptual Frameworks and Archival Sources 
My research for this thesis follows a three-part model, namely, the development of a conceptual 
framework (Chapter 3), the use of this framework to organize my data-gathering (Chapter 4), and 
finally the subsequent analysis of those data (Chapter 5). To develop a conceptual model for 
examining the production, purpose, and use of the EEF’s operation maps I relied heavily on 
David Woodward’s (1974) framework for the ordering of cartographic history. I used this 
framework to organize my data, which were gathered from primary documents located in various 
archives, into a lens appropriate for answering my research questions. I chose to view the entire 
EEF as a cartographic system along the lines suggested by Woodward in relation to the 
production of the operation maps. To do this I first searched for archival sources that would 
allow me to modify Woodward’s framework, making it specific to the structure and function of 
the EEF organization. Second, using this modification of Woodward’s matrix I searched for 
further data showing how this cartographic system functioned to produce and use the operation 
maps. Third, to analyze my data I employed a process of multiple working hypotheses—a 
concept advanced by Thomas C. Chamberlin in 1890—to try to determine which sources of 
information prompted EEF intelligence officers to change the locations and designations of 
enemy units on the operation maps. The sources for each of these steps were largely the same 
documents within the British National Archives and the Imperial War Museum archives, though 
I gleaned different information from them for each task.  
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Figure 3.1. David Woodward’s suggested cartographic framework for the study of the history of cartography (Woodward 1974, 
103). 
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Figure 3.2. Woodward’s framework modified to reflect the structure of the EEF cartographic system. 
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Conceptual Framework: Woodward’s Cartographic System 
 In developing a conceptual framework to examine the EEF’s operation maps, I chose to 
employ the matrix suggested by David Woodward for examining cartographic history. In his 
landmark (1974) article in The American Cartographer, Woodward outlined a structure that 
divides cartographic systems into vertical columns differentiating production elements from their 
products and into horizontal rows for the different sequential phases of map production. This 
structure distinguishes between and combines the form and content of maps (Edney 2005, 23). 
Woodward subdivided the production column to differentiate between the personnel, techniques, 
and tools employed in each phase of the cartographic system (Figure 3.1). Furthermore, this 
model is cyclical, both internally and externally, insofar as the product of each phase provides 
the foundation for the production process of the succeeding phase, and the final map product 
spurs further information-gathering to begin the whole process anew.   
Woodward and his framework have been undeniably influential within the history of 
cartography, in large part because the framework brings together the study of the map production 
process and the study of the map as a historical artifact (Edney 2005, 20). As this paper attempts 
to accomplish both of these tasks in the case of the EEF operation maps, I found this framework 
well-suited to my research. But despite its wider relevance, a cursory survey of studies that cite 
Woodward reveals that few scholars have rigorously applied his framework. A notable exception 
is Lydia Pulsipher’s (1987) article examining a 1673 map of the Caribbean island of Montserrat 
that uses many parts of the framework, though in general Woodward’s 1974 article is cited for 
his broader influence on cartographic thought (Edney 2005, 23). Jeremy Crampton in his book 
The Political Mapping of Cyberspace indicates one possible criticism of Woodward’s framework 
by noting that a focus on the map and its content can ignore how the map was ultimately used, a 
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criticism echoed by Edney (Crampton 2003, 61; Edney 2005, 20). This criticism is particularly 
relevant to my research insofar as the end use of the operation maps is an important subject of 
my inquiry and in some instances might have differed from their originally intended purpose. 
Even so, the cyclical operation mapping process and its daily feedback that is evidenced in the 
related records overrides Crampton’s complaints because this cycle allowed me to reconstruct 
how the operation maps were used. Furthermore, as I will discuss further in my findings, 
Woodward’s framework is a highly relevant and under-utilized analytical tool for examining the 
broader cartography conducted by military organizations.    
 Specific to this project, I found Woodward’s framework to be a valuable tool for focusing 
my examination of the EEF for several reasons, not least of which was that the EEF contained 
units that conducted each of the roles in this model. The creation of the operation maps was itself 
a cyclical process, as the evidence indicates that each day’s map influenced the operations of the 
following day and therefore the information gathered and plotted on the subsequent maps. 
However, I felt the need to modify Woodward’s table in content though not in structure to reflect 
the specific organization, mission, and function of the EEF (Figure 3.2). By examining the 
organizational charts and rosters of the EEF and its daily GHQ and subordinate unit intelligence 
summaries and war diaries, I was able to replace the generic elements of the matrix with specific 
military analogues. I will re-visit the process for creating this framework in greater detail in 
Chapter 4, but for now suffice it to say that the framework led me to examine processes that I 
would otherwise have ignored, including—for example—how quickly and by what means 
gathered information was transmitted from the intelligence-gathering elements of the EEF to the 
information-processing elements, how the information was analyzed and negotiated at the GHQ 
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staff level, and by what means the information analysis was transmitted back to the operational 
units in the form of finished operations maps. 
Archival Sources: Maps, Unit Records, and Personal Papers  
 The documents I examined also fall generally into three categories: 1) the operation maps 
themselves as well as other maps produced by various sub-units of the EEF, 2) unit war diaries 
and intelligence reports from the EEF General Headquarters (GHQ) and its subordinate units, 
and 3) the personal diaries, papers, and correspondence of key individuals within the EEF who 
participated in various ways in the production of the operation maps. The original operation 
maps and other official unit records from the EEF are located in the War Office collections of the 
British National Archives at Kew, while the personal papers of individuals connected to this 
subject are mostly located in the Imperial War Museum archives in London, with some located 
in various other archives in the United Kingdom. During the data-gathering phase of my 
research, I found Arn Keeling and John Sandlos’s (2011) article on the use of technology and 
electronic media to aid and enhance archival research to be particularly helpful given the large 
volume of documents I needed to examine.  
 As Keeling and Sandlos suggest, I was able to digitally capture a very large number of 
relevant documents while in the archives because I had laid the groundwork before ever arriving 
in the United Kingdom. Using Microsoft Excel, I organized the preliminary targets of my 
research into tables that could be cross-referenced by location in the EEF order of battle, 
academic citation, and address within the archives. I also organized folders on my computer to 
reflect the hierarchy of the EEF’s units and personnel whose documents I would pursue. During 
my time in the archives, I regularly added the photographs of original documents that had I 
captured into these folders. Furthermore, I thoroughly prepared my equipment before I arrived, 
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with the result that my time in the archives was streamlined and my data was thoroughly 
organized before I departed. 
 
Figure 3.3. The relative land coverage of the four different base maps employed by the EEF cartographers to print the operation 
maps. 
Operation Maps and Other Maps 
 As stated above, the historical documents relevant to the creation of the EEF operation 
maps are largely located in two archives in the United Kingdom—the National Archives and the 
Imperial War Museum archives—with some related personal papers located individually in other 
collections. I find it useful to divide these documents into three general categories based on the 
content and function of the manuscripts. The first category contains the original operation maps. 
A complete series of the original editions of the operation maps is located at the National 
Archives in Kew in the collections WO 153/1035/2 and WO 153/1035/3, as well as WO 
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153/1041. I began my research here by thoroughly examining and photographing each map. This 
examination by itself yielded several interesting indications about how the maps were both 
produced and used. Interestingly, I also found original editions of the operation maps in several 
official unit records and in the private papers of several individuals. This pattern of distribution 
gave me clues as to the distribution and purpose of the maps. 
 The EEF cartographers employed four different base line maps at different times during 
the operation mapping process.  The initial base map was a 1:100,000 line map of the area of 
southern Palestine encompassing the Gaza-Beersheba position (Figure 3.3). The scale and extent 
of this map was appropriate for the opening phase of the battle and also effective in allowing the 
British cartographers to mark unit positions without undue crowding or graphic interference. 
However, by 7 November much of the important activity on the ground was beginning to occur 
beyond the northern and eastern edges of terrain represented by these maps. To compensate for 
this fact, the EEF intelligence staff substituted a 1:250,000 scale base map on 9 and 10 
November that covered a far greater extent of the Palestine theater and showed somewhat more 
detail of the physical and cultural terrain. Given that the British could only locate a small number 
of Turkish units during this time and that the number of British units moving forward in pursuit 
was limited for logistical reasons, the smaller scale of the map did not seem to present any 
problems in terms of crowded unit symbols. However, these maps also provided coverage for 
large areas in the south and east that were irrelevant to the ongoing operations. Accordingly, on 
11 November the EEF staff adopted a 1:168,960 scale base map that covered a more appropriate 
range of terrain and seems to have been a good compromise between scale and coverage. Even 
so, this base map would only be in service through 14 November, at which point both the form 
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and function of the operation maps changed with the introduction of a 1:500,000 scale map 
significantly smaller than each of the previous charts. 
 The 7
the 
FSC’s 1917 series of operation map can be organized into three distinct groups 
that correspond to the operational phases of the 3
rd
 Battle of Gaza (see Chapter 1). In the initial 
assault phase the maps were reasonably complete and accurate because the static operations of 
the preceding months had allowed the EEF to gather large amounts of intelligence about the 
Turkish deployments. These editions were printed on the 1:100:000 scale base maps. In the 
second phase of mobile operations, however, the operation maps were characterized by 
incompleteness and inaccuracies as the British intelligence officers struggled to gather and 
synthesize data quickly enough to keep pace with the movements of the opposing forces. These 
editions encompassed those maps printed on the 1:250,000 scale and 1:168,960 scale base maps. 
In the third phase, the EEF cartographers attempted to reestablish an organized picture of the 
front lines using the 1:500,000 scale base map.  
 The operation maps themselves are interesting both in what they show and in what they 
omit. In some respects the maps are simplistic in the extreme. The base outline maps for all of 
the three sets depicted a very selective and limited set of terrain features—towns, major wadis, 
and the front trace of major fortification systems—and did not depict any relief. Each was 
annotated along the lower margin, indicating that the map represented the situation as known by 
GHQ at 6pm on the date of the map’s publication (Figure 3.4) though some interesting 
exceptions to this timeline exist, including a series of preliminary working maps and one other 
map depicting the situation at 2am on 13 November instead of 6pm on the previous day. For 
operational information, the maps showed the known or suspected locations of both Turkish and 
British cavalry and infantry units at the brigade level as well as the location of division, corps, 
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and army headquarters. Not depicted were artillery and logistical units, though some symbols 
appear representing tents and shelters or other indications that large bodies of troops were 
observed in a particular location. While the symbols employed to depict unit locations were 
largely standardized, the officers preparing the maps frequently made effective use of attenuation 
symbols such as question marks and hollow boxes. These officers also cleverly manipulated the 
traditional box unit symbols to communicate uncertainty or confusion regarding the actual 
conditions on the ground. In another technique, the EEF cartographers annotated the map 
margins and some map symbols to indicate either that a unit was known to be in the theater but 
had not yet been located or to clarify some detail regarding a unit already depicted. I will 
describe these techniques in detail in Chapter 5. 
 
Figure 3.4. A facsimile of the bottom edge of the 6 November operation map. All of the operation maps were annotated in this 
way. Note the prominence of the scale, time, and date information, and that the time and date are in red to differentiate the map 
from other editions (TNA WO 153/1035/2). 
 Also located in these collections are other small-scale maps covering the terrain of the 
Palestine Theater from Sinai to Anatolia along with very simple concept maps communicating 
the British plans for deploying into their assault positions prior to the commencement of the 
attack. Many of the unit war diaries and intelligence summaries I examined also contained their 
own maps that communicated information as varied as plans for machine-gun barrages and 
circuit diagrams for the laying of communications wire. These charts were useful to my research 
in a complimentary role because they usually depicted information that the operation maps 
ignored, thereby providing further clues as to the specific purpose of the operation maps. 
 Taken together, the operation maps form the foundation and core of my investigation into 
their creation, purpose, and use. Taking into account what the maps depict—and what they do 
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not—provided me with strong initial indications both about what sources of information 
informed them and about what the ultimate purpose of these maps was. The changing format of 
the maps also indicated an evolution of purpose, particularly the shift from the second to the 
third set of maps that suggested, as Peter Collier (2008) has noted, that they might have taken on 
more of a historical rather than operational role at this point of the campaign. However, to really 
understand these maps requires a thorough investigation of other documents—official and 
personal—that illuminate the processes and people that created and used them. 
Intelligence Summaries and Unit War Diaries 
 After examining the original operation maps, I next focused my efforts on the second 
category of archival documents: the daily intelligence summaries created by the EEF GHQ and 
its subordinate Corps headquarters, and the unit war diaries kept by every unit in the force, 
sometimes down to the company level.
1
 The relevant EEF GHQ intelligence summaries are 
located in the National Archives in the collections WO 157/717 (July 1917) through WO 
157/722 (December 1917), while most of the unit war diaries are located in the ‘World War I 
Egypt and Palestine’ portions of the WO 95 collections, except for the war diaries of the Royal 
Flying Corps units, the records of which reside in the AIR 1/2210/209/26/2 collection. Both of 
these types of documents—intelligence summaries and war diaries—were sufficiently similar to 
have been recorded on the same official government form, Army Form C. 2118, which gave the 
recorder the option of crossing out either ‘WAR DIARY’ or ‘INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY’ at 
the top to designate which role the form is serving. These forms consisted of columns to the left 
of the page for the entry of the place, date, and time of the record, a large space for its substance, 
and another column on the right edge of the page for further remarks (Figure 3.5). These forms, 
                                                             
1 The military unit hierarchy of both the EEF and the Turkish army, from largest to smallest, was: army (or force), corps, 
division, regiment (or brigade), battalion (or squadron), company (or troop).  
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usually filled out in neat cursive script using pencils, provided a vehicle for intelligence officers 
and unit recorders to efficiently organize and record information about daily events. 
 
Figure 3.5. British Army Form C.2118. This form was used by staff officers top record intelligence summaries and war diaries 
(note the interchangeable titles at top). This particular facsimile also shows an example of the hand-drawn identification tables 
used by the EEF intelligence officers to organize their data and analysis (TNA WO 157/720). 
 
 Of these two kinds of documents, the EEF’s intelligence summaries were the most 
immediately connected to the operation maps. EEF GHQ intelligence staff produced these 
summaries daily, as did the subordinate headquarters of XX Corps, XXI Corps, and Desert 
Mounted Corps. These headquarters frequently shared intelligence, though which direction the 
information flowed was not always clear from the records. These summaries represent a 
compilation of intelligence about enemy forces and terrain gathered from various sources and 
these sources could be either within the EEF or external to it. The entries in the intelligence 
summaries contained information about enemy units as far from the Palestine front as the Balkan 
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and the Caucasus fronts, though the focus was on subjects of more immediate importance to 
southern Palestine.  
The most useful entries in these summaries proved to be the standardized identification 
tables that appeared regularly, particularly in the GHQ summaries (Figure 3.5). These (usually 
hand-drawn) tables displayed newly-arrived information about enemy units that had been located 
or otherwise identified, noting the unit’s designation, the effective date of the report identifying 
the unit, and—crucially—the source of the information, along with other details pertinent to the 
subject unit. More common entries, however, took the form of a daily narrative that described 
observations made by elements within the EEF. The subjects of these observations included a 
wide variety of topics, including fresh work sighted on enemy fortifications, tallies of enemy 
tents and shelters (T&S in short hand), and direct observation of or contact with enemy troops. 
The sources for these reports were sometime stated explicitly, but more often needed to be 
deduced from the type of information they provided. Overall, these intelligence summaries 
served my research in the same way they originally served the EEF command: as a one-stop 
clearing house for data about enemy positions and movements. Both of the formats—
identification tables and daily narratives—often linked directly to unit positions and 
identifications on the daily operation maps.  
 While the intelligence summaries provided me with data on what the EEF intelligence 
staff knew and when they knew it, the unit war diaries provided data on how the force gained 
much of this information. These diaries—daily logs of the unit activities from the corps down to 
the company level—were produced in narrative form with greater detail generally recorded by 
larger formations. War diary entries at the corps level sometimes ran several typed pages for a 
single day, while entries for a typical infantry battalion or signal company were often composed 
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of a single line of text describing several days’ activity. The details within the diaries also varied 
depending on what type of formation they recorded; infantry and cavalry units typically marked 
down significant troop movement or when and where they had made contact with enemy forces, 
while signal companies usually listed friendly units with which they could communicate and 
how many miles of telegraph cable they had laid. Also present in these documents—usually as 
appendices—were typed summaries of operations, statistics on enemy equipment and readiness, 
copies of daily orders and operation orders, and various maps illustrating concepts relevant to 
ongoing and planned activities. Taken together, these war diaries provide insight into the 
information-gathering and document-distribution stages of the cartographic framework by 
recording many of the incidents—operations, patrols, enemy contact, desertions, raids—that 
produced the information that appeared in the intelligence summaries and eventually on the 
operation maps.  
Personal Papers 
 The third category of archival sources I examined were the personal papers of individuals 
who were directly or indirectly involved in the operation map production/product system. This 
category included the collections left by commanders and staff officers who served in the EEF. I 
selected which collections to pursue based on three separate searches. First, I searched for the 
records of individuals who had been cited by other scholars who have written about the operation 
maps. This search was by far the most fruitful and yielded the most relevant collections. Second, 
using the rosters of EEF officers and their positions in Pirie-Gordon’s A Brief Record of the 
Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force as a guide, I searched in the Imperial War 
Museum (IWM) archives for papers of individuals who served in the EEF GHQ or subordinate 
Corps GHQs during the relevant time period. These individuals would likely have participated in 
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some way in the operation map production process. This search produced only a few further 
records and these were not particularly fruitful in their content. Third, I searched both the IWM 
archives and published literature for individuals who could have been tangentially related to the 
operation maps, either in the various modes of information gathering or in the maps’ use, 
including pilots, artillery officers, and other people with more narrow technical or tactical roles 
within the EEF. This line of inquiry produced several interesting collections that provided insight 
into the details of how various organizations within the EEF functioned and interacted with 
others. Overall, while the volume of data I gathered from all three of these inquiries was small 
compared to the official records located in the National Archives, the relevance of specific pieces 
of information contained in these papers proved to be vital to my understanding of this subject 
and to the conclusions I have drawn in this thesis. In the following paragraphs I will discuss the 
role several of the most relevant collections played in my research and argument. 
 No examination of any subject related to intelligence in the EEF would be complete 
without relying in some way on the diaries of Major (later Colonel) Richard Meinertzhagen. A 
capable, innovative, and free-thinking officer of impressive initiative, Meinertzhagen served in 
an intelligence role with British forces in East Africa and France prior to joining the EEF 
intelligence staff in May, 1917. One of three General Staff Officers, 2nd Grade (I) assigned to 
Allenby’s staff, he would develop and execute one of the more innovative and personally 
audacious deception operations of World War I when, prior to the 3rd Battle of Gaza, he filled a 
knapsack with false plans for a British frontal assault on the Gaza defenses, along with other 
items to make the knapsack appear authentic, and arranged for himself to be pursued by a 
Turkish patrol. This enemy patrol in due course captured the knapsack (but not Meinertzhagen). 
This coup helped to shift the Turkish command’s attention away from the location of the real 
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initial assault on Beersheba.
2
 More relevant to this project, however, was Meinertzhagen’s direct 
involvement in the operation mapping process as noted both in his personal diaries and in the 
records of the 7th FSC (Meinertzhagen 1960, 225; Maule 1919, 6). Additionally, as Peter Collier 
noted, Meinertzhagen himself must have believed these maps were important, as he included a 
complete copy of them in his diaries and personal papers, which now reside at Rhodes House at 
Oxford University (Collier 2008, 11). Meinertzhagen published portions of his personal diaries 
as several books, with his Army Diary (1960) containing the entries relevant to this project. In 
addition to his direct role in the operation mapping process, a disagreement regarding these maps 
between Meinertzhagen and his supervisor, Guy Dawnay, which is recorded in Meinertzhagen’s 
diary, provides key insights to the internal workings of the EEF intelligence staff as well as clues 
to the operation maps’ purpose and use. I will return to this specific incident in detail in Chapter 
4. 
 In recent years several scholars have called into question the veracity of portions of 
Meinertzhagen’s diaries, noting that some details do not match other corresponding records and 
other passages appear to have been revised at later dates (Collier 2008, 11). I noted some of these 
inconsistencies in my own project, but I was also able to verify the details relevant to my 
research through numerous other sources. Additionally, I would note that whatever 
inconsistencies may be present in his diaries, Meinertzhagen was undeniably an individual of 
impressive intelligence and ability, as evidenced both by his performance during the war and by 
praise from his contemporaries. As such, I have treated his papers as key and reliable parts of my 
research, though I did devote extra effort to triangulate passages important to my argument. 
                                                             
2
 Meinertzhagen later discovered that the Turkish officers in the opposing army had been skeptical of his ruse, but 
the German officers had believed the false information was in fact true and convinced their Turkish counterparts to 
act accordingly (Meinertzhagen 1917, Vol. 20, 38). 
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  The papers of Brigadier General Guy P. Dawnay are of similar importance to those of 
Meinertzhagen. Dawnay, in his role as Brigadier General, General Staff (BGGS)
3
, was the direct 
supervisor of the GHQ staff officers who processed the intelligence that appears as graphics on 
the operation maps. While his papers do not contain any direct references to these maps, they do 
provide insight into the internal workings of Allenby’s staff. Interestingly as well, Dawnay’s 
papers, located in the IWM archives, contain original copies of the operation maps, indicating 
that he too considered them to be important in some way. Additionally, Dawnay’s diaries 
recorded his personal relationship with the commander of the British XX Corps, Major General 
Sir (later Lord) Philip Chetwode. These diary entries provided evidence corroborating some of 
the conclusions I have drawn from Meinertzhagen’s papers about the role of the operation maps 
within the EEF command. 
 Besides these two key collections, several others provided helpful data about the 
operations maps, their relevant intelligence, and GHQ and Corps headquarters functions. These 
included the papers of the already-mentioned Lord Chetwode, as well as the collections of Major 
General Sir Arthur Lynden-Bell, Chief of Staff of the EEF until September, 1917, and Captain 
Gerard Clauson, who helped coordinate British wireless intelligence activities across the Middle 
East, all of which are located in the IWM archives. Furthermore, the papers of Major General Sir 
Steuart Hare, commander of the British 54th Division, and Major V.H. Bailey, an artillery officer 
and adjutant, also located in the IWM archives, provided data regarding how the EEF both 
gathered and transmitted raw information to the GHQ. Aces and Kings (1936), the thoroughly 
enjoyable published first-hand account of the Royal Flying Corps in Palestine by Australian flier 
                                                             
3 The BGGS served as the GHQ’s chief of staff, though in the case of an organization as large as the EEF this position was 
subordinate to an officially designated chief of staff of higher rank. In the case of the EEF, Allenby’s chief of staff was Major 
General L.J Bols. The role of both the BGGS and chief of staff was to manage that staff and ensure that they were operating 
according to the commander’s intent. 
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L.W. Sutherland, also provided important information in the form of a narrative account of the 
RFC’s photo processing and communication systems.  
Even so, many of the individuals who played key roles in the Palestine campaign and 
who would have had a direct hand in one aspect or another of the operation map system, 
including Allenby, his chief of staff Major General L.J. Bols, and various other commanders and 
staff officers, left behind collections that contain only sparse information or failed to leave any 
papers at all. Despite these gaps in the historical record, the original operations maps and the 
EEF’s intelligence summaries and war diaries provided the muscle for the story of operation 
maps, and these personal accounts that are present provided the texture and very often the vital 
connective tissue, helping me to piece together not just the dry theoretical concepts of how the 
EEF was supposed to have functioned, but also the rich human story of how it actually did. 
Analyzing the Data Using Multiple Hypotheses 
 Having organized the EEF into a cartographic system according to Woodward’s 
framework and having used this lens to gather my data, I next analyzed these data by further 
using Woodward’s model in conjunction with Chamberlin’s (1890) concept of multiple working 
hypotheses to explore how this cartographic system functioned to produce each of the individual 
operation maps. Chamberlin, a giant of American geology, argued that complex problems could 
be explored more efficiently if researchers checked their data against multiple well-defined 
models rather than against a single hypothesis.  To apply this method to my own research I 
searched relevant primary documents for evidence of why a particular Turkish or British unit 
symbol appeared, moved, or disappeared on each consecutive edition of the maps. I then checked 
the information’s content and source against one of six well-defined but not mutually-exclusive 
explanations. This allowed me to rapidly and efficiently deduce the reasons for many of the 
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changes that appeared on the consecutive maps and to make high-confidence guesses on most of 
the rest.  
 As scholars in other fields have noted, the multiple-hypotheses method is not without 
drawbacks and detractors. Ned A. Dochtermann and Stephen H. Jenkins argue in an article in 
Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology that this method can sometimes lead to delays in accepting 
a single, well-founded and supported explanation (Dochtermann and Jenkins 2011, 38-39). 
Naomi Oreskes argued in her book The Rejection of Continental Drift: Theory and Method in 
American Earth Science that such a delay occurred when US scientists were slow to accept the 
theories of Alfred Wegener (Oreskes 1999, 69, 308).
4
 The same concern arose in my own 
research as some unit moves on the operation maps seemed to beg a quick acceptance of a 
simple and well-documented explanation in lieu of a search that checked every hypothesis before 
coming to a conclusion. In these cases I accepted the initial explanation but did not consider it 
final, instead remaining open to future revisions of my conclusion. Dochtermann and Jenkins 
also cautioned against treating complimentary hypotheses exclusively as alternatives to each 
other (Dochterman and Jenkins 2011, 40). This was a relevant consideration for my method, as 
each of my hypotheses could be complimentary to any of the others, and vice versa. In fact, 
particularly during the early stages of 3rd Gaza, EEF intelligence officers usually plotted unit 
positions based on intelligence from a combination of information sources rather than a from 
single report. Therefore, I did not treat any of my hypotheses as mutually exclusive but 
considered them to be complimentary. 
                                                             
4 Oreskes argued that geologists in the US in the early 20th century, including Chamberlin, were overly invested in their 
established competing geomorphic hypotheses and were slow to adapt their thinking to incorporate new forms of data that that 
were incompatible with these theories but that supported Alfred Wegener’s Theory of Continental Drift. In short, the presence of 
so many competing theories drowned out, for a while, the best supported theory. 
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 In applying Chamberlin’s concept to this project I began with six parallel hypotheses for 
how each unit was both located and identified. These hypotheses postulated that the symbols on 
the operations maps represented units located and/or identified by one or a combination of 1) 
ground reconnaissance and contact, 2) prisoner and deserter statements, 3) aerial reconnaissance, 
4) signals intercepts, 5) agent networks, and 6) a combination of any of the previous (Figure 3.6). 
In determining what sources of information the symbols on the map represented, I found that the 
data located in the archival documents I examined were much less ambiguous on this subject 
than I had initially expected, allowing me to demonstrate direct links between specific 
information-gathering events and changes to the operation maps with high confidence. This 
approach allowed me to pursue each of the different explanations simultaneously and did not 
require me to settle on any single or mutually exclusive conclusions as to the sources of the map 
changes.  
 
 
Figure 3.6. My six working hypotheses for the sources of intelligence represented by the map symbols on the 7 th FSC operation 
maps. 
 
 A word here seems appropriate about the two complimentary types of information about 
units that the operation maps represented, namely their location and their identity. The parallel 
tasks of locating a unit—finding signs that a large body of troops and materiel were present at a 
specific location—and identifying a unit—gaining knowledge of its specific designation and 
place within the order of battle—generally fell to different information-gathering elements 
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within the EEF. The units conducting these tasks also changed with the proximity of the target 
unit to the front. For example, aerial reconnaissance and photography was highly useful in 
locating units—both friendly and enemy—particularly in the area near the front lines. However, 
this intelligence platform was nearly useless in identifying these same formations in the absence 
of information gathered from other sources. Similarly, agent networks could identify new enemy 
formations entering the theater, but the information they provided was generally too slow in 
arriving or too general to provide an accurate location of the target unit at the front. I therefore 
grouped the EEF’s information gathering organs into four categories based on their relative 
usefulness in locating or identifying units, and also by the scale—near or far from the front—at 
which they operated best (Figure 3.7). One fact that this table clearly illuminates is the 
importance of signal intercepts to all four quadrants of this intelligence gathering matrix.  
 
 
Figure 3.4: Table showing the type of information and scale at which the various sources of intelligence excelled.  
 
 This matrix is not without its drawbacks. For one, the units of scale (near and far) are 
ambiguous and apply differently to different information-gathering methods. The ‘near’ scale to 
an airplane conducting reconnaissance just behind the front may still be ‘far’ to a cavalry patrol 
attempting to observe the same location. In general, however, I defined ‘near’ to refer to the front 
itself and the rear areas of immediate impact on the front, while ‘far’ designates the units and 
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areas that would take days or weeks to influence the battle. Interestingly, the Royal Flying Corps 
(RFC), in organizing its reconnaissance missions, observed a similar division of scale, naming 
them ‘tactical’ (near) or ‘strategical’ (far) missions, and assigning different squadrons to 
specialize in each. Another drawback is that this table cannot by itself decipher the source of a 
certain piece of information, insofar as most of the intelligence sources appear in more than one 
quadrant.  
 Even so, this simple matrix helped to focus my investigation on the information-gatherers 
most likely to have provided the data leading to specific updates to unit locations on the 
operation maps. Some sources of information, particularly signal intercepts and statements 
provided by prisoners and deserters, were valuable across both scale and role. Additionally, some 
location changes appear to have been the result of intelligence reports from multiple sources, 
while others appear to have been the result of informed deduction or even guesswork. Some 
changes generated controversy between the intelligence officers responsible for the data 
represented on the maps. The usefulness of this matrix lies in how it allowed me to initially 
eliminate certain hypotheses about the sources of particular updates. For example, aerial 
reconnaissance would never be source of information identifying an enemy unit. Similarly, 
contact could not be the source of information for anything in the far scale as it required physical 
interaction between friendly and enemy elements. Overall, I applied these multiple hypotheses to 
explore and explain the progression of unit symbols across the 7th FSC’s operation maps by 
using the Woodward’s framework as a lens, as I will describe more fully in Chapter 5. 
Summary of Sources and Methods  
 The conceptual framework, research methods, and sources I employed for this thesis 
allowed me to gain a thorough understanding of how the EEF cartographic system gathered, 
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analyzed, and communicated information to create the operation maps of October, November, 
and December 1917. This in turn allowed me to make educated deductions about why these 
maps were created and how they were used. David Woodward’s cartographic framework was 
particularly useful as a tool for examining the self-contained cartographic system that any large 
military organization represents. This applicability of Woodward’s framework to broader studies 
of military cartography is a finding that I will return to in greater detail in my concluding 
chapter. Chamberlin’s multiple hypotheses method also proved appropriate given the clearly-
defined and possibly complimentary explanations that existed for the positions of unit symbols 
on the operations maps. The data I collected at the National Archives in Kew, the Imperial War 
Museum in London, and elsewhere, proved far richer and more relevant to my project than I had 
dared to hope, often allowing me to track a piece of information from its source, through its 
various modes of transmission and analysis, onto the operation map, and thence to influence 
further operations and information gathering. The following chapters describing my data 
collection and analysis will illustrate my reason for this stated enthusiasm. 
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Chapter 4. Using Woodward’s Framework to Gather and Analyze Data 
In this chapter I will describe in detail how I used the Woodward cartographic framework as a 
lens to analyze how the EEF as a system both produced and used the 7th FSC operation maps. 
To do this, I will first relate how I used archival material to modify Woodward’s generic model 
to reflect the specific structure of the EEF as a cartographic system. This initial analysis yielded 
interesting findings, both anticipated and unanticipated, and allowed me to answer one of my two 
research question: what was the purpose and use of the operation maps? My subsequent analysis 
of the operation maps in Chapter 5 then applies this modified framework in conjunction with 
Chamberlin’s multiple working hypotheses concept to answer my initial research question: what 
sources of intelligence do the various operation maps represent? In this chapter I will move 
through each sequential phase of Woodward’s framework and describe how I replaced his 
generic elements with the specific personnel, techniques, tools, and products of the EEF 
cartographic system.  
Altering Woodward’s Framework 
 As I related in Chapter 3, Woodward’s matrix depicted a generic system that occurs in 
four phases. The framework addressed both the production process and the resulting products of 
each of these phases. In the following section I will demonstrate how I used archival sources to 
replace the generic elements in each phase of Woodward’s framework with specific EEF 
analogues. In this process I relied on the scholarship of others who have written about 
cartography and intelligence in the EEF—particularly Collier, Sheffy, and Occleshaw—as well 
the same primary sources I subsequently employed to analyze the operation maps. This initial 
step of my analysis produced some interesting findings, not the least of which relates to the 
applicability of the Woodward framework to studying the history of military cartography. 
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Information-Gathering 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Information-gathering phase of Woodward’s cartographic framework modified to reflect specific elements of the 
EEF. 
 
 I began by examining how the EEF gathered the raw data that eventually became the 
estimates of friendly and enemy unit positions depicted on the operation maps. As John Keegan 
described in his book, Intelligence in War, the scope and value of military reconnaissance prior 
to World War I has been restricted by how far a person could see and how far and fast a courier 
could carry information once it had been gained (Keegan 2003, 5). Previously, military forces 
had been limited to sending scouts—usually cavalry—to within line of sight of an enemy force, 
sometimes resulting in combat or ‘contact.’ These scouts would then return and report their 
observations. These activities, which I collectively term ‘ground reconnaissance and contact,’ 
were supplemented by information gleaned from enemy prisoners and deserters and by 
intelligence provided by spies. The relatively small amount of useful information within the line 
of sight of a scout or spy as well as the slow rate at which these observations could be carried by 
a messenger precluded near-real-time estimates of enemy dispositions such as those that 
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appeared on the operation maps and limited the utility of the information in general (Keegan 
2003, 5-6).
1
  
 By contrast, technological advances in the areas of communication and transportation 
prior to the outbreak of World War I combined to revolutionize how military organizations 
gathered information. The telegraph, and later—and of greater significance for information-
gathering—the radio, allowed information to be transmitted rapidly over long distances. These 
new media of communication opened new possibilities for intercepting messages. The range at 
which these messages could be intercepted (hundreds of miles in the case of radio) began to 
bring near-real-time intelligence within the grasp of military headquarters. In the realm of 
transportation, the proliferation of motor vehicles, and in particular aircraft, increased the speed 
at which scouts could travel and the scope of what they could see. Thus, signal intercepts or 
signals intelligence (SIGINT) and aerial reconnaissance joined the more traditional methods of 
intelligence-gathering and increased the scope of what a military force could see (Keegan 2003, 
102; Occleshaw 1989, 55-60). 
 Additionally, the nature of World War I land combat—a conflict characterized by siege 
warfare on a massive scale—in many cases altered the utility of traditional methods of 
reconnaissance. On a static front as existed before Gaza and Beersheba in late 1917, the value of 
information gleaned from prisoners and deserters, patrols, and even from an officer with a view 
of the enemy fortifications, increased because the information was less likely to change in the 
time it took to transmit the data to headquarters. However, the normal constraints on these forms 
of reconnaissance quickly reasserted themselves once the Gaza battle became more mobile 
(Occleshaw 1989, 79-92; Sheffy 2004, 148).  
                                                             
1 Interestingly, Keegan divides military intelligence gathering into a 5-phase operation that roughly mirrors the Woodward 
framework. His five phases are 1) Acquisition, 2) Delivery, 3) Acceptance, 4) Interpretation, and 5) Implementation (Keegan 
2003, 6). 
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 From this broad survey of military information-gathering during World War I, I drew 
both my specific techniques of production in the first phase of Woodward’s framework and each 
of my six working hypotheses as to the sources of intelligence represented by the unit symbols 
on the operation maps. These two lists are the same and consist of 1) signal intercepts, 2) aerial 
reconnaissance, 3) ground reconnaissance and contact, 4) prisoner and deserter interrogations, 
and 5) agent networks (my sixth hypothesis being a combination of two or more of these). Below 
I will describe in detail each of these information-gathering functions within the EEF system and 
the organizations that performed them. I will also describe their resultant products and how all of 
this fits into my modified version of Woodward’s cartographic framework. 
Signal Intercepts   
 The interception of Turkish and German electronic signals, specifically radio and 
telegraph messages, was of prime importance to the EEF information-gathering effort, so much 
so that radio intercepts were denoted by the code phrase “an absolutely reliable source” in 
intelligence summaries and other documents. This phrase was intended to conceal the source 
from spies and to highlight the fidelity of the information it provided.
2
 As others have already 
noted, messages on both sides of the conflict would have been enciphered or encoded under ideal 
circumstances (Occleshaw 1989, 110-114).
3
 These codes and ciphers were routinely 
compromised, making the messages encrypted with these systems readable by the enemy. The 
British in particular were successful in cracking nearly every Turkish code and cipher, a fact that 
                                                             
2 British officers used specific terms to denote and conceal wireless intercepts in their records during the course of the Palestine 
campaign. Intelligence summaries first referred to wireless intercepts as originating from “Agent X” or “Agent Y.” In the weeks 
leading up to Gaza offensive the term of choice was “an absolutely reliable source.” As the battle progressed the British 
intelligence summaries adopted the passive voice to denote wireless intercepts, using the preface of “there are indications that...” 
or “it is reported that...” before relating the content of an intercept. These terms indicated the importance the British placed on 
information gathered from wireless intercepts and their desire to conceal their reliance on this source from the enemy. However, 
these attempts appear somewhat ham-fisted as the contents of intercepted messages could realistically only come from wireless 
intercepts (Sheffy 2004, 252).  
3 Ciphers are the transposition of letters, numbers, or symbols for the purpose of encryption whereas codes rely on books 
available to the sender and recipient of preselected definitions for letter or number groups (Sheffy 2004, 228).    
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yielded a great deal of valuable intelligence to Allenby and his force (Ferris 1992, 11).
4
 
Additionally, encoding or enciphering wireless or telegraph messages could be a time-consuming 
and tedious process. Thus, many messages—particularly ones of tactical or immediate 
importance—were sent ‘in the clear,’ without any sort of encryption. This meant that any 
unintended recipient could read the message. Much of the most tactically relevant information 
would have been sent and intercepted ‘in the clear’ (Occleshaw 1989, 112-13).  
By late 1917 the EEF was well-served by a robust wireless intercept service with 
intercepting stations located in Cairo (with its receiver atop the Great Pyramid), Cyprus, and near 
the EEF GHQ at Bir Salem. These stations had the added ability—recently invented—to conduct 
direction-finding (D/F) operations. This meant that they could determine a line of bearing to the 
source of the transmission they were intercepting and these, when cross-referenced with 
intercepts from other stations, could begin to triangulate the location of the transmitter. These 
intercepting stations were augmented by the three wireless stations of the EEF Corps GHQs, by 
the station serving the Palestine Brigade RFC squadrons, and by Royal Navy ships in the 
Mediterranean and Red Seas. These were all further supplemented by the wider British and 
Entente wireless interception network stretching across the Mediterranean, the Balkans, and 
Mesopotamia. The interception effort for the EEF was coordinated from 1916 onwards by 
Captain Hugh Lefroy, who was responsible for the entire Middle East area. He was joined, 
starting on the eve of 3
rd
 Gaza, by Captain Gerard Clauson, who coordinated the cryptanalysis of 
the various intercepted messages (Sheffy 2004, 223-25, 230).  
Unfortunately, Lefroy either did not leave useful records of his activities or those records 
were suppressed by the British government in an effort to conceal the critical value of this 
                                                             
4 One code the British were never able to crack was the so-called “Yilderim code” used by the Turkish army’s Yilderim Force, a 
reserve army whose ultimate destination—Mesopotamia or Palestine—was of great interest to British intelligence during the 
Gaza offensive (Sheffy 2004, 229). 
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intelligence source. Clauson did leave papers, but his records address mostly the mathematical 
cracking of successive Turkish and German codes and ciphers and revealed little about the 
tactical or operational value of the intercepts themselves. Additionally, many of the intercepted 
messages have either been lost or suppressed (Ferris 1992, 254). This means, for the purpose of 
this project, the only useable records of these intercepted messages were their end result: entries 
in the EEF GHQ Intelligence summaries and enemy unit positions on the operation maps. These 
indirect records revealed both the unique capabilities of this information-gathering medium and 
also some of its limitations.  
Unlike other intelligence platforms, wireless intercepts could reveal both the location and 
identity of enemy units far from the front. They could also reveal much about the quality and size 
of these units in the form of intercepted reports sent by unit commanders. Furthermore, wireless 
intercepts could even reveal enemy intentions when a headquarters transmitted plans or orders to 
its subordinate formations. All of these kinds of data appeared in the EEF intelligence 
summaries, sometimes explicitly identified as coming from ‘an absolutely reliable source’ and at 
other times identifiable simply by the type of information recorded, as when the summary noted 
an enemy wireless station opening or closing in a certain location (see GHQ IS 3/10/17 and 
24/10/17 for examples). Other entries indicated that Turkish units down to a relatively low level 
(corps, or possibly division) appear to have used wireless sets to communicate and thus revealed 
information about both their location and identity (see map “Enemy W/T Stations in Syria and 
Palestine” in GHQ IS 4/10/17). These entries are frequent and often appear to be the sole source 
for unit positions on some of the operation maps. Thus, signal intelligence officers and the 
wireless intercept infrastructure of the EEF formed an important component of the information 
gathering process in my modified cartographic framework.  
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 Tapping into enemy telegraph lines was another method for intercepting enemy signals, 
though more difficult and of much more limited scope and utility than wireless signals. Field 
telephone lines—ever-present along the front to allow communication between units—could be 
tapped either by attaching a cable directly to a line above-ground or, in the case of buried cables, 
by listening through an electromagnetic coil placed against the ground to use the earth as a 
transmitter (Sheffy 2004, 245-46). While these techniques were common on the Western Front, 
the evidence in Palestine is far less certain. Some entries in the EEF intelligence diaries contain 
information that could very easily have been gathered from this source, but by and large this 
method of interception seems to have been relatively little employed by the EEF. However, 
because it was a source available to the EEF system, it could not be ignored; I included this 
method under the broader ‘signals intercept’ term. 
 The value of signal intercepts changed during the course of 3
rd
 Gaza and its aftermath 
based on the nature of the operations conducted by both armies and the terrain in which they 
were operating. As Sheffy notes, wireless intercepts allowed the British forces to correctly 
identify the headquarters of nearly every Turkish and German unit on the Gaza-Beersheba front 
line from early 1917 through the opening days of the battle (Sheffy 2004, 222). However, once 
the campaign entered its far more fluid pursuit phase, signal intercepts degraded significantly in 
quality. This seems to have been amplified by the fact that wireless intercepts were often the 
only source of information that EEF GHQ could reliably obtain during mobile operations (Sheffy 
2004, 242). The operation maps reveal many of the limitations of information received under 
these circumstances. These limitations included large gaps in knowledge about Turkish unit 
locations, misidentified Turkish units, and warnings on the maps about formations that never 
even entered Palestine (see operation maps of 3/11/17, 13/11/17, and others). However, wireless 
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intercepts do appear to have continuously provided information through all three phases of the 
battle whereas other sources sometimes dried up completely. Thus, while signal intercepts may 
not have been exactly ‘absolutely reliable,’ they were at least consistently available and could 
often provide the qualitative data about the enemy that other sources could not. They therefore 
deserve a prime place in the information gathering phase of the EEF cartographic system. 
Aerial Reconnaissance 
 By World War I, aircraft had, like electronic communications, emerged as a completely 
new and revolutionary vehicle by which to gather information by relieving much of the usual 
difficulty endured by earth-bound observers. A pilot and an observer in an airplane, because of 
increased speed and the advantage of altitude, could gather more information far more quickly 
than their terrestrial counterparts. By late 1917 the EEF was effectively positioned to benefit 
from these advantages in the coming campaign. EEF pilots, who had already begun to pioneer 
the use of aerial photography for accurate map-making, would now test the value of airplanes in 
providing up-to-date tactical and operational intelligence on a rapidly changing battlefield 
(Collier 1994, 100). The relevant intelligence summaries and war diaries illustrated both the 
advantages and limitations of this mode of information-gathering, demonstrating that this was 
not only the main—but often-times sole—source of information influencing the depiction of 
units on some editions of the operation maps. 
 By October 1917 the Royal Flying Corps in Palestine was effectively organized and well-
equipped for its reconnaissance tasks. The RFC command on the front, the Palestine Brigade, 
had recently been reinforced to a strength of two wings each consisting of two squadrons.
5
 The 
40
th
 (Army) Wing, with No. 111 Squadron and No. 67 Squadron (previously No. 1 Australian 
                                                             
5 A squadron usually contained twelve aircraft, but this number varied wildly depending on combat losses, maintenance, 
reinforcements, and any number of other factors. 
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squadron), was responsible for conducting ‘strategical’ or ‘far’ reconnaissance for the entire 
EEF. The 5
th
 (Corps) Wing supported the EEF’s two infantry corps with ‘tactical’ or ‘near’ 
reconnaissance mission conducted by No. 113 and No. 14 Squadrons (Sheffy 2004, 279). These 
units had been recently equipped with modern aircraft that allowed them to overcome the 
disadvantage during the previous months of having to evade superior German aircraft. These 
new machines allowed British observers to patrol the skies over the front with near impunity and 
prevented the German and Turkish pilots from gathering similar information about British 
positions and movements (Cutlack 1923, 48).      
 Both strategical and tactical missions usually flew twice daily with flights taking off in 
the early morning and early afternoon, weather-permitting (Cutlack 1923, 77; GHQ IS 15/11/17). 
Since stationary bodies of troops could easily evade aerial observation, both kinds of 
reconnaissance missions attempted to locate secondary evidence that ground forces were present 
in an area. Strategical missions typically covered the areas far behind the battle line, often as far 
as Jerusalem in the weeks leading up to the start of the offensive. These missions tried to locate 
troops and supply lines as they neared the front by focusing on railroad lines and transportation 
hubs. Tactical reconnaissance missions, by contrast, observed the front itself along with its 
immediate rear areas, reporting on moving groups of enemy soldiers, camps, fortifications, and 
railroad sidings. In addition, the tactical reconnaissance squadrons continued to provide 
photographic support to the 7
th
 FSC’s topographical mapping efforts (Cutlack 2009, 70).  
 The information these missions provided possessed advantages and disadvantages 
relative to other intelligence sources. They could observe enemy positions much farther from the 
front lines than ground reconnaissance missions could, and because the target of aerial 
reconnaissance could be directed and did not require enemy units to transmit a message or 
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perform some other act first, they could be used at will to verify reports obtained from other 
sources. On the other hand, aerial reconnaissance was unable to identify enemy units in the 
absence of other information because an airplane could never fly close enough to an enemy unit 
to see patches on uniforms or question its soldiers. Additionally stationary bodies of troops could 
hide themselves quite effectively from aerial observation with minimal effort even in open 
terrain by using local vegetation or even simply remaining still, which fact often seems to have 
caused gaps in or misinterpretation of data (Sheffy 2004, 283).  
Thus, aerial reconnaissance faced pitfalls similar to those that hampered wireless 
intelligence-gathering. The information these missions provided, while nearly always available, 
was often woefully incomplete and in many cases misleading, particularly when observations 
were used to determine enemy intentions. An example of such a misinterpretation occurred when 
the GHQ predicted incorrectly that Turkish forces would evacuate Jerusalem in mid-November 
based on aerial observations of troops moving north along the Schechem road (GHQ IS 
18/11/17). Despite these shortcomings, the flexibility and near-constant availability of aerial 
reconnaissance made it an indispensible information-gathering tool for the EEF, so much so that 
this source more than any other was responsible for the addition of unit symbols to the operation 
maps based on single reports or observations. As such, aerial reconnaissance was clearly a 
primary and vital information-gathering component of the EEF cartographic system.
6
     
Ground Reconnaissance and Contact    
  Historically the most traditional method of military reconnaissance was to send a ground 
force within close proximity of the enemy to observe and then report its observations, and so 
                                                             
6 One other component of aerial reconnaissance was No. 49 Balloon squadron, which arrived on the Palestine front prior to the 
opening of the Gaza offensive. Observers in tethered balloons could observe Turkish trenches and rear areas with more 
persistence than heavier-than-air craft, but were more vulnerable to weather and enemy fire. These appear to have been used 
more for artillery-direction than for information-gathering in Palestine (Collett 1917). 
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much the better if this force could seize a prisoner for questioning or capture important enemy 
documents. Though this age-old method of intelligence-gathering was vital during World War I, 
and remains so to the present, the unique conditions of the Great War amplified the utility of 
some techniques of ground reconnaissance and marginalized others. The large-scale siege 
warfare that occurred on every major front of the war also typified both the beginning and end of 
the 3
rd
 Gaza campaign. This context provided advantageous conditions for small-scale raids to 
gather intelligence and seize prisoners. Also, a static front allowed commanders and staff 
officers—who were normally dependent on patrols to act as their eyes—to find a particularly 
good vantage point within their own lines from which to personally observe the enemy’s 
trenches.  
 On the other hand, large systems of trenches limited traditional cavalry or infantry 
reconnaissance patrols by restricting their mobility and by hiding the targets of their 
reconnaissance. Finally, large combat operations, both offensive and defensive, always generated 
a great deal of information about enemy units’ location and identification. Perhaps no more 
concrete evidence of the presence of enemy troops exists than incoming fire, and dead or 
captured enemy soldiers provide the surest verification of their identity (Occleshaw 1989, 79-
80). Notably, the relative values of each of these techniques would shift significantly in the 
second phase of the Gaza campaign, when operations became far more fluid and mobile than the 
norm in this war. 
 Since the most basic technique of ground reconnaissance is the patrol, I will begin by 
describing how patrols functioned within the EEF system. Along stretches of the front where the 
opposing fortifications were in close proximity—most notably before Gaza—both armies sent 
patrols into the ‘no-man’s-land’ between the lines. These patrols could consist of work parties to 
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improve or repair wire entanglements or clear fields of fire, small listening posts to give early 
warning of an enemy attack, squads sent out to observe a particular feature in the enemy’s line, 
or counter-patrols to interfere with enemy efforts. All of these operated almost exclusively at 
night, as in daylight the soldiers performing these tasked would have been exposed to fire from 
the trenches. These missions would frequently encounter enemy patrols conducting similar tasks 
or observe enemy fortifications from close range, providing clues as to how heavily held a 
particular stretch of front might be or the locations of key weapons along the line (see “Tank 
Redoubt” in 52nd Division WD 24/7/17). 
 Further east from Gaza, where the British and Turkish lines were increasingly distant 
from each other, the techniques for reconnaissance became less routine and more formalized, 
consisting of large patrols of cavalry that could move with relative freedom in areas between the 
lines. Assisting this mobility was the fact that many portions of the front between Gaza and 
Beersheba were lightly held by both sides. The EEF was a cavalry heavy force, with three of its 
ten divisions (the Australian, ANZAC, and Yeomanry Mounted Divisions) and one of its three 
corps (the Desert Mounted Corps) composed almost entirely of mounted troops, in addition to 
the cavalry squadrons automatically assigned to each of the infantry divisions. In a time when 
motorized transport was relatively scarce and lacked effective cross-country mobility, these 
horse soldiers provided the primary means for conducting mobile long-range ground 
reconnaissance. The EEF war diaries and intelligence summaries in the weeks and months 
leading up to the Gaza offensive revealed a lively tempo of skirmishes between patrols from EEF 
cavalry units and their Turkish counterparts along the eastern part of the front towards 
Beersheba, and EEF cavalry patrols were frequently sent out to gain specific information about 
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topics ranging from the location of wells to the extent of Turkish fortifications at a particular 
section of front (AMD WD 27/10/17; ANZAC WD 13/12/17).  
 Both the EEF war diaries and numerous personal collections, including those of Major 
V.H. Bailey and Lord Philip Chetwode, recounted a third form of patrolling conducted by the 
EEF during this time: officer reconnaissance. Indirectly, this form of patrol may have been the 
most important with respect to how the operation maps were eventually employed. As the plans 
for the 3rd Gaza offensive became finalized, commanders in the EEF mandated that their 
subordinate officers conduct direct reconnaissance of the terrain across which their units would 
move and operate (Chetwode, “Notes on Future Actions and Organization of XXth Corps”). In 
the Gaza sector these patrols seem to have typically taken the form of observations of no-man’s-
land from friendly trenches, while in the more open Hareira and Beersheba sectors mounted 
groups of officers escorted by cavalry were actually able to move across the terrain through 
which they would later lead their units (Bailey, 5/3/17).
7
 These patrols helped provide 
commanders and staff officers with healthy background knowledge about both the physical 
terrain and enemy positions that would later supplement the rather sparse information 
communicated by the operation maps. This provided some clues not just about how the EEF 
gathered information, but also about how it used the operation maps.  
 Each of these forms of patrolling was subject to the limitations that have always afflicted 
ground reconnaissance. First, their field of view was limited by what they could see from ground 
level. Intervening hills, vegetation, and buildings, even relatively small ones, could hide 
surprisingly large bodies of troops from direct observation. Second, the information that these 
patrols collected usually needed to be carried back to a headquarters where it could be 
                                                             
7 EEF staff officers were trained to create terrain sketches, perspective views of the Turkish lines from various points in the 
British lines with inset maps showing the scope of the terrain presented. Some excellent examples of these exist in the 52nd 
Division War Diary and elsewhere (Bailey, 7/3/17). 
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transmitted up the chain of command. This was not a major disadvantage during the static, set-
piece phase of the campaign, when the lines were more or less stable and forms of 
communication were both robust and redundant. However, when the battle entered the more 
mobile pursuit phase, the communication bottleneck became significantly more pronounced 
(161st Infantry Brigade WD 2/11/17).  
 Routine patrolling tied closely into another, more violent form of ground reconnaissance: 
the raid. Contrary to popular conceptions about siege combat in World War I, the front lines of 
trench fortifications were surprisingly vulnerable to attack in many places, particularly at night. 
Both the British and Turkish forces launched raids into each other’s trenches in the months prior 
to the start of the Gaza offensive, though the British seem to have been more active in this 
regard. In contrast to simple patrolling, commanders usually sent out raids to accomplish a 
specific mission, sometimes to destroy a particular fortification or weapon or to kill enemy 
troops occupying the opposite trench and disrupt their plans. One goal of almost every one of 
these attacks, however, was to capture prisoners who could later be interrogated, a process which 
I will cover in greater detail in a subsequent section. Suffice it to say, these raids were a common 
information-gathering tactic, often on a surprisingly large scale (Meinertzhagen 1917, Volume 
20 11/6/17).  
 Meinertzhagen implies in his diary that he took part in a large and successful raid on a 
Turkish fortification along the coast called “Sea Post” by the British (see Figure 1.1 in Chapter 
1) and the war diaries of British battalions, divisions, and corps contain frequent accounts of 
raids—always launched at night—ranging in size from a single squad of perhaps ten soldiers to 
battalion-sized attacks that required extensive planning and generated large numbers of 
casualties. The direct information these raids generated was usually vague and impressionistic, as 
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in whether an enemy trench was strongly held or not, but the indirect intelligence they created in 
the form of prisoners who could be interrogated—as I will relate later—was often accurate, 
extensive, and specific, and directly relatable to details that appeared on the operation maps (XXI 
IS 11/9/17 through 11/11/17). Because of this, they deserve a place as an information-gathering 
method in my modified Woodward matrix. 
 The final method that ground forces in the EEF used to gather information was large-
scale combat operations. These operations involved whole divisions or corps attacking to seize 
terrain or destroy enemy forces. Unlike patrols and raids, the mission of the large units 
conducting these operations was not to gather intelligence but instead to move the campaign 
forward operationally and strategically by gaining advantages over the enemy. Despite this lack 
of focus on intelligence, active operations generated large amounts of data simply from the fact 
that these movements were the best way to make contact with the enemy (read: draw fire) and to 
maintain that contact through combat. Combat generated casualties, and enemy dead and 
prisoners, as already discussed, were a major source of tactical information for the EEF. The 
flow of this information to the GHQ was constrained, however, by the need to transmit it by code 
through wireless, heliograph, or signal flags or to entrust a written note—usually a few jotted 
sentences on a standardized dispatch book—to a courier who would then need to make his way 
across country to deliver his message to higher headquarters. Thus the amount of information 
gathered versus the amount actually transmitted appears to have been rather small and limited in 
scope (see XX IS 1/11/17 through 30/11/17 for example).  
 The intelligence summaries and war diaries from the first phase of the Gaza offensive 
showed that as the British forces attacked they generated a flood of information from units 
engaging the Turks in combat. Some of the information confirmed what the GHQ already knew, 
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some was new information, and some was erroneous. Conversely, the information available to 
the staff officers populating the operation maps slowed to a trickle when the British forces lost 
contact with much of the Turkish army after the Turks withdrew from the Gaza-Beersheba line, 
as illustrated by the near total disappearance of Turkish units from the maps in the middle part of 
November (operation maps 7/11/17 to 8/11/17 and 10/11/17 to 11/11/17). This illustrated not 
only the importance to intelligence-gathering of large-scale active operations that maintained 
contact with the enemy, but also the central role of all forms of ground reconnaissance as these 
larger operations would have been composed of smaller patrols, raids, and attacks. Therefore, 
active operations and ground reconnaissance in general were an important component of the 
modified Woodward framework that could locate and in some cases identify Turkish units.  
Rough View-Shed Analysis for British Units 
 Another method I employed to determine what intelligence could have been gathered by 
ground reconnaissance was a rough view-shed analysis of the Palestine front.  To conduct this 
analysis, I took digital scans of the 7th FSC’s operation maps and superimposed them first on a 
digital elevation model of modern-day Israel (available for free from the Cyprus Bibliographic 
Archive of Earth Science, or “CYBAES,” http://www.cybaes.org) and then onto digital scans of 
several modern-day topographical maps of Israel. I registered these maps to each other by 
choosing several prominent terrain features, including the towns of Gaza, Beersheba, Hebron, 
and the city of Jerusalem, along with several major wadis and the Palestinian coastline. I then 
rubber-sheeted the maps so that these features aligned tolerably well. The terrain features on 
these maps did not correlate perfectly—likely due to different projections cast by the different 
maps—but I was able to bring them close enough for the purposes of this project. 
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Figure 4.2                  Figure 4.3 
 
Figure 4.4. The purple shaded areas represent the rough field of view of the British units. The approximate horizontal distance 
for these figures is twenty-five miles. These figures are intended to be printed in color. 
 
 Next, using Adobe Illustrator I traced the positions of the British and Turkish forces for 
each day’s edition of the operation maps onto the CYBAES digital elevation model. I then 
surrounded each symbol with an eleven-mile
8
 buffer representing an ideal field of view given 
perfectly flat terrain and clear atmospheric visibility. Next, I traced a more realistic field of view 
                                                             
8 Based on my personal experience and training. 
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for each unit given the obstructions of intervening or rough terrain that would have blocked the 
view of someone observing from eye level (Figure 4.2). Once I had completed this, I double-
checked the realistic view-sheds by over-laying them onto the scans of the modern topographic 
maps to ensure I had not misinterpreted the relief and shadow terrain portrayed by the CYBAES 
map (Figure 4.3). I then created a more easily readable map of the major terrain features by 
portraying them as brown area symbols on a lighter brown background representing level terrain, 
and also adding intuitive symbols for other terrain features such as water obstacles, roads, 
railroads, and towns. The result was the final form of my own maps that allows someone to see 
the relative positions of the opposing armies and their relations to key terrain features on the 
battlefield, and also what the British forces likely could and could not see due to the terrain 
(Figure 4.4). 
 This analysis was fruitful in that it revealed some interesting details that were not readily 
available from studying the 7th FSC’s operation maps. For example, in several cases the Turkish 
army used low hills and ridges to screen their local reserve battalions from British view, meaning 
that these units needed to be located by means other than direct observation. This view-shed 
analysis also made me aware of a systematic technique that the EEF cartographers used to 
communicate uncertainty; whenever a Turkish unit retreated out of sight from contact with a 
British unit, the mapmakers subsequently represented this unit’s estimated position using a 
hollow box rectangular symbol instead of the normal solid rectangle. In addition, this analysis 
aided my research into the EEF’s information processing because it revealed not just which 
Turkish units were within the EEF’s view-shed, but also which British had lost communication 
with higher headquarters. Because much of the EEF’s messages were transmitted by line-of-sight 
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methods, knowing that a British unit could not quickly communicate what it saw was an 
important and enlightening piece of information.    
Prisoners and Deserters 
 Within the EEF information-gathering system one of the most fruitful sources of 
operational intelligence was statements made by enemy soldiers who had either been captured by 
raiding, patrolling, or active operations, or who crossed from their units into the British lines 
willingly as deserters. As I have already related how ground reconnaissance tended to generate 
enemy prisoners for questioning, I will in this section focus first on Turkish deserters and then on 
the actual statements that both the prisoners and deserters gave to their British interrogators. The 
information these soldiers provided to the EEF was usually of immediate value in both locating 
and identifying the Turkish units in close proximity to the front, though they occasionally 
provided information relating to distant theaters of the war, often with surprising accuracy. In 
addition, there seems to have been some sharing of information gleaned from these interviews 
between the various Allied fronts in the Middle East, as reports of deserter and prisoner 
statements from the Caucasus, Balkan, and Mesopotamian fronts were frequent entries in the 
EEF intelligence summaries. 
 Deserters crossing the lines were a frequent occurrence during the long period of static 
siege warfare that settled over southern Palestine between the 1st and 3rd battles of Gaza. The 
number and quality of deserters varied based on what Turkish unit was in the line, the rank or 
intelligence of the deserter, and the general mood and morale in the Turkish lines (see GHQ IS 
23/9/17, 29/9/17, 2/10/17). The Ottoman Empire was a multi-ethnic and multi-national entity, 
and its army reflected this. Divisions tended to be raised from particular locations or ethnicities. 
Thus one division—the 26th, for example—might be composed of ethnic Greeks and Armenians, 
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who often identified more with the cause of the British than with their own commanders 
(Erickson 2007, 2; GHQ IS 4/10/17). The proximity of the opposing lines was also a factor. 
Generally if the trenches were relatively close together, as they were in the Gaza sector, then 
deserters could cross over relatively easily, whereas in areas where the lines were distant from 
each other—the Sheria-Hareira sector for example—a defecting soldier would have to travel a 
long way to reach the safety of enemy lines.
9
  
 The value of information that deserters and prisoners provided depended on the position, 
knowledge, and intelligence of the individual, as well as on the skill of the interrogator 
conducting the interview. The EEF intelligence summaries condensed the information provided 
from this source periodically both in the aforementioned identification tables and in another set 
of weekly hand-drawn tables that summarized the number, unit, and rank of deserters who had 
crossed. These entries in the intelligence summaries revealed a hierarchy of value assigned to 
different sorts of prisoners and deserters. The statements of officers appear to have been the most 
trusted because they usually gave the highest quality and greatest breadth of information. Just 
below this strata came the non-commissioned officer and “intelligent deserter” category, who 
also seem to have garnered trust from the British staff officers. Next came the private soldiers, 
usually designated simply as “deserter” or “prisoner” in the intelligence summaries. These were 
the most frequent type of source, and could often give surprisingly detailed and complete reports. 
Finally came the “unreliable deserter” whose statement was related but with the qualification that 
it should be viewed with skepticism (see GHQ IS 8/10/17 and 17/10/17 for examples of each). 
 The skill of the interrogator could also play a role in the quality of information extracted 
                                                             
9 British signal intercepts frequently recorded the concerns of Turkish commanders about the numbers of deserters leaving their  
formations. Their solutions ranged from exhortations to patriotism and duty to threats of mass punishment and severe 
consequences for the officers of units with particularly poor statistics. Nor was this a problem of the Turkish side exclusively; 
while few if any British, Australian, or New Zealand soldiers went over to the Turks during the conflict, a desertion of an Indian 
soldier, particularly a Muslim soldier from modern-day Pakistan, was not an un-heard-of occurrence (GHQ IS 17/10/17). 
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from the enemy soldier. In his diary Meinertzhagen, for example, described his differing 
methods for interrogating Turkish soldiers in contrast to captured Germans and Austrians. Using 
the wrong method could cause the soldier to stop talking or alternately to try to tell the 
interrogator what the prisoner believed he wanted to hear rather than the truth, neither of which 
would be helpful in gaining accurate intelligence (Meinertzhagen 1960, 220, 226).
 10
 
 One of the advantages of prisoner and deserter intelligence was that it could provide 
comparatively large amounts of timely data about the location, identification, and quality of units 
in the line and just behind it. Even a relatively junior deserter could—and frequently did—point 
out the location of his own regiment in the opposite trenches, identify the units to the flanks and 
rear of his own, provide commentary on the unit’s strength and quality of supplies and morale, 
and pass along gossip from the rest of the army. Officers could provide an even greater scope of 
information, and usually with greater accuracy (GHQ IS 27/8/17 and 4/11/17 for example).
 11
 
Another advantage was that, since the interviews appear to have been conducted at the various 
unit headquarters of the EEF, the information they produced was available almost immediately to 
those subordinate commanders. The disadvantages, however, were that the statements were often 
inaccurate or based on hearsay, and that—with the exception of raids launched to seize 
prisoners—this source was dependant on the decision of an enemy soldier to desert and provide 
information and thus could not be focused by the EEF intelligence staff on a particular problem 
or location. Even so, the EEF’s intelligence summaries devote a great deal of text to 
                                                             
10 From Meinertzhagen’s diary entry for 15 August 1917: “When a prisoner is captured he is frightened, he does not know what 
is going to happen to him, what sort of treatment he may get, in fact the...Turks expected physical ill treatment if not death. They 
would be most anxious to please and answer questions which after about twenty-four hours’ captivity, a good meal and a night’s 
sleep they would refuse to answer. I impressed this method on all Intelligence officers and the results were striking. Most German 
officers refused to talk at all, very few did. Most Turkish officers would talk within a few hours of capture, but once they had 
recovered from shock they would become obstinately silent or would excel themselves by lying.” His entry on 3 January 1918 
noted “I have seen many interrogations of prisoners carried out in a rough, bullying manner. It does not pay. It might do so with 
an Arab or an Egyptian, but not with a German” (Meinertzhagen 1960, 220, 226). 
11 In at least one exceptional case the commander of a Turkish battalion defected and provided detailed information about his 
own unit as well as his entire brigade and division. Such a high ranking desertion was an intelligence disaster for the Turks (GHQ 
IS 1/9/17). 
76 
 
summarizing the information gained this way, illustrating its importance within the EEF 
information-gathering system. The versatility of these statements for information-gathering—
they could provide location, qualitative, and quantitative data—made them a central technique in 
the EEF’s cartographic framework. 
Agent Networks 
 The final information-gathering entity that I included in my modified framework is the 
role played by intelligence agents—spies—and their networks behind enemy lines. In the case of 
the EEF and the Palestine front, this category essentially consisted of only one network, the 
famous Nili organization composed of a group of Palestinian Jews, many of them from the 
Aaronsohn family, who provided data to the British until their operation was compromised and 
brutally crushed by the Turks. The story of this organization has been told elsewhere (see Sheffy 
2004) and is beyond the scope of this thesis. What I am concerned with is the type and quality of 
information that they provided to the EEF in the context of the operation maps. Here the records 
are ambiguous. Sheffy has described that one method the Nili organization employed was train 
watching at railroad junctions in Palestine. Members of the group would sell food to the soldiers 
at the station and try through conversation to gain information regarding the transiting unit’s 
identity and destination (Sheffy 2004, 159-66).  
 As Sheffy has also noted, the information gained—though usually precise, accurate, and 
well-respected by British intelligence—tended to be of little tactical value for two reasons. First, 
as the information was gathered relatively far from the front lines, it was rarely of immediate 
relevance to ongoing operations. Second, the reports from this network and other agents had to 
follow a long and circuitous route to make it into the hands of British officers (Sheffy 2004, 
160). Thus, the intelligence was often out of date before it could be effectively acted upon. Even 
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so, information from this network appears in many of the EEF intelligence summaries prior to 
the Gaza offensive listed as coming from “a very reliable source” or simply from “an agent” (as 
opposed to the “absolutely reliable source” of wireless intercepts) and provided information 
about new Turkish units arriving to the Palestine theater that could then be located and identified 
by other means once they neared the front lines (GHQ IS 16/9/17). While these agent reports 
were slow in arriving and sometimes incorrect, what mattered for this project and for the maps is 
that EEF intelligence officers lent these observations enough credence at the time to incorporate 
them into the Turkish order of battle being tracked by the operation maps, making this another 
important source for the EEF information-gathering system. 
The Product: Raw Intelligence 
 The products of the information-gathering phase of the EEF cartographic system were 
myriad: intercepted messages, aerial photographs, patrol reports, reports from subordinate units, 
transcripts of prisoner and deserter interrogations, and agent reports from behind the lines. These 
pieces of raw data fed into the daily intelligence summaries compiled by staff officers at the EEF 
GHQ. As I have already stated, these daily compilations of information that were available to the 
EEF intelligence staff are the most obvious link between the gathered information and the 
operation maps. How these summaries were compiled was an act of information-processing, as 
were the decisions at lower levels of the EEF hierarchy about what information to transmit to 
GHQ, and I will discuss these processes in the next section. The individual pieces of information 
gathered by the various intelligence organs of the EEF acted as a bridge between the 
information-gathering and information-processing phases of a modified cartographic framework. 
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Figure 4.5 Information processing phase of Woodward’s cartographic framework modified to reflect specific elements of the 
EEF.  
 
Information-Processing 
 In this section I will discuss the portions of the EEF cartographic system that processed 
the raw data produced during the information-gathering phase. The process largely took place 
after the raw data had reached the EEF GHQ and was mostly conducted by the British staff 
intelligence officers who tracked the Turkish order of battle and decided where to plot Turkish 
units on the operation maps. However, another aspect of information-processing occurred 
simultaneously to the information-gathering phase at lower levels in the EEF hierarchy. This 
ground-level analysis included the value judgments made by low-ranking soldiers, officers, 
pilots, and signalmen about what raw data to observe, record, and transmit to higher 
headquarters. These decisions effectively filtered the information before it ever arrived at GHQ. 
Another filter was the structural limitations of transmitting information through the 
communication technology available to the EEF in 1917. In this section I will examine these two 
processes—the communication process within the EEF and the intelligence staff’s analysis 
process—and then relate these to the resultant product within the EEF cartographic framework. 
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Signal Units 
 The techniques and tools these various entities in the EEF system employed to process 
the information about Turkish unit positions varied depending on who was doing the processing. 
I will start by relating the limitations with which subordinate EEF units had to contend to 
transmit their observations to higher headquarters. EEF formations contained units whose sole 
function was to maintain communications with the rest of the force. Each of the EEF’s three 
corps contained a dedicated signal company. Additionally, each of the cavalry divisions within 
the Desert Mounted Corps contained their own signal squadron, a fact that likely reflected the 
expectation that the cavalry would move more quickly across terrain and thus require heavier 
signal support to maintain communications. These communication organizations all left war 
diaries that are little more than weekly or daily notes recording with whom they were in 
communication and by what means. Despite the sparse text in these war diaries, they reveal a 
great deal about how the EEF communicated and thus the limitations on what information could 
efficiently be transmitted. Additionally, the operations orders preserved in the war diaries of 
many of the combat formations often contain explicit instructions about how tactical information 
was to be relayed as well as comments about the effectiveness and drawback of various 
communications media (XXI WD, “XXI Corps Order No. 11”).  
 As a modern military force in 1917, the EEF possessed redundant means to maintain 
contact with its units during combat operations. The primary means of communications was the 
cable telegraph supplemented by the cable telephone. These were most reliable when the front 
was stationary and the signal companies and squadrons could lay and bury their cables between 
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predictable headquarters locations (54 Division Signal Company, 11/24/17).
12
 When operations 
became more mobile, all of the signal units’ war diaries began a monotonous record of the daily 
reeling and unreeling of miles of cable in an attempt to keep pace with their advancing units. 
Thus, cable communication was frequently lost during the pursuit phase of the Gaza campaign as 
signal units worked to push their cable heads forward to the front (ANZAC MD Signal Troop, 1-
30/11/17).
 13
 Furthermore, the need to employ Morse code in the case of the telegraph constricted 
the amount of information that could pass through this medium. This restriction was common to 
every form of communication available to the EEF at this point except telephones and couriers 
(AMD Signal Squadron, 8/11/17). However, cables were generally secure from enemy 
interception and interference except when very close to the front lines and the British signal 
companies and troops seem to have been tirelessly adept at rapidly moving their cable 
infrastructure forward to quickly reestablish contact between headquarters and units.
14
  
     Wireless was another form of communication available to the EEF signal units. Called 
‘radio telegraph’ because—like its cable telegraph counterpart—it was restricted to sending and 
receiving electrical dots and dashes, the transmitters and receivers were generally concentrated at 
corps-level headquarters and above, which limited their ability to maintain contact with smaller 
formations (AMD Signal Squadron, 8/11/17).
15
 Also, the range of the radio transmission was 
limited by terrain features and the curvature of the earth. Since the signals emitted by these 
wireless sets were omni-directional, they could easily be intercepted by the Turks and deciphered 
or simply translated if the message had been sent ‘in the clear,’ a common mistake of individuals 
                                                             
12 Prior to the start of the Gaza offensive the EEF’s signal companies buried 827 miles of cable in the Gaza sector to prevent them 
from being cut by artillery fire during the battle. These measures were very effective, with only three cables being cut by enemy 
fire during the operation (“Report on Signal Communications 3rd Battle of Gaza” 54 Division Signal Company WD 24/11/17). 
13 To aid in this labor, one signal unit invented a cable reeling machine that could be mounted on a Ford motor lorry that could 
reel and unreel cable far more quickly than by hand. A diagram of this machine worthy of a patent office is contained in the war 
diary of the Desert Mounted Corps Signal Company. 
14 Often the British were able to use captured Turkish cable as they advanced their communication nodes during the offensive 
(XX Signal Coy WD, 3/11/17). 
15 Radio voice communication—called ‘radio telephone’—would not be available until later in the war. 
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attempting to quickly send important tactical information (Occleshaw 1989, 136). On the 
positive side, radio telegraph sets—often mounted on wagons for mobility—required relatively 
little infrastructure to operate when compared to cabled communications, and the amount of 
information this medium could handle was no more restricted (Sheffy 2004, 173). 
 During mobile operations when cable telegraphy was impractical, the primary means of 
communication between units below the corps level was visual signals. These usually took the 
form of heliographs during the day and signal lamps at night (AMD Signal Squadron WD, 
31/10/17). A heliograph was a visual telegraph that used mirrors to reflect sunlight towards a 
distant point. This beam could be interrupted by shutters or by tilting the mirror to communicate 
using dots and dashes. Signal lamps used a similar concept with the difference that the device 
provided its own light source in the form of an oil lamp. These devices were distributed at least 
down to the brigade level and perhaps lower in the EEF hierarchy, making them the most 
common means after the cable telegraph for transmitting messages over a distance, though the 
night-time signal lamps seem to have been rather ineffective (54 Div. Signal Company, 
24/11/17).
16
 As they were directional, visually transmitted messages were relatively secure from 
enemy interception, though they faced the same data throughput constraints as other forms of 
telegraphy.   
                                                             
16 On at least one occasion the Australian Mounted Division Signal Squadron recorded that it could receive signal lamp messages 
over the visual horizon by reading the reflected flashes off of low clouds. The same entry expressed concern, however, that if 
they received the messages this way, so could the Turks, particularly since the messages, usually very secure, were sent “in the 
clear” (AMD Signal Squadron, 9/11/17).  
82 
 
 The final form of communication I 
will discuss is the use of couriers to carry 
messages and documents across the 
battlefield. This is the form of 
communication that armies prior to the 
middle of the 19th century relied upon 
almost exclusively. The British Army 
provided its forces with small dispatch 
books (Army Form C.2123) containing 
alternating pages of paper and carbon 
paper that allowed officers to jot down a 
message, which could be quickly torn off 
and handed to a courier, leaving behind a 
carbon copy in the notebook (Figure 4.6). 
 Many of these dispatches have 
been compiled in several unit war diaries 
in the EEF. These records reveal that messages sent this way usually did not contain any more 
detailed information than could be transmitted by telegraph (see XX WD Appendix 4 for 
examples). This form of communication was also much slower than the other methods I have 
discussed, and could also be more tenuous, as couriers could be killed or—more commonly—
become lost en route to the message’s addressee.17 Despite their limitations, messages sent via 
                                                             
17 The EEF put great effort into ensuring the effectiveness of its courier system including assigning GHQ liaison officers with 
each formation to send regular position and situation reports, outlining principles to follow for couriers and the officers 
dispatching them, and outfitting signal units with special equipment like motorcycles to speed couriers on their way (“Tactics of 
Mounted Troops” in ANZAC WD; 3 ALHB 22/11/17). 
Figure 4.6. Facsimile of British Army Form C.2123. This particular 
dispatch announced the dramatic seizure of Beersheba by cavalry 
charge on the evening of 31 October 1917 as well as the numbers of 
prisoners captured (Meinertzhagen 20, 31/10/17). This figure is 
intended to be printed in color. 
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courier possessed one major advantage over the other forms of communication available to the 
EEF: throughput. Whole documents could be entrusted to a courier including—as I will discuss 
later in relation to the operation maps themselves—maps, which before the age of digital 
communications could only be transmitted by being physically carried from one place to another. 
One new tool that the British employed to increase the speed of their messengers was a 
technology only recently arrived on the battlefield: motorcycles. Numerous entries in signal 
company diaries include praise for these machines and suggestions about how they should be 
distributed throughout the force (3rd ALHB WD 22/11/17). Even so, communication by courier 
was slow even under safe circumstances, and slower during combat operations.                             
 I include the communications infrastructure of the EEF in the information-processing 
phase of my modified cartographic framework because the constraints that this infrastructure 
imposed on the flow of information forced low-ranking individuals within the EEF hierarchy to 
conduct their own analysis of the information they had gathered before transmitting it to their 
higher headquarters. This fact led to an apparent filtering of the information available to the 
officers at GHQ who were responsible for annotating the daily operation maps. A message could 
potentially have been filtered more than once if it passed through multiple subordinate 
headquarters along its path to GHQ. The effect of this appears to be that basic information like 
the location and identification of enemy units was more accurately represented on the operation 
maps than was more complicated data such as the strength, morale, or capabilities of a particular 
unit. Such qualitative intelligence required a greater amount of information to be transmitted 
across the EEF’s constricted communication conduits. This fact was evident in several of the 
operation maps that depicted very weak Turkish units with (in retrospect) inappropriately large 
symbols (see later in this chapter). Thus, low-ranking individuals in the EEF could influence the 
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data that appeared on the operation maps produced at GHQ by their own decisions about what 
information was important enough to send quickly and what could wait. This fact in itself 
highlights the value of viewing the whole EEF as a cartographic system. 
Staff Analysis    
 Once the filtered raw data arrived at the GHQ it underwent a more traditional form of 
analysis at the hands of the staff officers whose role it was to organize the information and 
present an accurate picture of the battlefield to the General Officer Commanding (GOC), General 
Allenby, and his subordinate commanders and staff. This analysis connected the raw data to the 
operation maps by stripping away what the relevant officers considered to be extraneous facts 
and by reconciling conflicting reports to present what the staff officers believed was the true 
situation on the battlefield. This process was not without conflict, as Meinertzhagen related in his 
diaries and as I will discuss below, and such disagreements provided insight into not just who 
performed the analysis, but also how they performed it. Thus, this staff analysis process was an 
important component of the EEF cartographic system’s information-processing phase and an 
important factor in understanding how the operations maps were produced and used. 
 I first will discuss the structure of the EEF intelligence staff before analyzing its function. 
Sheffy has already mapped out the structure of the EEF intelligence staff, and Guy Dawnay’s 
papers included a thorough roster of the GHQ staff as it was in December 1917, at the end of the 
Gaza offensive. To reconstruct the staff’s organization I have relied heavily upon Sheffy’s 
(2004) book about intelligence in this theater. My contribution to this is simply to add 
individual’s names to the organizational positions that Sheffy had already worked out. As the 
EEF intelligence staff was a large and complex organization, I intentionally ignore elements that 
did not participate directly in the production of the operation maps.  
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 The central figure in this portion of 
the staff was Richard Meinertzhagen, who 
oversaw Palestine intelligence. His direct 
subordinates were the Ia (order of battle) 
officer Captain A.S.G. Musgrave; the Ic 
(topographic officer) whose duties appear 
to have been shared by Musgrave and the 
commander of the 7th FSC, Major Maule; 
and the Corps of Guides and Interpreters, 
which assisted in interrogating prisoners 
and deserters. Meinertzhagen also 
coordinated the intelligence sent to GHQ by the RFC and the Royal Navy Air Service (RNAS) 
(Figure 4.7). Captain Musgrave, as the Ia, would have been responsible for analyzing incoming 
intelligence to the GHQ and keeping a running track of all enemy units in the Palestine theater, 
while the Ic role would likely have added to this analysis the cartographic tools provided by the 
mapping activities of the 7th FSC, including the base line maps on which the Turkish positions 
were eventually plotted. Meinertzhagen, in turn, answered to his direct superior and BGGS of the 
EEF, Guy Dawnay, who interacted directly with Allenby and his Chief of Staff, Major General 
L.J. Bols (Sheffy 2004, Chart 5; Dawnay 1917, 5-6).  
Figure 4.7 A portion of the chart created by Yigal Sheffy showing 
the structure of the EEF intelligence staff as it existed in 1917 (after 
Sheffy 2004, Chart 5). 
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Figure 4.8. Facsimile example of a working copy of the 31 October operation map showing the situation around Beersheba at 
1305 hours.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.9. Facsimile of the 6 pm final copy of the 31 October operation map showing the situation around Beersheba. Note that 
the location of British positions is nearly identical on both maps and that Turkish unit symbols are absent from the working copy. 
The horizontal distance of these figures is approximately fifteen miles. These figures are intended to be printed in color. 
 
 Dawnay, Meinertzhagen, the 7th FSC War Diary, and the operation maps all provide 
valuable clues regarding the function of the intelligence staff’s analysis of information relating to 
Turkish positions. Interestingly, Guy Dawnay’s typed staff roster contained a hand-written note 
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reading simply “maps” next to Musgrave’s name, indicating that Musgrave was the officer 
responsible for annotating the Turkish positions on the operation maps. Two entries in the 7th 
FSC War diary that stated that an officer outside of the survey company was responsible for 
annotating “military information” on their maps reinforce this conclusion (7th FSC WD, 
21/4/17).
18
 While the actual drafting of the operation maps was a function of the next 
cartographic phase, several of these maps contain clues about how the intelligence staff resolved 
enemy positions from the raw data available to them.  
While the operations maps were generally printed once per day and annotated as 
representing the “Situation as known at GHQ at 6 pm” on the appropriate date, the maps for 31 
October, when the attack on Beersheba began, departed from this norm. On this date the 
operation maps held by the National Archives contain editions annotated for “dawn to 0900,” 
“0930,” and “1305” in addition to the regular 6pm map. These supplementary maps differed 
from the polished 6pm map in that they were obviously drawn in contrast to the published maps 
and they depicted only British unit positions, omitting completely any Turkish unit symbols. 
This type of map occurred again in the operation map series on 1 and 2 November (0600 and 
0800 respectively) and on 6 November (0800 and 1430) as the battle was transitioning into the 
mobile pursuit phase. These working copies of the operation maps are evidence of a staff officer, 
probably Musgrave, using the maps as an analytical tool to try to make sense of the large amount 
of data arriving at GHQ. The fact that these maps only depicted British positions suggests a 
process by which the intelligence staff first plotted the positions of friendly units from whom 
they were receiving information and then used this plot as a framework to locate Turkish 
positions on the final polished map. Thus, the process would look something like this: dispatches 
                                                             
18 The 7th FSC war diary records that a Lieutenant Shairpe was responsible for annotating “military information” on maps in the 
entry for 21 April 1917. However, since this name does not appear on Dawnay’s roster from December 1917, I believe that his 
role was taken over by Musgrave some time during the intervening period.  
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and cables arrived at GHQ and were passed to the intelligence staff, which would then plot the 
positions of the friendly units, then analyze the data about enemy troops in relation to these 
friendly positions, and finally reach a consensus as to the location, identity, and strength of the 
Turkish units. These enemy positions would then be plotted in relation to the known British 
positions (Figures 4.8 and 4.9).  
 Meinertzhagen’s diary also indicated that the above analysis was subject to review by the 
chain of command all the way up to Allenby. Meinertzhagen related in his diary entry of 2 
November that Dawnay ordered him to withdraw that day’s operation map because it was 
misleading (Meinertzhagen 1917, Volume 20 2/11/17). He then stated on 4 November that 
Dawnay “realized his mistake in not crediting the intelligence on the 2nd” and that “Allenby 
[was] also convinced” before writing on 6 November that “Dawnay again refused to believe” the 
intelligence analysis of Meinertzhagen’s group (Meinertzhagen 1917, Vol. 20 46-48). I will 
delve into greater detail about this specific conflict when I discuss how the operation maps were 
used, as this incident is vital in understanding many aspects of the operation maps. For now, I 
want to point out that these entries indicate an analytical process by which Meinertzhagen and 
his subordinate officers would use the line maps provided by the 7th FSC in conjunction with the 
raw data arriving at GHQ to develop what they believed was an accurate picture of the 
battlefield. They would then present their analysis to Dawnay—and perhaps also Allenby—for 
approval before distributing this analysis more widely.          
 While the product of the information-processing phase of the EEF cartographic system 
would naturally seem to be the operation maps, these are more properly the product of the 
document-distribution phase. In my modified framework, the products of the second-phase 
analysis were primarily the intelligence summaries that the GHQ intelligence staff compiled 
89 
 
daily and also the working maps that the staff used to organize and eventually publish the final 
polished maps. These two types of documents were products of an on-going cyclical process of 
information analysis and reconciliation that attempted to organize the raw data received by the 
GHQ into a coherent and useful picture of the battlefield. These two products directly informed 
the physical manifestation of this picture—the operation maps—during the process of document-
distribution in the next phase, which I will discuss below.    
Document-Distribution  
 
Figure 4.10: Document-distribution phase of Woodward’s cartographic framework modified to reflect specific elements of the 
EEF. 
 
           In my modification of Woodward’s framework, the document-distribution phase 
encompasses the drafting and dissemination of the final-product operation maps. I divided this 
process into two parts: the first part was the drafting and printing of the polished operation maps, 
which was a combined effort between specific individuals on the EEF intelligence staff and the 
draftsmen of the 7th FSC; the second part was the distribution of these large maps to the EEF 
GHQ and its subordinate headquarters, where they were used for planning and general situational 
awareness. The pattern of distribution for the operation maps was an important factor in 
determining how the maps were used in the final phase, emphasizing this phase’s importance to 
the entire framework. The end products of this phase were the operation maps. 
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Drafting the Operation Maps  
 The drafting of the operation maps was a collaboration between the intelligence staff at 
EEF GHQ and the draftsmen of the 7th FSC. The evidence for this exists in the 7th FSC war 
diary, Maule’s (1919) report, Meinertzhagen’s diaries, and finally in an annotation on the crude 
binding of the operation maps stored at the National Archives. I will first outline what the 
drafting process looked like, then present my evidence. Prior to the start of the campaign, the 7th 
FSC had printed dozens of copies of the line maps that were the base for the operation maps. 
Some of these stockpiled maps were given to GHQ; there an intelligence officer—probably 
Musgrave by the start of the Gaza campaign—added known positions of British units throughout 
each day and then, after analyzing the intelligence available at the time, drew the location and 
identification of the Turkish units in the field. The map was returned to the 7th FSC at 4pm for 
the finishing process. There, two draftsmen created a colored plate each for the British (red) and 
Turkish (green) unit symbols and used these to overprint colored layers onto the base line 
maps.
19
 Meinertzhagen stated proudly that his staff delivered their working drafts to the 7th FSC 
at 4pm each day and that the finished maps were ready by 6pm (Maule 1919, 16; Meinertzhagen 
1960, 225). 
 As Collier (2008) noted, we know the identity of one of the two draftsmen from the 7th 
FSC, an Indian by the name of C. Malama, because of the hand-written note on the worn cover 
of the WO 153/1041 collection of maps in the National Archives that reads “Mr. C. Malama 
belonged to the Survey Coy, GHQ, EEF, during the period covered by the maps, & was one of 
the 2 draftsmen responsible for drawing the colored plates representing the two Armies on each 
night,” along with a note that Mr. Malama himself had deposited this collection of maps with the 
                                                             
19 For the minute details about how this finishing process was conducted, including the chemical compounds and types of ink 
used, see Maule (1919). 
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Historical Section (Military Branch) of the British Army. Furthermore, the 7th FSC war diary 
recorded the number of operation maps printed each day by these two draftsmen, though the 
identity of the second draftsman appears to be lost to history. Once the finished map copies were 
printed they were either returned to GHQ for distribution or distributed directly from the 7th FSC 
to the map’s various recipients, though the former scenario is more likely (Meinertzhagen 1960, 
224). 
 The paucity of information regarding these two draftsmen is unfortunate, given their 
importance as the individuals who physically created the operation maps. However, some 
speculation on their background is possible from contextual evidence. Matthew Edney described 
in his (1997) book, Mapping an Empire: The Geographical Construction of British India, 1765-
1843, how the British Survey of India had grudgingly created a European-style surveying and 
mapmaking tradition within the Indian population to aid their mapping of the sub-continent 
(Edney 1997, 244, 307). Furthermore, the British Middle Eastern commands in World War I, 
particular in Mesopotamia but also in Palestine, relied heavily on Indian troops and resources. 
This reliance extended to individuals with technical skills, like surveyors and draftsmen, who 
were in short supply everywhere (Collier 1994, 101). Based on this context, we can assume that 
Mr. Malama and his colleague were scientifically trained technicians from the British 
Government of India, who had been provided to the EEF to assist in their cartographic activities. 
Further research into the Indian influence on the British mapping of the Middle East would 
certainly be enlightening.   
 I failed to locate any records of how the physical act of distributing the maps was 
conducted, but I believe sufficient evidence exists for me to speculate intelligently. The 
operation maps were large documents, with dimensions roughly a yard by a yard and a half, 
92 
 
which at a time before the electronic transmission of images could not have been easily 
transported in any way other than by vehicle. I have already mentioned how motorcycles were 
used by couriers in the EEF, but I believe the maps themselves are too large to make this vehicle 
practical. The surviving maps show no signs of being rolled up (though they probably were) and 
what folding they have undergone appears to have been done to make them fit into archival 
storage rather than to make them easy to transport. Instead, because both Meinertzhagen and 
Dawnay recorded their easy access to automobiles, I believe these vehicles were probably how 
the maps travelled from the 7th FSC to the various headquarters (Dawnay to his wife, 10/12/17). 
All but one edition of the operation maps presented the situation as known at GHQ as of 6pm of 
the relevant date. This, along with the note on the cover of the National Archives collection 
about Mr. Malama and his colleague drafting the maps each night, demonstrated that the maps 
were printed between 4 and 6pm, and then distributed during the night so they would be 
available for whatever use they were destined while the information on them was still current.   
 The EEF distributed the maps more widely than the 7th FSC and GHQ, however. Three 
sources provide information about who the intended recipients were. First, besides the complete 
series of original maps located at the National Archives, which likely remained in the possession 
of the 7th FSC, I located other original copies in the papers of Guy Dawnay, the XXth Corps 
commander Lord Philip Chetwode, Richard Meinertzhagen (unsurprisingly), and in the XXth 
Corps War Diary. This broad scattering of original operation map editions indicates that the 
maps were distributed at least down to corps headquarters. Second, the number of copies printed, 
as the 7th FSC war diary records, (fifteen or sixteen on most days) suggests that the maps were 
distributed down to division level, assuming that each headquarters received only one map. 
Furthermore, Meinertzhagen wrote in his diary that the maps were distributed to corps and 
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division commanders (Meinertzhagen 1960, 224).
20
 Dispatches located in Dawnay’s papers 
record that copies of the operation maps—likely the later, 1:500,000 scale reprints—were sent to 
the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) in London along with General Allenby’s report 
on the progress of the campaign (Dawnay, “Note on Operations on the Palestine Front for 
C.I.G.S. and D.M.O., 17/11/17).  
 The products of the document-distribution phase were the operation maps, which were 
the vehicle for disseminating the geographic knowledge produced by the information-gathering 
and information-processing phases. While the mechanics of this phase seem rather simple, they 
are vital to the understanding not only how these maps were created from the inputs of the 
preceding phases, but also how they were ultimately used in the next phase of the EEF 
cartographic system. In my next section I will show that how the maps were produced as well as 
to whom they were distributed provides evidence about their purpose and end-use, and that both 
their purpose and use changed over the course of the campaign. 
Document-Use  
 
Figure 4.11. Document-use phase of Woodward’s cartographic framework modified to reflect specific elements of the EEF. 
 
 The fourth and final phase of the EEF cartographic framework—document-use—is 
directly relevant to my second research question regarding the purpose and use of the operation 
                                                             
20 This note appears on page 224 of Meinertzhagen’s (1960) published Army Diary, though not in his original diary located at 
Rhodes House at Oxford University.  
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maps. I relied upon several sources to determine how the maps were used by individuals in the 
EEF. First, the pattern of the printing and distribution of the maps, which I have already 
discussed, provided some clues as to how they were used during the campaign. Also, the conflict 
recorded in Meinertzhagen’s diary between himself and Dawnay concerning the content of the 2 
November map gave more clues. Finally, Dawnay’s own papers and his copies of the dispatches 
sent by the EEF GHQ to the CIGS in London indicated an evolving purpose for the maps that 
was also indicated by their changing format. Finally, the information that the maps present or 
omit is one of the strongest indicators of their purpose. All of these sources indicate that the 
maps were an important operational level planning tool for the EEF and its subordinate corps 
headquarters in the opening phases of the Gaza offensive, but as the campaign reached its 
successful conclusion their purpose shifted towards recording for history the accomplishments of 
the EEF in Palestine. The products of this phase—namely, the operations orders issued and 
military operations conducted by the EEF after the start of the Gaza offensive—completed the 
cycle of this cartographic system by setting the conditions for the force to gather further 
information on each successive day.    
 The pattern of printing and distribution for the operation maps recorded in the 7th FSC 
war diary was the first indication of their purpose. While the number of copies printed was high 
during the opening days of the offensive around Gaza and Beersheba—between 30 and 90 copies 
each day from 28 October through 8 November—the number of sheets slowed to a trickle of 
fifteen or sixteen per day for the remainder of the offensive (7th FSC WD, 31/11/17 through 
22/12/17). Ninety copies would have been enough to give a copy to every brigade in the EEF, 
though such a broad distribution seems unlikely. A more realistic explanation is that 7
th
 FSC 
produced a surge of maps at the beginning of the battle when time and resources were abundant, 
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but had to economize once the constraints imposed by offensive operations began to show 
(Dawnay to his wife, 29/11/17). The fifteen copies of the maps printed in a normal day would 
have been enough to send one copy to each of the ten division and three corps headquarters in 
the EEF, with the remaining two maps being held at GHQ and at the 7th FSC.
21
 
 What does this pattern indicate about the purpose of the maps? Except for the opening 
days of the offensive, when the 7th FSC printed between 30 and 90 operation maps, the limited 
number of copies of each day’s edition would have restricted the distribution of the documents to 
large formation headquarters. This indicates that these maps were intended to be used by 
headquarters staffs of divisions or corps to make operational level decisions, and not by brigades 
or smaller units for tactical level decision-making. This information on who was using the maps 
is important because division-level and larger headquarters possessed groups of staff officers 
whose role it was to plan large-scale operations and issue operation orders to their subordinate 
headquarters.  
 As to how these maps were used, the Meinertzhagen-Dawnay disagreement over the 2 
November operation map gave insight into their purpose. First, some background is necessary: 
the most capable corps commander in the EEF was Major General Chetwode, commander of XX 
Corps—the infantry force sent to attack Beersheba on the east flank. However, as Dawnay 
recorded, some misgivings about Chetwode’s decision-making processes existed, including that 
he often responded too strongly to perceived enemy movements instead of executing his own 
planned operations and forcing the enemy to respond to his force’s maneuvers (Dawnay to his 
wife, 3/11/17; Meinertzhagen 1960, 220). As the British attack on Beersheba developed, the 
German commander of the Turkish forces on the Gaza-Beersheba line, General Kress von 
                                                             
21 Meinertzhagen states in his Army Diary that 25 copies of the maps were printed each day, a figure that does not match the 7th 
FSC’s official records (Meinertzhagen 1960, 225). 
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Kressenstein, responded in a manner the British had not anticipated. British planning foresaw 
von Kressenstein either moving his reserve divisions (the 7th, 19th, and 26th Divisions) from 
their positions north of the front directly to the Beersheba area, or alternately keeping them close 
to Gaza to repulse a strong frontal attack there. Instead, von Kressenstein moved his reserves to 
the extreme east end of the front, into rough country to the north-east of Beersheba, in an attempt 
to draw the British right flank into a slow and fruitless fight there. Such a distraction would have 
prevented the British from decisively attacking the Turkish forces still holding the center of the 
line in the Sheria-Hareira sector (Dawnay to un-named recipient, November ’17).  
 Dawnay and Meinertzhagen even disagreed regarding whether this Turkish maneuver 
was a blunder. Dawnay viewed von Kressenstein’s actions as a brilliant move and perhaps his 
only hope in stalling the British offensive (Dawnay to his wife, 12/11/17). This reflected 
Dawnay’s doubts about Chetwode, whose responsibility it was to both deal with the additional 
Turkish forces on his flank and continue the offensive from the recently-captured town of 
Beersheba northwestward to smash the center of the Turkish defenses. Meinertzhagen, on the 
other hand, viewed the Turkish movement to the flank as a blunder because it prevented them 
from reinforcing their forces in the center where the next British blow would fall (Meinertzhagen 
1917, Vol. 20 46). Where both men agreed was in the actions they believed that Chetwode 
needed to take with his corps; he needed to continue his advance on the Sheria-Hareira sector 
with as much force as possible, leaving as few troops as prudent to cover the Turkish units to the 
north and north-east of Beersheba. Though Dawnay himself did not record any disagreement 
with Meinertzhagen over the operation maps, the editions of 2–4 November—as well as 
Dawnay’s own reservations about Chetwode—both bore out Meinertzhagen’s account and 
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provided unique and valuable insight into how the operation maps were used both by the EEF 
GHQ and by the subordinate corps headquarters. 
 The operation map of 2 November was the subject of Meinertzhagen’s alleged 
disagreement with Dawnay. This map depicted the Turkish 19th and 26th Divisions having 
moved from their initial locations—in reserve near Beit Hanun and Hareira (see Figure 1.1), 
respectively—to new locations north and northwest of Beersheba. The map depicted both of 
these formations with large rectangular symbols covering a broad front, indicating units of some 
strength (right side, Figure 4.12).
22
 This reflected Meinertzhagen’s—and likely his subordinate 
staff’s—view of this maneuver as being a blunder by von Kressenstein because the symbols 
emphasize this particular Turkish movement and by comparison minimize the strength of the 
defenses in the Turkish center (left, Figure 4.12).  
 But according to Meinertzhagen, Dawnay “refused to credit” the intelligence represented 
by this map and ordered it withdrawn (Meinertzhagen 1917, Vol. 20 46). This order reflected 
Dawnay’s view that the flank maneuver by the Turks was particularly dangerous because it 
might prompt Chetwode to commit too much of his force to fruitless fighting north of Beersheba 
and thus stall his vital attack on the center of the Turkish line, with the result that the entire 
British offensive might bog down in indecision. The operation map of 3 November showed the 
Turkish 19th and 26th Divisions back at their original reserve locations, though the uncertainty 
of their actual position was indicated by the use of hollow rectangle symbols rather than the 
usual solid blocks, in addition to question marks (attenuation symbols) next to the units, as well 
as arrows and text stating that “Part or all of this Div. may have moved southeastward” (upper 
left corner, Figure 4.13). The 4 November map then returned the symbol for the 19th Division 
                                                             
22 Interestingly, the later reprint of this map in the 1:500,000 format reduced the size of the symbols representing these divisions, 
bringing the maps into closer accord with reality.  
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back to its probable true location northeast of Beersheba, corroborating Meinertzhagen’s account 
of Dawnay’s having disputed the 2 November map (Figure 4.12), thereby forcing Meinertzhagen 
and his staff to revise the unit positions for the 3 November edition (Figure 4.13), then accepting 
Meinertzhagen’s analysis of the situation on 4 November (Figure 4.14) (Meinertzhagen 1917, 
Vol. 20 48). 
 
Figure 4.12. Facsimile showing the 2 November operation map’s depiction of the situation on the Beersheba flank. Note the 
large symbols used to denote the Turkish 26th and 19th Divisions. 
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Figure 4.13. Facsimile showing the 3 November operation map’s depiction of the situation on the Beersheba flank. Note the 19 th 
and 26th Divisions denoted by hollow boxes at their original positions further west with dashed lines and question marks marking 
where the staff believed they had moved. 
 
Figure 4.14. Facsimile showing the 4 November operation map’s depiction of the situation on the Beersheba flank. The 19 th 
Division was returned to the Beersheba flank, where it had likely been since 2 November, but was now represented by a more 
appropriately sized symbol. The horizontal distance of these three figures is approximately twenty-five miles. These three figures 
are intended to be printed in color. 
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This episode speaks directly to how the maps were used and to their importance in the 
EEF’s decision-making process. Far from simply being graphical rosters of British and Turkish 
unit positions, these maps allowed the British commanders to gauge at a glance the weight of 
Turkish forces arrayed against various points of their own lines and to make decisions about how 
to array their own forces in response. In present-day U.S. military terminology, these pre-
planned alternatives for dealing with predicted or unanticipated enemy actions are called 
‘decision points’ and are graphically represented on operational planning maps (US Army 2004, 
1-45). The 7
th
 FSC’s operation maps were an early form of this sort of military decision-making 
in which a headquarters staff attempts to predict the different courses of action the enemy force 
might take and then presents pre-planned and simplified alternatives to the commander about 
how to deal with the situation. In this case, Allenby and Chetwode needed to decide how to 
respond to von Kressenstein’s unexpected movement to the far eastern flank of the line, and the 
dispute indicated that the map’s content was central to their decision-making process, as I will 
elaborate below. 
 Meinertzhagen knew that the operation maps would be an important factor in decisions 
about the course of the campaign and he attempted to use them to convince his superiors to stay 
the course and continue the attack towards Hareira and Sheria in the center of the Turkish line. 
Dawnay, knowing Chetwode’s competent—but in this case counter-productive—tendency to 
“meet troops with troops,” and also realizing Allenby’s tendency to trust his subordinates and 
allow them to run their units without undue interference, feared that the 2 November map would 
lead Chetwode to divert too many of his troops away from the central assault. He therefore 
intervened to alter the maps being sent to Chetwode so that the bulk of the Turkish reserves on 3 
November appeared to be arrayed northwest of XX Corps rather than to the northeast. Ironically, 
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both Meinertzhagen and Dawnay wanted the same outcome: for Chetwode to continue his attack 
northwest with minimal diversion of forces. Their disagreement about the operation maps 
indicated that both men believed these documents were an influential part of their commanders’ 
decision-making process, and also revealed the role the maps played at the EEF GHQ and corps 
headquarters level of operational planning. 
 The product of these decisions and of this phase in general were the operation orders that 
turned the EEF and corps commanders’ choices into actions by their troops. The war diaries of 
all the major units in the EEF contain copies of these operation orders. While none of the orders 
that I have found referred to the operation maps directly, the influence of the maps on how 
campaign developed is clear. After the war, when the typically humble Allenby was receiving 
accolades for the success of his campaign, he gave credit to the role of intelligence in his 
decisions. These decisions took the form of orders issued to his troops, and much of the 
intelligence was communicated by the operation maps (Sheffy 2004, xvi). These maps, as an 
efficient and effective medium to simplify and communicate the diverse information available to 
the staff officers of the EEF, prompted Allenby and his corps commanders to move their forces 
in one direction or another in response to enemy maneuvers. These new operations, in turn, 
completed the cycle of the cartographic framework by moving the British forces into contact 
once again with Turkish forces (or not) and thus gathering further information that needed to be 
processed, distributed, and ultimately used. 
 Thus, with my alteration of the Woodward cartographic framework now complete and 
one of my research questions—what was the purpose of the operation maps?—answered, I am 
ready to move on in the following chapter to my second research question: what sources of 
information do each of the successive editions of the operation maps represent? Woodward’s 
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framework provides me with an effective lens through which to analyze the maps and to try to 
choose from among my multiple hypotheses as to the relative influence of each of the various 
information-gathering entities within the EEF cartographic system.  
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Chapter 5. Operation Map Analysis 
In this chapter I present my evidence relating to my initial research question: what sources of 
intelligence did each of the operation maps represent? In Chapter 4 I created a conceptual 
framework for attacking this question by modifying David Woodward’s framework to reflect the 
specific cartographic structure of the EEF. This allowed me to determine the specific processes 
used by elements of the EEF to gather and process information and to distribute this information 
using the operation maps. I identified six general sources of information in this structure: signal 
intercepts, aerial reconnaissance, ground reconnaissance and contact, prisoner and deserter 
statements, and agent networks, or a combination of these. These six sources represent the six 
working hypotheses I used to analyze the migrating unit symbols on the operation maps. As I 
described in the preceding chapter, the processes by which these sources gathered and transferred 
information provided considerable evidence about the information the operation maps could (and 
could not) have provided. 
 I will present my analysis of each map in chronological order because my research 
indicated that the information depicted on the operation maps built upon itself insofar as one 
day’s events often determined the symbols on the next day’s map. This chronological structure 
also fits the three-phase progression of the battle, namely, the initial set-piece stage, the mobile 
pursuit phase, and the reestablishment of the front in central Palestine. These operational phase 
transitions corresponded to changes in how the operation maps were produced and used. As I 
will show, the operation maps were most complete, accurate, and operationally useful in the 
early set-piece stage of the battle, when the situation was relatively well-known, and later on 
briefly as a tool to reestablish a coherent picture of the operational situation during the third 
phase, when the front was being reestablished. In the intervening period the maps provided an 
104 
 
often frustrating record of confusion and guesswork, while those editions produced at the very 
end of the campaign, in late November and early December, were intended to be historical 
artifacts rather than operational tools.
1
      
 
Figure 5.1. Overview of the theater of operations in which the 3rd Battle of Gaza campaign was fought including major towns, 
roads, railroads, and water features. The darker brown areas represent elevated or rough terrain. (This figure is intended to be 
printed in color) 
 
 
                                                             
1 For a comprehensive table of my results regarding the most probable hypothesis for the sources of information locating and 
identifying each Turkish unit on each edition of the operation maps, see Appendix B. 
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Phase 1: Set-Piece Assaults and Cartographic Frustration, 28 October to 6 November 
 The first phase of the Gaza-Beersheba offensive, which lasted from 28 October until 6 
November, represented a period during which the battlefield was well-known and the enemy 
situation was reasonably clear. These conditions were ideal for how the EEF leadership used the 
maps, namely as decision-making aids that discerned the enemy order of battle and its 
deployment. During these operationally stable periods the drafters of the operation maps could 
rely on redundant sources of information to check their analysis against reasonably sure 
baselines. But as the battle developed the number of units involved increased, the maps indicated 
that the cartographic process broke down because information became scarce, uncertain, and 
contradictory. These conditions forced the EEF staff to plot Turkish positions based on flimsy 
evidence that often originated from single sources, which frustrated their efforts to present a 
clear and accurate interpretation of the battlefield. As such, the maps for these days demonstrated 
both the strengths and limitations of operation mapping.  
The Multi-Source Baseline: 28 October 
 The operation maps’ first edition, which was printed on the evening of 28 October and 
depicted the situation as known by the EEF GHQ as of 6 pm on that day, represented the 
accumulation of intelligence-gathering activity by the EEF since the end of the 2nd Battle of 
Gaza in April 1917. The static nature of the front during this time and the proximity of the 
opposing armies allowed both sides to use multiple sources of information to develop a thorough 
and accurate picture of the location and identification of their opponent’s units. For the first 
several days of the 3rd Battle of Gaza, this map served as a reliable baseline with which the EEF 
intelligence staff could adjust the positions of both the Turkish forces and their own. As such, 
this map was particularly important and I will describe it in detail by noting where the 
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information for each of the map’s unit symbols originated. I will start at the north-west end of the 
front line around Gaza and move south-east through the central Hareira-Sheria sector, before 
ending at the Beersheba flank (see Figure 5.2).  This progression divides the front into three 
distinct sections just as the EEF intelligence summaries did. 
 
Figure 5.2. Detailed overview of the initial front line running between Gaza and Beersheba with important points on the line 
annotated. (This figure is intended to be printed in color) 
The Gaza Sector 
 At the start of the battle the British knew the positions of their own forces with great 
accuracy due the robustness and redundancy of their communications (see for example XXI 
Signal Coy WD, “Diagram of Communications, XXIst Corps”). Musgrave and Meinertzhagen 
apparently didn’t even see the need to differentiate the symbols depicting the British XXI Corps 
units arrayed against Gaza, which was the most congested portion of the front. They decided 
instead to represent these units with unlabeled red blocks (lower left in figure 5.3). The Turkish 
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units around Gaza, consisting of—from west to east in the front line—the 53rd and 3rd 
Divisions, and in reserve the 7th and 19th Divisions under the direction of the Turkish XXII 
Corps, were depicted in greater detail. 
 
Figure 5.3. Facsimile of a portion of the 28 October operation map showing the Gaza sector of the front. The horizontal distance 
of this figure is approximately ten miles. (This figure is intended to be printed in color) 
 The symbol for the headquarters of the Turkish XXII Corps on the 28 October map
2
 was 
located atop the ridge and in the orchard groves north of the town of Gaza (Figure 5.3). The 
                                                             
2 For complete reproductions of each day’s operation map, see Appendix D. 
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presence of this corps on the Palestine front had been confirmed by a deserter in August, and this 
fact was corroborated by signal intercepts from the Turkish wireless station at Gaza and from the 
Turkish headquarters in the ensuing months (GHQ IS, 10/8/17; GHQ IS, “Map of enemy W/T 
stations in Syria and Palestine corrected to 4/10/17” in). The XXII Corps headquarters would 
have been housed in bunkers or dugouts and thus hidden from British RFC tactical 
reconnaissance missions. Moreover, my rough analysis of the topography (see Chapter 4) 
indicates that its location was secure from direct observation by British units south of Gaza as 
well as from ships off the coast. Therefore, the most convincing hypothesis for the source of 
information about the location and identification of this headquarters was a combination of 
deserter statements and signal intercepts. 
 The 53rd Division on the 28 October map was shown occupying the trenches at the far 
west end of the line, with its 161st Regiment anchoring the flank on the shoreline at Sea Post and 
the 163rd Regiment farther inland at Rafa Redoubt (Figures 5.2 and 5.3). This division’s 79th 
Regiment was depicted in reserve in the orchards north of Gaza (lower left of Figure 5.3). The 
53rd Division’s presence on the Palestine front had been established by statements from a 
deserter who crossed the lines from Ali Muntar ridge on 30 July. The division’s position was 
confirmed shortly thereafter by other means, probably wireless interception, though the record 
was ambiguous on this score (GHQ IS, 30/7/17 and 17/8/17). The date of this division’s final 
deployment into the line prior to the start of the battle and the position of its regiments on 28 
October was learned from several soldiers, who had deserted the 163rd Regiment as well as from 
others who had left the 7th Division’s 134th Regiment. These deserters had crossed over on 21 
October and revealed that the 53rd had relieved the 24th Division in the trenches along the coast. 
They also stated that the 24th Division (I will discuss this unit more fully below) had in turn 
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moved south-east and relieved the 7th Division in the central sector (GHQ IS 21/10/17). Other 
deserters arriving at the British lines identified the 161st Regiment during the second week of 
October (GHQ IS 13/10/17). No specific sources were recorded for the location of the 79th 
Regiment, but its location—protected from direct observation from both ground and air 
reconnaissance—indicated that its position was probably pointed out by deserters from one of its 
sister regiments. The presence of troops in the Turkish trenches between the coast and Rafa 
Redoubt was confirmed by constant observation and patrolling from the opposite British 
fortifications, though this does not appear to have contributed to the identification of the Turkish 
units. Therefore, deserter statements were the most plausible source of information leading to the 
depiction of the 53rd Division and its subordinate regiments on the 28 October operation map.  
 Southeast of the 53rd Division, the Turkish 3rd Division was shown occupying the 
elaborate fortifications crowning Umbrella Hill and Ali Muntar ridge south of Gaza. Its 138th, 
31st, and 32nd Regiments were in the line from northwest to southeast, respectively, with 
battalions in reserve in the orchards and cactus groves atop the hill (bottom center of Figure 5.3). 
Like the 53rd, the 3rd Division was identified on the Gaza front in July 1917 and confirmed—
probably by wireless, though the intelligence summary failed to specify the source—in August 
(GHQ IS, 30/7/17 and 17/8/17). This division entered the front line in early September and 
immediately began hemorrhaging a steady stream of deserters, several of whom were described 
as either “reliable” or “intelligent.” These deserters identified the location of each of the 3rd 
Division’s regiments to the nearby British (various GHQ IS from 17/9/17 through 27/10/17). 
Given that these units occupied the most elaborate fortifications along the Turkish line, they 
would have been rather difficult to identify either by ground or aerial reconnaissance. Therefore, 
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the best explanation for their location and location on the 28 October map is the statements from 
these deserters. 
 The Turkish 7th Division was depicted several miles north of Gaza by a single large 
block symbol with attached text noting the number of its battalions and identity of its regiments 
(top right of Figure 5.3). This division was known to be in reserve due to statements by deserters 
from the 53rd Division, which it had been relieved in the line by the previously displaced 24th 
Division (GHQ IS, 21/10/17). The 7
th
 Division’s presence in the Gaza sector was first detected in 
mid-July 1917, when a British raid on the Sea Post fortification captured prisoners who revealed 
their unit’s identity (GHQ IS, 18/7/17). Thereafter, a trickle of deserters from each of the 
division’s three regiments allowed the British to track the 7th’s movement to posts farther east in 
the Turkish line and from thence into reserve positions farther north along the coast (various 
GHQ IS from 18/7/17 to 21/10/17). However, these statements were insufficient to provide a 
precise location for the division on the 28 October map. These location data came from RFC 
aerial reconnaissance missions that devoted great effort before the start of the offensive to 
counting tents and shelters (T&S) behind the Turkish lines as indicators of the presence of large 
bodies of troops (GHQ IS, 22/9/17). Even so, these aerial missions were unable to identify units 
solely by the presence of tents. Thus, the likely sources of information for the location and 
identification of the Turkish 7th Division on the 28 October map appears to have been a 
combination of deserter statements and aerial reconnaissance. 
 The second division held in reserve by the Turks—the 19th—was the most recent arrival 
to the Palestine front of any of the Turkish formations. Like the 7th Division, the 19th was 
depicted by a single large block symbol with associated descriptive text in the vicinity of Beit 
Hanun, northeast of Gaza (center of Figure 5.3). How the British tracked this illustrated the value 
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of wireless intercepts and agents reports to the British information-gathering effort. The first 
mention of the 19th Division in the EEF intelligence summaries was an entry indicating that the 
unit was in Allepo in Syria at the end of August (GHQ IS, 25/8/17). A second “usually reliable” 
agent reported the division’s subordinate regiments at the railroad junction of Rayak (in present-
day Lebanon) on 20 October (GHQ IS, 20/10/17). This second report illustrated the slowness 
with which such information reached the EEF, insofar as the British had already used wireless 
intercepts to track the transit of each of the 19th Division’s subordinate units through Rayak 
between 23 September and 11 October (GHQ IS, 24/10/17). Having confirmed the arrival of this 
unit to the theater, the British needed only to pinpoint its location on the front. This was 
accomplished on 25 October, when an RFC mission sighted 220 new tents near Beit Hanun 
(GHQ IS, 26/10/17). That mission report provided the evidence that Meinertzhagen’s officers 
used to plot the location of the 19th Division. This case illustrates how the British used multiple 
methods to follow an enemy unit’s progress into the theater and then employed their own 
intelligence-gathering means to pinpoint its location on the front. The dominant sources in this 
instance were signal intercepts and aerial reconnaissance, supplemented by agent networks. 
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Figure 5.4. Annotated facsimile of the area of the 28 October operation map showing the central (Hareira-Sheria) sector of the 
front. The horizontal distance of this figure is approximately twenty miles. (This figure is intended to be printed in color) 
 
Hareira-Sheria Sector 
 Moving southeast along the front lines brings us next to the central portion of the Turkish 
front, called the “Hareira-Sheria sector” or simply the “Hareira sector” in the British records. 
This portion of the front was the responsibility of the Turkish XX Corps—consisting of the 54th, 
26th, 16th, and 24th Divisions—with its headquarters in Sheria3 (Figure 5.2). This corps’ 
existence was confirmed by the same deserter who identified each of the other two Turkish corps 
                                                             
3 British maps and intelligence documents were inconsistent in their naming conventions, which reflected the difficulty in 
translating foreign names into English. For example, Beersheba was referred to variously as Beersheba, Beersaba, Bar Saba, 
Saba, and Tel el Saba in GHQ intelligence summaries. As a convention, I chose to refer to place names by their most common 
and simplest form in the British documents, which sometime contradicted the names shown on the operation maps, as in the case 
of Sheria vs. Tel el Sheria in Figure 5.4.    
113 
 
on the Palestine front in August 1917 (GHQ IS, 10/8/17). However, like the other corps- and 
army-level headquarters, this one’s location and identity were continually tracked by the 
transmissions from its wireless set (GHQ IS, “Map of enemy W/T stations in Syria and Palestine 
corrected to 4/10/17”). Therefore, the best explanation for the location and identification of this 
headquarters on the 28 October map was signal intercepts and deserter statements. 
 In the northwest of the Hareira sector the Turkish 54th Division was shown on 28 
October deployed in and around Tank Redoubt with two of its regiments—the 164th and 
165th—in the trenches and one—the 19th—in reserve (upper left of Figure 5.4).4 A trickle of 
deserters had heralded this division’s arrival at the front in August, though far fewer crossed over 
from this unit than from the divisions in the Gaza sector, where the opposing lines were closer to 
each other. This information was corroborated by RFC missions that noted large increases in the 
number of tents in the Hareira-Sheria area (GHQ IS, 2/8/17 and 6/8/17). In October, deserters’ 
statements allowed the British intelligence staff to track the normal rotation of the 54
th
 Division’s 
regiments between the trenches and their reserve camp behind the Tank Redoubt hill 
(represented by three small green squares in the upper left of Figure 5.4). This camp presented an 
interesting analytical case, as my own rough field-of-view analysis indicated that this reserve 
position was hidden from direct observation by British ground elements. Whereas the front-line 
redoubts could be observed from the British trenches, this reserve camp needed to be located by 
aerial reconnaissance. This aerial pinpointing occurred initially in August, though the identity of 
the units occupying the reserve camp on 28 October was learned from deserter statements prior 
to the beginning of the assault (GHQ IS 26/10/17). These data indicated that deserter statements 
                                                             
4 A redoubt was a strongpoint in the defensive lines characterized by elaborate fortifications that held relatively large numbers of 
troops and machineguns. These redoubts were linked together by more lightly-held intervening stretches of trenches. Tank 
Redoubt was so named because a British tank had been knocked out there in the course of the failed British attack known as the 
2nd Battle of Gaza. This tank had been incorporated into the Turkish defenses after the British withdrew, reportedly being used as 
a wardroom for Turkish battalion officers. 
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and aerial reconnaissance were the most likely sources for the 54th Division’s symbols on the 28 
October operation map. 
 Southeast of the 54th Division, the 26th Division on the 28 October map occupied the 
Atawineh and Hairpin Redoubts with its 58th and 76th regiments, respectively, and with its 59th 
and 78th regiments in reserve north of Sheria (center-left and center of Figure 5.4). The 26th—
due to particularly poor morale and large numbers of deserters—may have been (from the British 
perspective) the best documented unit in the Turkish army. Initially, wireless intercepts (“Agent 
Y”) and prisoners taken from other divisions in July allowed the British to note this unit’s arrival 
in Palestine (GHQ IS 10/7/17, 11/7/17, and 24/7/17). Shortly thereafter the British scored an 
intelligence coup when the battalion commander of the 2nd Battalion, 59th Regiment defected to 
their lines with several of his officers. Such a high-ranking deserter was unusual, and he 
undoubtedly brought with him broad knowledge of his division’s deployment (GHQ IS 31/8/17). 
His arrival preceded a flood of further desertions from each of the 26
th
 Division’s regiments, 
with 58 of 82 deserters from the Turkish army in September coming from this one division 
(GHQ IS 4/10/17). Their statements confirmed the identity of the division’s regiments around the 
two redoubts, as well as the location of the two reserve regiments near Sheria (GHQ IS 
26/10/17). Furthermore, the reserve regiments’ camps had been pinpointed by an RFC mission in 
early October (GHQ IS 3/10/17). Clearly, the information relating to the 26th Division on the 28 
October map came overwhelmingly from the large number of deserters that this division 
provided, supplemented by aerial reconnaissance in the unit’s rear areas. 
 Farther south and east, occupying the section of front straddling the Wadi-el-Sheria, the 
Hareira-Tepe Redoubt, and the Rushdi System (see Figure 5.2), was the Turkish 16th Division, 
consisting of the 47th, 48th, and 125th regiments (low center of Figure 5.4). Entries relating 
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specifically to this division were sparse in the EEF GHQ records, but the sector of the line it 
occupied was the target of heavy aerial reconnaissance because it was beyond the range of 
persistent ground reconnaissance by the British forces. These missions relied upon indirect 
indications of enemy presence, such tents and shelters, new work on entrenchments, and artillery 
positions (RFC WD Vol. 1, 2). The deployment of the division’s regiments was gleaned from a 
deserter of the 47th Regiment who arrived in the British lines in mid-October (GHQ IS 
13/10/17). The paucity of information about this unit in the British records called into question 
the seemingly certain designations that appeared on the 28 October operation map. Based on the 
available evidence, the 16
th
 Division’s location and identify appear to have been derived 
primarily from aerial reconnaissance supplemented by a few deserter statements. The uncertainty 
about this unit’s identity would cause some confusion as the British offensive and Turkish 
reactions made the battlefield conditions more fluid in the coming days.  
 The final and southernmost Turkish unit in the Hareira sector was the already-mentioned 
24th Division, which consisted of the 2nd and 143rd regiments and occupied the Kauwukah 
system of trenches directly south of Sheria (lower right of Figure 5.4). This division was another 
late arrival in the theater, having been tracked passing through the Rayak railway junction by 
wireless intercepts in the first two weeks of September (GHQ IS 26/9/17). The specific 
deployment of this unit on the 28 October map revealed some interesting details about how 
Meinertzhagen’s staff officers resolved conflicting information. During October the 24th 
Division’s two regiments furnished the British with deserters who provided information about its 
deployment in the Kauwukah System (GHQ IS 21/10/17, 26/10/17, 27/10/17). However, other 
deserters—from the Turkish 7th and 54th divisions—stated that the 24th was instead deployed 
farther south around Beersheba (GHQ IS 21/10/17). Thus, on the same day the EEF intelligence 
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officers received reports that the same unit was in two different locations. Meinertzhagen chose 
to present the information provided by the 24th Division deserters after their accounts were 
corroborated by an RFC mission on 25 October, which had sighted an increase in tents in the 
Kauwukah area (RFC WD Vol. 1, 25/10/17; GHQ IS 25/10/17). This information indicated that 
the 24th Division’s location was plotted based primarily on deserter statements with 
confirmation provided by aerial reconnaissance. 
 
Figure 5.5. Annotated facsimile of the Gaza sector of the 28 October operation map. The horizontal distance of this figure is 
approximately ten miles. (This figure is intended to be printed in color) 
 
Beersheba Sector        
 The final sector of the Turkish front—the fortifications around Beersheba—was also the 
farthest from the British trenches (Figure 5.5). These fortifications were thought to be defended 
by a single Turkish infantry division—the 27th—on 28 October, and screened to the west by the 
Turkish 3rd Cavalry Division. Beersheba’s topographical location in a shallow bowl around the 
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Wadi-el-Saba and the presence of the Turkish cavalry on the high ground west of the town (see 
Figure 5.5), prevented British ground forces from observing this area from the south or west. 
These factors influenced Allenby’s decision to assault the town using a flanking maneuver to the 
east, thereby attacking downhill from the Judean foothills with the benefit of good fields of view. 
Beersheba’s distance from the British lines meant that few soldiers from the occupying units 
could easily desert. Thus, information about the 27th Division deployed around the town was 
relatively scanty, though the presence of troops in the fortifications had been well-established by 
aerial reconnaissance. This portion of the map demonstrated how the British would rely on signal 
intercepts and aerial reconnaissance when circumstances prevented them from using deserters or 
direct observation. 
 The Turkish 27th Division, according to British intelligence, consisted of the 67th and 
81st regiments along with one other regiment that either was never identified or never existed. 
Deserters had identified these regiments around Beersheba in July and August 1917, but this 
report was followed by a long stretch of time during which the intelligence summaries omitted 
any mention of these units. This silence lasted until a deserter from the 81st Regiment crossed 
over on 27 October, just before the start of the offensive (GHQ IS 30/7/17, 1/8/17, 27/10/17). 
The lack of information in the intervening period prompted at least one report by the intelligence 
staff that the Turks had evacuated Beersheba. The presence of a third regiment around Beersheba 
was indicated by wireless intercepts (“reliable”) in mid-September, while the presence of the 
27th’s headquarters in the town was confirmed when a wireless station began operating there a 
few days later (GHQ IS 19/9/17, 21/9/17). Additionally, RFC missions over the town provided a 
steady stream of reports about the locations of camps, horse lines, and artillery positions (RFC 
WD Vol. 1, 25/10/17 through 30/10/17). Thus, while the specific deployments depicted on the 28 
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October for the 67th and 81st regiments likely came from the deserter who arrived on 27 
October, the primary sources of information of the 27th Division were aerial reconnaissance and 
signal intercepts. 
 The Turkish 3rd Cavalry Division was unique among the units depicted on the 28 
October map insofar as both its location and the identification of two of its three regiments were 
derived primarily from direct ground observation. One of the division’s regiments—the 27th 
Cavalry—was shown far to the north of Beersheba in front of the Kauwukah fortifications (lower 
right of Figure 5.4). The other two—the 6th and 8th cavalry regiments—were deployed on the 
high ground to the west of Beersheba, screening the town and its fortifications from view (left 
side of Figure 5.5). Only one deserter and one prisoner from this division were captured by the 
British in the period from July until the start of the Beersheba-Gaza offensive, but the GHQ 
intelligence summaries were replete with reports of direct observations of Turkish cavalry by 
ground and aerial assets (see GHQ IS 15/9/17 and 16/10/17 for example). As cavalry were easier 
to spot than infantry from the both ground and the air, the British consistently overestimated the 
strength of this division (GHQ IS 1/8/17). The 27th cavalry regiment was certainly located and 
identified by a combination of aerial reconnaissance and signal intercepts, but—in the absence of 
other data—the remaining two cavalry regiments and their screen line on the 28 October map 
appear to have been under observation by the nearby British 53rd Division, a conclusion I based 
on my own rough field-of-view analysis. Thus, ground reconnaissance appears to have been the 
primary source for these symbols, supplemented by aerial reconnaissance and signal intercepts. 
 The 28 October operation map as a whole was unique in the entire series of operation 
maps because it represented the accumulated knowledge of unit positions gathered by the EEF 
over a number of months, rather than the rapid-fire daily tracking of a dynamic situation that the 
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subsequent maps represented. This map’s heavy reliance on multiple information sources for 
each unit symbol emphasized the importance of the information gathering phase of the EEF 
cartographic system. Except in the case of spies, the speed at which information could be 
processed and given to the mapmakers does not appear to have restricted what was depicted on 
this map. Furthermore, the evidence pertaining to the location and identity of each Turkish unit 
appears to have been generally unambiguous, a fact that further deemphasized the importance of 
the information-processing phase. The dominant source of information for the information 
depicted on this map was the statements by Turkish deserters. This source was usually confirmed 
by signal intercepts and aerial reconnaissance.  
Altogether, the 28 October map proved the most complete picture the British GHQ would 
make of the battlefield in the coming campaign. As the offensive commenced and increasing 
numbers of units maneuvered on each succeeding day, the following maps began to exhibit less 
confidence in the mapmakers’ depiction of enemy and even friendly positions. 
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Figure 5.6. Overview of the major maneuvers conducted by both armies during the first phase of the 3rd Battle of Gaza (29 
October to 6 November). (This figure is intended to be printed in color)  
The Assault: 29 October - 6 November 
 The editions of the 7
th
 FSC operation maps that recorded the British approach to and 
assault on the Beersheba-Gaza line illustrate the context in which these maps excelled: a 
comprehensively analyzed and thoroughly planned set-piece battle. The British offensive opened 
with the dramatic assault by the Desert Mounted and XX
5
 Corps on the Turkish flank at 
Beersheba (Figure 5.6). In the ensuing days the British continued their advance from Beersheba 
                                                             
5 In British military naming conventions, corps are generally referred to simply as “XX (twenty) Corps,” rather than the US style 
of saying and writing “the XXth (twentieth) Corps.” As I am discussing British military formations, I chose to employ this 
convention in my own writing.   
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towards the central sector of the Turkish line. Once many of the Turkish reserve forces had been 
drawn east, the EEF launched a direct frontal assault on the Gaza defenses. During these nine 
days of operations the relative importance of the information-processing, document-distribution, 
and document-use phases of the EEF cartographic framework increased, while the information-
gathering phase relied less on deserters and more on ground reconnaissance and signal intercepts. 
 The 29 and 30 October operation maps (not shown) contained no significant 
modifications to the EEF’s picture of the Turkish army’s deployment. This was not surprising 
insofar as the few reports in the GHQ intelligence summaries for these days generally reinforced 
the picture presented on the 28 October map. One minor exception was the Turkish 19
th
 
Division, which moved slightly west to the area around Huj. This movement had been revealed 
by wireless intercepts and aerial reconnaissance during the day on 30 October (GHQ IS 
30/10/17). Additionally, on 29 October a small skirmish had allowed the British to retrieve the 
body of a Turkish soldier, whose papers confirmed the location of the Turkish 16th Division 
(GHQ IS 29/10/17). Aside from these two incidents, the only significant differences between two 
maps and the 28 October map was that they tracked the British Desert Mounted and XX Corps’ 
incremental progress eastwards to their assault positions around Beersheba. EEF GHQ had 
ordered all British units to send situation reports at regular intervals; these reports contained, 
among other information, the location of these units’ headquarters as well as the locations of 
their subordinate formations (XX WD Vol. 1, “Force Order No. 54”). Thus, the communications 
systems of the EEF—mostly cable telephone and telegraph at this point—were the primary 
sources of information for the changes to these maps, emphasizing the importance of information 
processing to the mapmaking process. 
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Figure 5.7. Annotated facsimile of the 0930 working copy operation map produced on 31 October showing the initial penetration 
of the Beersheba perimeter by the British 60th Division and the flanking advance of the British cavalry. The horizontal distance of 
this figure is approximately 15 miles. (This figure is intended to be printed in color) 
 
Figure 5.8. Annotated facsimile of the 4pm working copy of the 31 October operation map showing further British advances. 
The horizontal distance of this figure is approximately 15 miles. (This figure is intended to be printed in color) 
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Figure 5.9. Annotated facsimile of the (6pm) final copy of the 31 October operation map. Note that Beersheba is shown still in 
Turkish possession but with British cavalry threatening the town from the east. The British charged and captured Beersheba at 
dusk.  The horizontal distance of this figure is approximately 15 miles. (This figure is intended to be printed in color) 
 The first major deviation from the 28 October map appeared on the several maps that 
depicted the situation on 31 October, the day that the British initiated their assault on Beersheba. 
Throughout the day the British created four working operation maps, which depicted the British 
unit positions from “dawn to 0900,” and at 0930, 1305, and “4pm (?).” These crude maps led to a 
finalized edition depicting the situation of both the British and Turkish forces as known at 6pm. 
The working copies reflected the information recorded in the written dispatches sent to EEF 
GHQ and other headquarters from the XX and Desert Mounted Corps headquarters during the 
day. For example, the “dawn to 0900” map reflected a dispatch to GHQ from XX Corps sent at 
0600 stating that all its forces were in position for the assault (XX WD Appendix I/27). The 0930 
map reflected the initial breach of the Beersheba perimeter by the 60th Division, announced by a 
dispatch sent at 0940 from XX Corps (Figure 5.7) (XX WD Appendix I/34). The time stamp on 
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the dispatch indicated that the time printed on the working maps represented the situation when 
the information was sent rather than when that the map was prepared, whereas the polished final 
operation map represented the situation when the map was printed.   
 The final 31 October map showed the British 60th and 74th Divisions having penetrated 
the Beersheba defenses from the west, while the brigades of the ANZAC Mounted Division 
threatened the town from the east (Figure 5.9). The Turkish 3rd Cavalry Division was shown as 
having withdrawn north into the Kauwukah system and the deployment of the Turkish infantry 
forces in that entrenchment were graphically reordered. In addition, a new cavalry unit identified 
as “4 divisional squadrons” appeared on this map near Sheria (not shown). In the hills to the 
northeast of Beersheba another small force of Turkish cavalry was shown facing off with the 
Australian 2nd Light Horse Brigade (upper right of Figure 5.9) and to the northwest of the town 
the British 53rd Division continued to screen the central sector of the Turkish lines (upper right 
of Figure 5.9). The Turkish reserve regiments shown within the Beersheba perimeter on 30 
October had moved to the surrounding trenches in the south and northeast on 31 October map. 
North of Gaza the symbol representing Turkish 7th Division (not shown) was shifted south to the 
previous location of the 19th Division (see Figure 5.3). Otherwise, the map showed no changes 
to the Turkish positions along the rest of the front. 
    Overwhelmingly the sources of information for the differences between the 30 and 31 
October maps came from ground reconnaissance and contact, with the gathered information 
being transmitted in dispatch form by wire telegraph or telephone after the initial report reached 
a corps headquarters. One indication of this process was the small Turkish cavalry unit opposing 
the 2nd Australian Light Horse in the hills northeast of Beersheba. Instead of an identity, the text 
accompanying this unit’s symbol recorded a strength estimate of “200 sabres” (top right corner 
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of Figure 5.9). The fact that the unit’s strength could be estimated but not its identity, along with 
the close proximity of the British cavalry force, indicated ground reconnaissance as the source of 
this information. Additionally, the movement of the Turkish reserves within the Beersheba 
perimeter could be traced to a specific dispatch revealing another ground reconnaissance report, 
wired to from XX Corps GHQ at 11:15, stating that the 60th Division had observed “an enemy 
body 300 or 400 strong moving from behind the trench line...in a N.N.E. direction” towards the 
trenches being threatened by the horsemen of the Desert Mounted Corps (center of Figure 5.9) 
(XX WD Appendix I/35). Furthermore, the GHQ intelligence summary noted that the presence 
of the two known enemy regiments in the Beersheba perimeter had been confirmed “by contact” 
(GHQ IS 31/10/17). However, neither the maps nor any of the British intelligence summaries 
accounted for the fact that prisoners from nearly all the Turkish regiments portrayed as 
occupying the Kauwukah system were taken in the fighting around Beersheba, a fact that 
indicated an analysis process by Musgrave and Meinertzhagen during the information processing 
phase, which I will discuss below.  
 The presence of a small cavalry unit annotated as “4 divisional squadrons” and the shift 
of the Turkish 3
rd
 Cavalry Division farther north on the map in the Kauwukah system on the 31 
October and 1 November maps (see Figure 5.11) indicated the use of an additional source of 
information besides ground reconnaissance, and also provided insight into the analysis process 
used by Meinertzhagen’s staff. The GHQ War Diary for the 31st recorded that aerial 
reconnaissance had observed three bodies of cavalry converging on a point near Sheria and that a 
later reconnaissance observed 1400-1500 cavalry holding the eastern end of the trenches. The 
narrative then speculated that the smaller groups of cavalry were “Divisional squadrons being 
concentrated with a view towards forming a new composite cavalry regiment” and that the larger 
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body was “probably the 3rd Cavalry Division” (GHQ IS 31/10/17). This entry revealed that the 
presence of cavalry in these two locations was based on hard information gathered through aerial 
reconnaissance, but the identity of these units as indicated on the map—particularly that of the 
divisional cavalry squadrons—was wholly derived through informed speculation. This 
highlighted the influence of staff analysis on the content of these two maps.        
 An additional observation about the final polished copy 31 October map provided 
information about its production schedule because it appeared to confirm Meinertzhagen’s stated 
timeline for submission and printing at 4pm and 6pm, respectively. This process highlighted one 
of the weaknesses of the operation mapping process. Because the map production timeline was 
designed to provide commanders with a product by 6pm, events that occurred after this time 
failed to make it onto the maps. In the case of the operations on 31 October, the key event of the 
day—the capture of the town of Beersheba and its wells in a dramatic cavalry charge—did not 
occur until after 7pm. The final 31 October map showed the Turkish forces still in control of the 
town but being threatened by the XX Corps from the west and the Desert Mounted Corps from 
the east (Figure 5.9). This would have limited the operation map’s usefulness for planning the 
operations for 1 November as the situation on the ground at the end of 31 October was 
drastically different from the reality portrayed, since the Turkish units in the Beersheba defenses 
had actually been destroyed or withdrawn north. The periodic cycle of the operation mapping 
process could break down if operations proceeded more rapidly or more slowly than the officers 
operating within its structure could account for, a fact that would become increasingly important 
when the situation across the front became more fluid in the coming weeks. 
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Figure 5.10. Annotated facsimile of the area of the 0600 1 November working copy operation map showing the situation around 
Beersheba. This map showed the town in British hands and British infantry consolidating their gains to the north. The horizontal 
distance of this figure is approximately 15 miles. (This figure is meant to be printed in color). 
 
Figure 5.11. Annotated facsimile of the finalized 1 November edition operation map showing the area of the front north of 
Beersheba. The horizontal distance of this figure is approximately twenty miles. (This figure is meant to be printed in color) 
128 
 
 
Meinertzhagen and his staff appear to have grasped this weakness in the mapping cycle, 
as they produced another working copy map indicating the updated British unit positions as of 
6am on 1 November, sufficiently early for the maps to have been incorporated into the latter 
parts of the day’s operational planning (Figure 5.10). This working copy map showed the British 
53
rd
 Division moving onto the ridgeline north of Beersheba from whence it could observe the 
Kauwukah trench system, and the 10
th
 Division occupying positions southwest across the Wadi 
Imleh from the Rushdi trench system. The final edition of the 1 November map showed both of 
these units in position with picket lines pushed forward to keep the entire Turkish front line south 
and east of Hairpin Redoubt under observation (Figure 5.11) (GHQ IS 1/11/17).  
The Turkish positions on the southeastern flank of their line, as shown on the final edition 
of the 1 November map, reflected a marked decrease in precision from the editions of previous 
days. Prior to the Beersheba assault nearly every Turkish unit symbol had been accompanied by 
text noting its identity down to the regimental level, but the 1 November map reduced the 
precision of many of these descriptors one step up the chain of command to the division level, 
using large blocks to represent the Turkish 24
th
 and 27
th
 Divisions around Sheria along with 
parenthetical notes listing their subordinate regiments (Figure 5.11). The note next to the 27
th
 
Division—previously garrisoning the Beersheba defenses—indicated that its regiments were 
“remains of” the formations that had participated in the previous day’s actions. The Kauwukah 
and Rushdi trench systems were shown as occupied by a thin picket line rather than the strong 
line of regiments portrayed previously. As with the 31 October map, the 1 November map 
represented a blending of hard information sources with informed speculation and analysis by 
Musgrave, Meinertzhagen, and their subordinate intelligence staff. The loss of precision evident 
on this map reflected an inability by the EEF intelligence officers to easily reconcile their own 
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neat picture of the battlefield with conflicting reports coming from the large number of prisoners 
captured at Beersheba. 
The symbols for the Turkish 24
th
 and 27
th
 Divisions represented aerial reconnaissance 
missions that reported large numbers of troops in motions around Sheria. These missions, 
supplemented by ground reconnaissance from the 10
th
 and 53
rd
 Divisions, kept the Rushdi-
Kauwukah area under continuous observation during the course of the day. Furthermore, 
prisoners captured during the previous day’s fighting from regiments not belonging to the 27th 
Division prompted the EEF intelligence staff to reevaluate their picture of the situation northwest 
of Beersheba (GHQ IS 1/11/17). The regiments of the 24
th
 Division that had been confidently 
portrayed as garrisoning the Kauwukah system on the previous editions of the operation maps 
were now aggregated farther north under their parent division’s symbol (top center of Figure 
5.11). Their replacement with a picket line (left center Figure 5.11) in the trenches represented 
confusion about the actual positions of the Turkish regiments. This confusion arose from the fact 
that prisoners from these formations had been taken in Beersheba, where they should not have 
been according to the British intelligence.
6
 The location of the 24
th
 and 27
th
 Division symbols 
indicated that Meinertzhagen and Musgrave used the aerial reconnaissance reports from this part 
of the front to paint a revised picture of the previous day’s developments, one in which both 
Turkish divisions—rather than just the 27th—had taken part in the fighting and then withdrawn 
north to Sheria in confusion (RFC WD 1/11/17).  
One other detail of the 1 November map worth noting illustrated a further drawback of 
the operation mapping cycle. The map included a small symbol for an infantry formation on the 
                                                             
6 The prisoners taken from Beersheba gave precise information about the composition of the Beersheba garrison that proved to be 
dizzyingly confusing for someone attempting to show a neat and orderly disposition of the Turkish army. For example, prisoner 
statements revealed that a battalion of the 27th Division’s 67th Regiment was actually in Galilee, that a battalion of the 81st 
Regiment was assigned to the 53rd Division around Gaza, and that this battalion had been replaced in the 27th’s order of battle by 
a battalion of the 181st Regiment not previously known to have been on the Palestine front (GHQ IS 1/11/17).  
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far eastern edge with the uncertain note “1 Battn. [battalion]?” (not shown). This symbol 
originated from an early morning aerial reconnaissance mission that had sighted “about 500” 
enemy infantry in this area moving north (GHQ IS 1/11/17). However, no further information 
arrived during the day confirming the location of this significant body of troops, and so the map 
drafters were left with the dilemma of having to speculate on where they had gone. They opted to 
leave the symbol where the initial report had indicated even though the information placing it 
there was almost twelve hours old. This illustrated two points: first, the cycle of the operation 
mapping process forced the intelligence staff in some cases to use old information because there 
were no intervening maps on which to plot enemy positions. Second, Meinertzhagen and his 
officers were being forced to rely on single sources of information and even single reports to 
derive their picture of Turkish deployments, often without confirmation from other sources. This 
contrasted with the multi-source approach that had informed their mapmaking in the more static 
operations prior to the Beersheba assault. This trend would only become more acute as the 
offensive developed.  
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Figure 5.12. Annotated facsimile of the portion of the 2 November operation map showing the Gaza sector of the front. This 
example shows the shallow penetration of the Turkish front line by the British 52nd Division and the deeper penetration along the 
coast by the 54th Division. The horizontal distance of this figure is approximately five miles. (This figure is intended to be printed 
in color) 
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Figure 5.13. Annotated facsimile of the portion of the 2 November operation map showing the central sector of the front. This 
example shows the large symbols representing the Turkish 19th and 26th Divisions at the eastern end of the line and greater clarity 
regarding the Turkish deployments in the Rushdi-Kauwukah area. The horizontal distance of this figure is approximately twenty 
miles. (This figure is meant to be printed in color) 
 
The hours before dawn on the 2 November saw the EEF launch the second phase of the 
offensive: the frontal assault on the trenches defending Gaza. By daybreak the British XXI Corps 
had occupied most of its initial objectives, which consisted of the Turkish front line trenches on 
Umbrella Hill and northwards (Figures 5.2 and 5.12). Their deepest penetration occurred in the 
sand dunes along the coast, where the British 54
th
 Division captured the town of Sheikh Hassan. 
This division was unable, however, to maintain a position on the low ridge that ran parallel to the 
sea and protected Gaza from direct observation (see Figure 5.2) (54 Div. WD 2/11/17). These 
advances were depicted on another working copy operation map representing the situation at 
8am on 2 November (not shown). 
The eastern sector of the front also saw significant—though more controversial—
cartographic development in the already-discussed migration of the Turkish reserve 19
th
 Division 
from its initial position south of Huj to the eastern edge of the line, accompanied by the 26
th
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Division (see Chapter 4). These divisions were shown being opposed by British cavalry 
formations that had moved north from Beersheba since the previous day (right side of Figure 
5.13). The situation in the Kauwukah and Rushdi trench systems was also depicted more 
confidently than on the day prior, perhaps representing the benefit to the EEF staff of twenty-
four hours in which to analyze the large amount of data generated by the capture of Beersheba. 
The only other significant change from the 1 November map was a lengthening of the amount of 
front covered by the Turkish 54
th
 and 16
th
 Division to account for the departed 26
th
 Division 
formations (upper right of Figure 5.13). These symbols represented a growing confidence on 
Meinertzhagen’s part in his process of portraying Turkish deployments. They also highlighted 
the intelligence staff’s tendency at this point to depict their analysis and speculation on the 
operation maps without differentiating these from hard data. 
In the Gaza sector, the 1:100,000 scale of the base line map used by the operation 
mapmakers was too small to adequately show the intricate trench systems and the deployments 
of the units occupying them. This limitation highlighted the fact that the maps were intended to 
support the operational and strategic rather than the tactical levels of planning.
7
 As such, the 
Turkish positions were depicted as a dense line of regiments bending back away from the coast 
opposing the British penetrations of the front (upper left of Figure 5.12). The source of 
information for these symbols on the 2 November map was largely ground reconnaissance and 
contact (Hare, “Report on the 3rd Battle of Gaza”). The arrangement of the Turkish symbols was 
designed to communicate the strong resistance that the British infantry were facing in their 
                                                             
7 The EEF produced some very detailed and effective large-scale tactical maps of this sector of the front. Of particular note is a 
trench map preserved in Chetwode’s papers at the Imperial War Museum that assigned a code name to each individual section of 
trench in the complex Turkish fortifications. This map divided the Gaza sector into three sub-sectors within which all the code 
names followed a consistent theme; for example, women’s names for one sector and men’s names for another. These code names 
were frequently cited in the war diaries of the assaulting XX Corps units to mark their progress into the Turkish defenses. 
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attempt to slog farther into the complex network of trenches around Gaza, rather than to give a 
precise picture of how the various Turkish regiments were arrayed (XXI WD 2/11/17).  
On the eastern end of the line, Meinertzhagen’s interpretation of the battlefield was on 
display more clearly than perhaps in any other example. His decision to portray the 19
th
 and 26
th
 
Divisions on the extreme eastern flank was built on a strong foundation of aerial reconnaissance 
missions that had reported dense clouds of dust indicating an eastward movements of Turkish 
forces. These reports indicated that these two reserve divisions had moved east (GHQ IS 
1/11/17; XX WD Appendix I/78). Even so, Meinertzhagen appears to have jumped the gun in 
pushing his interpretation of the raw data. As noted in Chapter 4, he had not accounted for 
Dawnay and Allenby’s fears about how his confident portrayal of a strong Turkish movement to 
this flank would impact the decision-making of the two British corps commanders at that end of 
the battlefield, Chetwode and Chauvel. Moreover, the 2 November map appeared to illustrate a 
major error of analysis insofar as the 26
th
 Division probably never actually moved from its 
position in the central sector until the Turks had evacuated the line on the night of 6 November.  
This episode illustrated the limitations of long-range reconnaissance by both aerial and 
ground observers, since neither the combined efforts of constant observation by the British 10
th
 
and 54
th
 Divisions nor multiple Royal Flying Corps missions could deduce the identity of the 
Turkish formations in motion behind the front or even determine their direction of travel in some 
cases (XX WD Appendix I/78). The misidentification of the Turkish 26
th
 Division on the 2 
through 4 November operation maps further highlighted the importance of staff analysis in the 
information-processing phase of the cartographic process. This analysis amplified the subjective 
nature of the end-product maps even though clear and concrete sources—in this case aerial and 
ground reconnaissance—were often abundantly available. Disagreement over what these sources 
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of information actually meant could lead to large variations in how the Turkish deployments 
were depicted. 
I have already recounted the dance of the Turkish 19
th
 Division across the next to two 
days’ editions of the operation maps (see Chapter 4). I will not belabor this point further other 
than to note that this unit’s oscillation back and forth across the front from 2 to 4 November 
corroborated the role played by information-processing in the production of the operation map. 
Apart from this, the maps for 3 and 4 November appeared to show—in their liberal use of 
attenuation symbols for nearly all of the Turkish units south and east of Hairpin Redoubt—an 
increasing frustration on the part of Meinertzhagen, Musgrave, and their fellow intelligence 
officers over their superiors’ reluctance in accepting their analyses, as well as frustration with 
their own inability to communicate a clear picture of the confused and rapidly-changing situation 
at the eastern end of the ongoing battle (Figure 5.14). 
 
Figure 5.14. Annotated facsimile showing the central sector of the 3 November operation map highlighting the intelligence 
staff’s use of attenuation symbols to communicate uncertainty and text to denote raw data and analysis. The horizontal distance 
of this figure is approximately twenty miles. (This figure is intended to be printed in color) 
 
On the other hand, these two maps also illustrated an increasing willingness by the 
mapmakers to employ more of Jacques Bertin’s visual variables in altering unit symbols on the 
operation maps to add nuance to the depicted information (Muller 1981, 1-3). Up to this point the 
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operation mapmakers had manipulated the variables of position, orientation, hue and size to 
denote the location, facing, nationality, and relative strength of units on the maps. From this 
point onwards they would also alter the texture and shape of their symbols to communicate 
uncertainty (Figure 5.14), raw data (Figure 5.15), disintegration (Figure 5.16), and motion 
(Figure 5.18). One of the first examples of this occurred on the 3 November operation map, on 
which several Turkish division were represented by hollow rather than solid box symbols. The 
mapmakers in this case altered the symbols’ texture to communicate uncertainty (Figure 5.14). 
 To say that the 3 through 5 November maps represented a cartographic temper tantrum 
on the part of Meinertzhagen and his staff would unjustly impugn their well-demonstrated 
professionalism. Even so, these three maps had an air of someone throwing up their hands and 
saying “you figure it out!” after the rebuff they had received from Dawnay and Allenby on 2 
November. Essentially, the only sure symbols on the eastern flank of the 3 November map were 
representative of raw data being plotted rather than analysis (see Figure 5.14). For example, at 
the southernmost point of the Turkish defenses were two notes stating “decrease in T&S [tents 
and shelters]” on the west side and “increase in T&S” to the east, a sure indicator of the simple 
transcription of an aerial reconnaissance report onto a corresponding location on the map. 
Between these two notes was a small cavalry symbol with its attached text stating “2 small 
cavalry camps,” another example of raw data simply plotted on the map without any attempt at 
interpretation (RFC WD 3/11/17). Farther north nearly every Turkish division was represented 
by a hollow box escorted by a question mark to show Meinertzhagen’s perhaps grudging 
acknowledgement that he and his staff could not definitively identify or even locate these units 
with the information available to them. Even so, Meinertzhagen and Musgrave tentatively 
continued to use their maps to try to show their superiors what they believed was occurring: a 
137 
 
Turkish move to the eastern flank. They did this by showing several of the division markers 
accompanied by line and arrow symbols and text indicating that “Part or all of this Div. may 
have moved E.SE.”  
The 4 and 5 November maps demonstrated somewhat greater clarity, with the 19th 
Division now definitively marked on the eastern flank (though not the 26th Division) along with 
the 16
th
 and 3rd Cavalry Divisions (Figure 5.15). The clarity here represented information 
gathered by contact as the 53rd Division and attendant cavalry brigades skirmished with these 
units and captured prisoners who identified their own units and those nearby. These prisoners 
also provided more distant intelligence that was represented on the maps, including the Turkish 
57th Regiment’s location marked far north of the battle line, clearly informed by a prisoner 
statement that located this unit “4 days march from the front,” as well as the arrival of the 12th 
Depot Regiment
8
 from Jerusalem along the road from Hebron (both not shown) (GHQ IS 
4/11/17). Furthermore, Figure 5.15 shows an example of a new symbol that the intelligence 
officers began to employ during this time: a tent representing a camp observed from the air with 
an attached note indicating the camp’s size. As with the 3 November map, these symbols and 
annotations were examples of raw data transcribed from the GHQ intelligence summaries rather 
than interpretation, but the rest of the 5 November map suggested an intelligence staff getting 
back into the saddle with increasing confidence that their superiors would accept and distribute 
their analysis (GHQ IS 4/11/17 and 5/11/17). 
                                                             
8 This Regiment did not actually reach the front but rather stopped in Hebron, where it remained until early December, opposed 
by a rotation of British units from XX Corps. On some days this unit was the only enemy formation that the British were able to 
positively identify on the operation map. 
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Figure 5.15. Annotated facsimile of the 5 November operation map showing the eastern flank of the front line. The 16th and 19th 
Divisions were identified with greater confidence than on previous days and a new type of symbol representing a camp observed 
from the air is present. The horizontal distance of this figure is approximately ten miles. (This figure is intended to be printed in 
color) 
The 2-5 November maps represented more than an interesting record of cartographic 
uncertainty, interpretation, and contestation. They also showed a staff who learned through their 
frustration to break out of the constraints of the standardized symbols they had been using and to 
be increasingly inventive with how they used the operation maps to communicate their analysis. 
The maps from 6 November onward showed an increasingly broad use of Bertin’s retinal 
variables (especially shape and texture) to manipulate the green and red symbols on the operation 
maps to communicate uncertainty and specific events that they believed were occurring. The first 
example of this occurred on the 6 November map at the eastern flank of the line where the 
Turkish 16th and 19th Division had been portrayed on the previous day. Instead of the usual 
rectangular symbol, on 6 November the units were represented by amoeba-like shapes with green 
dots scattering away from them (Figure 5.16). This was an attempt by Meinertzhagen and his 
staff to communicate their belief that these units were in the process of disintegrating and fleeing 
after their combat with the British XX Corps, who had finally attacked through the Kauwukah 
and Rushdi trench systems towards Sheria and Hareira.  
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Figure 5.16. Annotated facsimile of the eastern flank of the 6 November operation map showing the amoeba symbols that the 
British staff used to represent what they believed were disintegrating Turkish divisions. The horizontal distance of this figure is 
approximately ten miles. (This figure is intended to be printed in color) 
Overall, the cartographic efforts of Meinertzhagen and his staff during the set-piece phase 
of the Gaza-Beersheba offensive demonstrated a transitional learning process mirroring the 
evolving sources and quality of the information available to them. Before the battle began they 
had been able to rely on multiple sources—primarily a combination of deserter statements, signal 
intercepts, and aerial reconnaissance—to confidently triangulate a highly accurate picture of how 
the Turkish forces were arrayed. But as the situation of these forces became increasingly fluid, 
particularly on the Beersheba end of the line, the intelligence staff began to struggle to maintain 
the clarity of the situation depicted on their maps. The rapid pace of events and the rigid 24-hour 
mapmaking cycle forced these operational cartographers to increasingly rely on single sources of 
intelligence and their own interpretation of scarce raw data—gathered mostly through ground 
and aerial reconnaissance in the confusion of combat—to plot where they believed the Turkish 
forces were located. Along the way their picture of reality ran afoul of their superiors because 
Meinertzhagen perhaps (or perhaps not) misread how influential the operation maps could be 
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when interpreted by the British corps commanders, particularly Chetwode. This led, after a brief 
bout of frustration, to an increasingly sophisticated manipulation of map symbols by 
Meinertzhagen’s staff to communicate and differentiate what they knew, what they believed they 
knew, and what they didn’t know about the situation on the ground.  
Phase 2: Mobile Operations and Cartographic Experimentation, 7-14 November 
 With the British XX Corps’ seizure of Hareira and Sheria on 6 November, the position of 
the Turkish army on the Gaza front had become untenable. The Turkish command seems to have 
grasped this fact more quickly than their British opponents. In fact, Dawnay’s dampening of 
Meinertzhagen’s enthusiasm for using the operation maps to communicate analysis rather than 
raw data may have occurred at a particularly inopportune time for the British, since 
Meinertzhagen seems to have eschewed representing his conclusion that the Turks were 
evacuating their line on the 6 November map at the exact moment when this was in fact 
occurring (Meinertzhagen Vol. 20, 48).
9
 The German commander of the Turkish army, General 
Kress von Kressenstein, did in fact extract his remaining forces from the Gaza-Beersheba front 
on 6 November without undue interference from the British troops, who found the opposing 
trenches empty of Turkish troops when they launched a general assault on the night of 6-7 
November. The withdrawal saved from encirclement the Turkish forces that had survived the 
previous weeks’ fighting and foiled the ultimate British objective of destroying von 
Kressenstein’s army.  
                                                             
9 Meinertzhagen claimed in his diary that Dawnay again refused to credit his analysis that the Turks were withdrawing 
(Meinertzhagen Vol. 20, 48). 
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Figure 5.17. Overview of the second phase of the Gaza campaign in which the EEF pursued the retreating Turkish army 
northwards from 7-15 November. (This figure is intended to be printed in color) 
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 This evacuation was also a transformative event for the EEF intelligence staff and 
mapmakers. In the span of a day the EEF had lost contact with nearly the entire Turkish army, 
throwing into confusion months of operational intelligence-gathering. From 7-14 November the 
operational mapmakers struggled each day to piece together a coherent picture of the Turkish 
deployments, a situation made even more difficult by the fact that both the retreating Turkish and 
advancing British units were in motion nearly every day of this period. Indeed, at times the EEF 
command struggled to keep track of its own units, much less those of the enemy. Meinertzhagen 
and his staff were able to piece together the location of bodies of enemy troops from fragmentary 
reports on many days, though almost never during this week of operations were they able to tag 
an identity to these enemy units. This dynamic and confusing operational context prompted the 
EEF intelligence staff to experiment with how they portrayed information on the operation maps,  
daily employing both tested and novel techniques to communicate what they knew and what they 
didn’t, and to differentiate between the two.        
7-8 November: Retreat, Pursuit, and Disappointment 
 The 7 and 8 November editions of the operation maps showed attempts by the EEF 
intelligence officers to use innovative symbols to communicate their analysis, but on a much 
larger scale than before, insofar as the mapmakers, perhaps emboldened by their correct 
prediction of the Turkish evacuation, seemed to regain confidence in their interpretation of the 
situation on the ground. Even so, these maps contained incorrect and incomplete information, as 
both the EEF information-gatherers and information-processors failed to keep pace with the new 
and rapidly changing operational situation of either the Turkish or British forces. Furthermore, 
these maps and the intelligence summaries that informed them highlighted the importance of the 
EEF’s communication systems to the information-processing phase of the cartographic system. 
143 
 
 
Figure 5.18. Annotated facsimile of the 7 November operation map showing two of the three comet-like symbols that depicted 
the Turkish army’s northward retreat (the third such symbol was at the eastern end of the map). This excerpt also shows the 
dashed perimeter attenuation symbol that was used to show the predicted extent of the Desert Mounted Corps’ advance. The 
horizontal distance of this figure is approximately 12 miles. (This figure is intended to be printed in color) 
 The 7 November operation map was notable for two reasons: it used innovative symbols 
to show the incorrectly perceived flight of the Turkish army, and it indicated that the EEF had 
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lost communication with the Desert Mounted Corps, which composed nearly one third of the 
British army. The staff also produced another working copy map showing the location of British 
units at 0830 on 7 November (not shown). This working copy showed the British XXI Corps in 
possession of Gaza and the surrounding fortifications, which had been occupied the previous 
night when XXI Corps had belatedly attacked the abandoned Turkish trenches. In the east, 
Chetwode’s XX Corps was shown deployed in the Turkish fortifications around Hareira and 
Sheria, and the units of the Desert Mounted Corps were located south of XX Corps, preparing for 
its overdue attempt to burst into the Turkish rear areas. From this working copy, the cartographic 
picture would only become less clear.  
The final edition of the 7 November map showed a considerably more confused picture. 
The Turkish army was depicted streaming north by three large symbols. These symbols 
manipulated texture, shape, and direction to show, at a glance, that Meinertzhagen and his staff 
believed that the Turkish army was fleeing in confusion. The symbols were oriented north and 
were squared at their front, but the rear of the symbols were streaming away south like the tail of 
a comet, creating an impression both of movement and of disintegration (two of these are shown 
in Figure 5.18). Text next to these symbols noted the divisions and regiments that each was 
believed to represent. Along the Wadi-el-Hesi—the next defensible line north of Gaza—two 
small and unidentified unit symbols were depicted defending the wadi’s road and railroad 
crossings (left center of Figure 5.18). In contrast to the confusion north of Gaza, farther south the 
Turkish 54th and 26th Divisions were shown in full detail with their positions unchanged from 
the previous day, still holding the trenches between Gaza and Hareira (bottom left of Figure 
5.18). The only major changes to the British deployment on this map from the 0830 working 
copy showed two divisions of XXI Corps having advanced from Gaza to the Wadi-el-Hesi and, 
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more interestingly, a very large area of the map within a red dashed line showing the predicted 
location of the Desert Mounted Corps (lower right of Figure 5.18). 
 The Turkish positions on the final copy of the 7 November map were based almost 
entirely on speculation by the EEF intelligence staff. The exceptions to this were the depiction of 
the Turkish 54
th
 and 26
th
 Divisions—shown still holding their positions in the center of the 
Turkish line—that were located by ground reconnaissance from the British XXI Corps, which 
had occupied the Turkish trenches around Gaza over-looking these units’ fortifications on the 
previous night, as well as the unidentified Turkish rear guards along the Wadi-el-Hesi. These 
rear guards were located by contact with the pursuing Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade (GHQ 
IS 7/11/17; XXI IS 7/11/17). Otherwise, the comet-like symbols used by the operation 
mapmakers for the retreating Turkish forces appear to represent a somewhat over-optimistic 
analysis by Meinertzhagen that the Turkish army was in headlong flight, with the disintegrating 
tails of the symbols giving the impression of units shedding soldiers and equipment in an attempt 
to speed their escape. This picture showed Meinertzhagen’s view—articulated in his diary—that 
a great victory had been won after hard fighting, and all that remained was for the cavalry to 
exploit it (Meinertzhagen Vol. 20, 48). His staff’s depiction of a fleeing army defended by 
particularly small rear guard symbols was a cartographic argument for the British cavalry to go 
into pursuit mode, a hope that would be dashed on the following day’s map. 
 Meinertzhagen and his staff also employed a new method to depict the unsure location of 
the EEF’s Desert Mounted Corps, which had passed through Hareira and Sheria into the Turkish 
rear. The DMC’s estimated position on 7 and 8 November was shown by a large dashed 
perimeter around text identifying its units (Figures 5.18 and 5.19). Both the form of the symbol 
and its size indicated what was occurring; EEF GHQ had lost communication with the advancing 
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cavalry. Without reports coming back from the DMC, the EEF GHQ could only estimate how far 
its units had advanced (AMD Signal Squadron WD 7/11/17; DMC Signal Squadron WD 
7/11/17).  Furthermore, the size of the perimeter estimating the Desert Mounted Corps’ position 
indicated that Meinertzhagen and his staff were again overly optimistic in their analysis of how 
far Chauvel’s cavalry had advanced into the Turkish rear areas. The extent of this symbol gave 
the impression that the Turkish 54
th
 and 26
th
 Divisions were essentially surrounded by the 
advancing horsemen, which was an opinion that Meinertzhagen also recorded in his diary 
(Meinertzhagen Vol. 20, 48). The events of the following day would show this analysis to have 
been flawed.  
 
Figure 5.19. Annotated facsimile of the 8 November operation map showing the hollow box symbols used to replace the 
previous day’s comet-like symbols representing fleeing Turkish units. The horizontal distance of this figure is approximately 
forty miles. (This figure is intended to be printed in color) 
 The 8 November operation map dispensed with the comet symbols in favor of the hollow 
boxes that the intelligence staff had employed to depict unsure Turkish positions earlier in the 
battle (Figure 5.19). Three of these showed the positions of three groups of Turkish divisions, 
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though text next to each box noted that their exact positions were “unknown” or “doubtful,” a 
fact that the ensuing days’ maps would confirm. The shift to these symbols didn’t indicate a 
change in the actual situation on the ground. Rather it reflected Meinertzhagen’s personal 
disappointment with what he viewed as the slow progress of Chauvel’s Desert Mounted Corps, 
which was allowing the Turkish army to escape intact (Meinertzhagen Vol. 20, 48-50). Even so, 
he and his staff continued to perpetrate one inaccurate holdover from the 7 November map in the 
form of the dashed perimeter symbol for the indefinite locations of the Desert Mounted Corps. 
On the 8 November map, this symbol, which also revealed that for a second day nearly a third of 
the British army was out of communication with GHQ
10
, had shifted northward and grown a lobe 
to the eastward. This lobe indicated that the cavalry might be able to cut off the retreat of the 
remnants of the Turkish 27
th
 Division, still shown as opposing the British forces on the far 
eastern end of the line, a hope that would prove as disappointing as the similar circumstances 
surrounding the Turkish 54
th
 and 26
th
 Divisions on the previous day.   
Overall, the 7 and 8 November maps showed that the EEF had largely lost contact with 
nearly the entire Turkish army as well as large part of their own forces. The implications of this 
were that if the Desert Mounted Corps could not communicate their own situation to GHQ, then 
they certainly could not communicate any information about the enemy. Furthermore, despite 
Meinertzhagen’s depiction on 7 November of a disintegrating Turkish army, Turkish rear guards 
along the Wadi-el-Hesi prevented the pursuing British forces from gaining any useful 
information about the enemy’s location. This represented a general breakdown of the 
information-gathering phase of the EEF cartographic system, which created a void that 
Meinertzhagen and his intelligence officers attempted to fill with overly optimistic analysis. 
                                                             
10 The need to gain firm location intelligence for the Desert Mounted Corps became so acute that the RFC diverted aerial 
reconnaissance missions to locate these friendly formations rather than enemy deployments (RFC WD 7/11/17). 
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Whether this optimism led to complacency among the EEF commanders on the night of 7-8 
November is unclear, as some commanders (particularly those in the Desert Mounted Corps) 
would not have even had access to these maps at this point. What is clear is that the maps 
presented a record of the elation of victory being felt at EEF GHQ after a week of hard fighting, 
but also of disappointment that the triumph was not as complete as first hoped.  
 
Figure 5.20. Annotated facsimile of the 9 November operation map showing the northeastward retreat of the Turkish forces. The 
horizontal distance of this figure is approximately fifteen miles. (This figure is intended to be printed in color)  
9-11 November: Symbols Old, New, and Old   
 The operations maps that the EEF printed and distributed from 9 to 14 November showed 
an intelligence staff that was grasping for ways to show something that could help them make 
sense of the confused events unfolding around the Turkish retreat. On 9 November they first 
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attempted a return to the traditional rectangular symbols that had served the operations maps so 
well during the set-piece phase of the battle (Figure 5.20), but quickly abandoned these for more 
ambiguous line symbols on the 10 and 11 November editions. These line symbols allowed them 
to depict an enemy force blocking their advance without having to differentiate the units that the 
lines composed. Thereafter until 14 November Meinertzhagen’s staff utilized a tested 
cartographic method developed on the Western front in France, which divided the Turkish front 
into sectors for the various enemy divisions holding their line. Overall, these editions showed an 
intelligence staff that was demonstrating increasing cartographic agility in how they used their 
maps to communicate information, though they also highlighted a further structural weakness of 
the twenty-four hour operation mapping process. 
 The most obvious difference between the 8 and 9 November maps was that the base map 
had changed. The new base map was similar to the previous one in that it showed only basic 
terrain features including towns, roads, railroads, and major water obstacles. However, this 
newer edition, printed at a scale of 1:250,000—as opposed to the 1:100,000 of the older 
editions—covered a broader area, depicting Palestine north to Ramle and east to the Dead Sea 
and encompassing the holy city of Jerusalem, the capture of which was one of the objectives of 
the British offensive (see Figure 3.3 in Chapter 3). The smaller scale of the new maps reflected 
the fact that the mobile operations following the collapse of the Gaza-Beersheba defenses had 
begun to run off both the northern and eastern edges of the old base maps. Furthermore, these 
new maps signified the fact that the methods the EEF cartographers had employed in the set-
piece offensive around Beersheba and Gaza were becoming increasingly inappropriate for the 
mobile operations that followed. 
150 
 
 The 9 November operation map depicted concrete positions for the Desert Mounted 
Corps—which had finally reestablished communications—showing its subordinate ANZAC 
Mounted Division establishing a picket line north of the Wadi-el-Hesi parallel to the infantry 
advance of the XXI Corps along the coast (lower left of Figure 5.20). To their north, the Turkish 
forces were depicted by long rectangles oriented from southwest to northeast along the road to 
Ramle with text noting that these symbols represented “Mass troops and Transport” of the 
“disorganized” 54th and 26th Divisions, protected by a small symbol representing an unidentified 
Turkish rear guard unit (Figure 5.20). The sources of the information portrayed on this portion of 
the map were aerial reconnaissance missions that observed moving troops and transport but 
could not identify them (GHQ IS 9/11/17). Many of the remaining divisions of the Turkish—
including the 19
th
, 24
th
, 27
th
, and the newly arrived 20
th
 Divisions—were depicted farther east, 
opposite the British 53
rd
 Division south and west of Hebron, a fact that not only contradicted 
their location on the previous day’s map, but also established the Turkish 19th Division as 
perhaps the most cartographically mobile formation on the battlefield (Figure 5.21).  
 
Figure 5.21. Annotated facsimile of the 9 November operation map showing the area to the southeast of Figure 5.20. This area 
contained the symbols for the remaining Turkish divisions which had been located in far different positions on the 8 November 
map. The horizontal distance of this figure is approximately twenty-five miles. (This figure is intended to be printed in color) 
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 The 9 November map illustrated the limitations of the rectangular unit symbols that the 
EEF mapmakers had been employing up to this point. The solid blocks denoting the eastern 
group of divisions (Figure 5.21) gave the impression that their location was based on solid 
intelligence reports. In truth, the location of these units on the map was based largely on 
speculation. Aerial reconnaissance had observed troops in these areas, but the intelligence staff at 
this point could not determine what units they represented (GHQ IS 9/11/17). Meinertzhagen and 
his staff seem to have realized the weakness of portraying their conjecture as established fact—
perhaps learning from their over-eagerness in illustrating the advance of the Desert Mounted 
Corps—and to have taken steps to improve the precision of their graphics on the succeeding 
editions of the operation maps by resorting to new and inventive symbols that departed from the 
traditional rectangles and hollow boxes.   
 The 10 and 11 November editions illustrated a new symbol employed by the EEF 
mapmakers. This symbol depicted a front line for the Turkish forces, but did not differentiate 
between the units that the line represented. In the western sector of the 10 November map the 
EEF intelligence staff placed a series of wavy lines identified only as “Rearguard Units” running 
southwest from the coast and blocking the British advance (Figure 5.22). These undulating 
symbols gave the impression of a tentative and weak stand by the Turkish forces along a line that 
had been located by contact as the divisions of the British XXI and Desert Mounted Corps 
probed forward. This analysis was reinforced by signal intercepts that indicated Turkish 
intentions to attempt to defend this line (52 Div. WD 10/11/17; GHQ IS 10/11.17). No 
identifications for Turkish units were present along this line with the exception of the Roman 
numerals indicating that this sector of the front was the responsibility of the Turkish VIII Army 
headquarters, a fact that would be established definitively by signal intercepts the following day. 
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Figure 5.22. Facsimile of the 10 November operation map showing the wavy line symbol used to represent the poorly defined 
Turkish front line that was forming. The horizontal distance of this figure is approximately twenty miles. This figure is intended 
to be printed in color. 
 The 11 November operation map (not shown) was similar to its 10 November 
predecessor in that it continued to depict the Turkish defenses with an undulating wavy line 
symbol, but this symbol was now accompanied by text denoting the fortification of this line as 
“Freshly dug and incomplete” instead of the “Rear guard units” note of the previous day. Many 
of the other differences for this map were more significant, starting with the base map on which 
the symbols were printed. This had changed again on 11 November to a 1:168,960 scale map 
after two days of using the 1:250,000 scale maps as a base, a change that allowed somewhat 
more detail to be depicted. Furthermore, rectangular unit symbols disappeared completely from 
this edition of the operation maps, suggesting that the mapmakers believed line symbols 
accompanied by descriptive text were a better means to communicate the staff’s analysis. This 
map also showed the first occurrence of a new labeling that Meinertzhagen and his officers 
would employ henceforth: text offset in the area of the map depicting the Mediterranean Sea that 
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communicated information that could not be tied to any specific location on the map. In the case 
of the 11 November map this text stated that “Identifications from all enemy Corps was obtained 
by contact on 10-11-17” and went on to qualify this with the statement that “They do not show 
the presence of these Corps in the enemy line but rather indicate disorganization” before 
concluding that “Locations of Divisions is unknown” (Figure 5.23).  
 
Figure 5.23. Facsimile of the new labeling technique that appeared first on the 11 November operation map. These labels were 
located in the area of the Mediterranean Sea on the map and contained information about units that could not be located as well 
as other qualitative information. 
This combination of wavy line symbols with offset text was an artful way for 
Meinertzhagen to communicate both what he and his staff knew—that a Turkish defensive line 
comprising the surviving formations of the Turkish army was coalescing as indicated—and what 
they did not know, namely the specific deployments of the Turkish subunits within this line. The 
lack of precision on these maps did not represent so much a dearth of information—plenty of 
intelligence was being gathered from prisoners who had been captured from the retreating 
Turkish army—as an inability to process the gathered information and depict it on a map quickly 
enough for the plotted symbols to be current (XXI IS No. 86). Thus the two mapping cycles of 8 
to 9 and 10 to 11 November represented an accordion effect
11
 within the EEF cartographic 
system in which the information-gathering phase failed as the British lost contact with their 
opponents and then the information-processing and document-distribution phases failed as 
                                                             
11 In which incoming information slowed to a trickle while British forces were attempting to locate their opponents, but then 
increased to the point where the information could not be analyzed quickly enough and thus began to back up when a solid 
Turkish position was encountered, much like the accordion effect of traffic engineering. 
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contact was reestablished and produced a glut of raw data that could not be analyzed and plotted 
quickly enough to account for the altered battlefield conditions. This is not to say that 
Meinertzhagen and his staff failed in their mapping efforts. On the contrary, the 11 November 
map was the culmination of numerous lessons learned by the EEF staff over the preceding days 
that demonstrated agility in dealing with the difficulties imposed both by the conditions of the 
battlefield and the structure of the operation mapping cycle. The following three days would 
demonstrate further cartographic growth on the part of these officers. 
13-14 November: Tested Techniques and Help from Above 
By mid-1917 the British Expeditionary Force in Europe and its staff processes were 
becoming increasingly professional and effective in contrast to their failures at the Somme in 
1916. When Allenby transferred from this force to Palestine in the summer of 1917, he brought 
with him many of the modern and sophisticated staff processes being employed in France 
(Meinertzhagen 1917, Vol. 20, 23). One of these appears to have benefitted the operation 
mapmakers directly in their attempts to portray an accurate picture of the battlefield from 12 to 
14 November. In the archival records of the British 3
rd
 Army are a series of “Order of Battle” 
maps that depicted the German front line divided into sectors for each division and annotated 
with text noting which German units were not accounted for (Figure 5.25). This technique 
appears to have been commonly used by British staff officers on the Western Front (Chasseaud 
2013). The EEF’s editions of the operation maps for 13 and 14 November are strikingly similar 
to these maps, a fact that indicates some influence exerted by the British Expeditionary Force in 
Europe on the operational cartography of the EEF. This is not surprising, as officers (including 
Allenby and Meinertzhagen) commonly transferred between these theaters. 
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Figure 5.24 (left) Facsimile of an area of the 13 November operation map showing the sector method of organizing the front 
lines (Turkish forces in green) and Figure 5.25 (right), a facsimile of a British 5th Army “Order of Battle Map” from the battle of 
Arras in France in April 1917 (German forces in red). Note the nearly identical symbols for the enemy front on the two maps. 
After the 11 November edition the next operation map printed by the 7
th
 FSC was 
annotated as presenting the situation as known by the EEF GHQ at 0200 on 13 November.
12
 This 
departure from the usual pattern of daily 6pm maps reflected the fact that the EEF GHQ and the 
7
th
 FSC had both moved forward from their original positions around Gaza on 12 November 
(Dawnay to his wife, 24 November 1917). As such, the task of transporting the 7
th
 FSC and its 
equipment northwards, reestablishing it near the new front, and still producing a map to cover 
the developments of 12 November indicated both commitment to the process by the mapmakers 
as well as the importance that the EEF command placed on map analysis. Even more impressive 
                                                             
12 This map was in place of the 6pm map that would have been produced on 12 November. 
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is that this map edition employed a new technique. The two 13 November maps portrayed the 
Turkish front line—which was assuming an increasingly north-south orientation as the British 
forces continued to advance north along the coast—with symbols that were identical to those 
used by the British army in France. These symbols added details to the previous editions of 10 
and 11 November by dividing the Turkish front into divisional sectors and plotting the location 
of major headquarters (see Figures 5.24). This renewed detail indicated that the EEF intelligence 
staff was again combining multiple intelligence sources, including statements from the more than 
7,900 prisoners taken since the start of the offensive, as well as aerial reconnaissance and signal 
intercepts, to triangulate the location and identification of the opposing Turkish forces (EEF IS 
9/11/17 and 13/11/17; DMC IS 14/11/17). Even so, the Turkish lines that these maps portrayed 
did not last long, and neither did this cartographic technique. 
 
Figure 5.26. Facsimile of the 14 November operation map showing rectangular symbols representing northward retreating 
Turkish units protected by an outpost line. The horizontal distance of this figure is approximately ten miles. This figure is 
intended to be printed in color.  
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The 14 November edition operation map highlighted the fluidity of the problem facing 
the EEF’s operational cartographers. These officers had just begun to reestablish a picture of the 
Turkish deployments when further British advances breached the Turkish line and sent the 
enemy retreating north yet again (Figure 5.26). This map showed the British forces opposed only 
by a Turkish picket line and marked a return to the traditional rectangular unit symbols to depict 
the Turkish positions, though these symbols were placed sparingly on this edition of the map. In 
this case they were used to depict four Turkish divisions and a regiment marching in column 
along the road to a new defensive line north of Jaffa (center Figure 5.26). The sources for these 
Turkish symbols were derived from ground reconnaissance by the Yeomanry Mounted Division 
and the XXI Corps in the case of the Turkish picket line, and aerial reconnaissance in the case of 
the northward moving columns (YMD WD 14/11/17; GHQ IS 14/11/17). Eastwards towards 
Jerusalem, the remainder of the Turkish army deploying in the Judean hill country was not 
located at all but rather relegated to a text label that noted which units the staff believed were 
there. This note stated that these units’ “positions [were] unknown.” This uncertainty once again 
highlighted the fact that concrete information about enemy locations dried up when the British 
forces lost contact with their Turkish opponents on the ground.  
Meinertzhagen and his staff leaned more heavily on different sources of information 
during this phase than those they had relied upon in the first phase. British forces were capturing 
thousands of Turkish soldiers who were willing to give them information, but this source was too 
slow given the circumstances. The intelligence staff relied instead on information sources that 
could provide them with near-immediate snapshots of the rapidly changing battlefield such as 
aerial and ground reconnaissance and signal intercepts. These sources could locate the enemy but 
not identify them. Even so, aerial reconnaissance in particular came into its own during this 
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phase because troops in motion were far easier to spot from the air than stationary ones. With so 
much of both armies in motion each day, the reports from the pilots became the most prominent 
sources portrayed on the operation maps. Signal intercepts also came more to the fore since—in 
the absence of information about where the enemy formations were—this source could reveal 
German and Turkish commanders’ intentions, which allowed Meinertzhagen to speculate on the 
location of the Turkish divisions.
13
 
The 14 November map also marked the end of the mobile pursuit phase of the offensive 
initiated by the 3
rd
 Battle of Gaza and a transition into a new phase characterized by a more 
stable front line and a deliberate British advance eastward into the Judean hill country. The 
preceding week of operations had seen Meinertzhagen and his staff lean heavily on their own 
speculation and analysis in the absence of good or current information arriving from the EEF’s 
information-gatherers. The increasingly confused situation on the ground, the alternating 
droughts and gluts of incoming information as units gained and lost contact with the enemy in 
the running fight northwards, and the inflexible twenty-four hour cycle of the operation mapping 
process, led these officers to experiment with a variety of symbols and techniques to 
communicate both knowledge and speculation about operational conditions. The EEF staff grew 
in their cartographic ability through these operations, but the more stable conditions of the next 
phase of the campaign would return them to the techniques they had employed in the early days 
of the battle. 
                                                             
13 On 11 November the EEF intercepted a Turkish order commanding their forces to counter-attack. The transmission was 
received clearly by the British receiving station but not by the Turkish recipients. As such, the Turks were forced to resend the 
message to their subordinate forces. Meinertzhagen noted gleefully in his diary that perhaps never before in military history had 
an army known its opponent’s orders before the opposing army received them (Meinertzhagen 1917, Vol. 20). 
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Figure 5.27. Overview of the major maneuvers during the third phase of the Gaza campaign. (This figure is intended to be 
printed in color) 
Phase 3: Advance on Jerusalem and Mapping for History, 15 November to 18 December 
 The operation maps underwent a striking transformation after 14 November that raised 
questions about their intended purpose at this point of the campaign. Prior to 15 November, each 
edition of the operation maps had been printed at relatively large scales and on physically large 
sheets that allowed significant detail in the symbols depicting the opposing units. From 15 
November onward, however, the maps were printed on a 1:500,000 scale map. Furthermore, the 
physical dimensions of these maps shrank from the size of a tabletop to the size of a piece of 
letter paper. This format, though more easily transportable, was also less conducive to depicting 
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operational detail with precision, a disadvantage that was ameliorated by the fact that the 
information available was not particularly precise at this time. Moreover, the pattern of 
distribution for these maps as well as entries in several of the associated officer’s diaries 
indicated that the purpose of the operation maps had shifted away from maintaining an accurate 
operational picture, and towards creating a historical record of the EEF’s accomplishments. This 
is not to say that the operational purpose of the maps had vanished; rather, this purpose was 
joined by another: communicating the EEF’s accomplishments to the world and to posterity. 
Reestablishing the Front, Physically and Cartographically, 15-17 November 
 These new format maps were printed at a time when the front was once again stabilizing 
and when the EEF intelligence staff could again slow down and triangulate information from 
multiple sources to both locate and identify the Turkish units confronting them. The first step in 
this process was to locate the new Turkish front line, a task that was accomplished from 15 to 17 
November and recorded on the corresponding editions of the operation maps. Over these three 
days the intelligence officers gained an increasingly clear picture of how the Turkish divisions 
and regiments were distributed as well as which enemy units had been destroyed outright in the 
fighting of the previous two weeks (Figure 5.28 and 5.29). The slower pace of operations 
allowed the staff to process the statements from thousands of prisoners captured in the fighting 
and to piece this intelligence back into their analysis of the Turkish deployments. 
 
Figure 5.28. Facsimile of a note on the 15 November map indicating that the Turkish 26th Division had likely been disbanded.  
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Figure 5.29. Annotated facsimile of the 16 November Operation map showing the reestablished front and increasing detail of the 
Turkish deployments. The horizontal distance of this figure is approximately forty miles. (This figure is intended to be printed in 
color) 
 
Figure 5.30. Annotated facsimile of the 17 November map showing the positive identification of the Turkish 12 th Depot 
Regiment around Hebron. The horizontal distance of this figure is approximately thirty miles. (This figure is intended to be 
printed in color) 
Each successive map for the period of 15 to 17 November depicted marginally greater 
detail than the previous day’s edition, capitalizing on the fact that the front was relatively stable 
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during this period. Few Turkish unit symbols were actually present on the 15 November map 
(not shown), reflecting the fact that ground reconnaissance was still feeling for the forward edge 
of the Turkish lines. What major units were depicted could all be traced to aerial reconnaissance 
missions that reported either moving troops or freshly dug fortifications in these locations (GHQ 
IS 15/11/17).  
Some interesting information was communicated by text set away from the scene of 
action that could only have been learned from prisoners, signal intercepts, or from agents. One 
note offset over the sea observed that, among the units that were still to be located by the EEF, 
the 26th Division had “Probably [been] drafted into other units” and was therefore no longer on 
the board, so to speak, and that the 53rd Division had “suffered very severely,” a preamble to 
perhaps removing this unit from the Turkish order of battle as well (Figure 5.28). More 
troublingly for the British, a note to the north on the 16 November map stated there were 
probably “12,000 German infantry at or near Shechem,” a report that must have come either 
from signal intercepts or an agent and that in retrospect was rather far-fetched (Figure 5.29). One 
area where each of these three maps consistently provided both the location and identification of 
the Turkish units was far to the south where the Turkish 12th Depot Regiment and 24th Division 
opposed the XX Corps Cavalry Regiment on the road south of Hebron, a fact that had been 
established through prisoner statements and could be confidently plotted because this portion of 
the front had been stable for several days (Figure 5.30) (GHQ IS 15/11/17). 
 The 16 November map showed somewhat more detail along the Turkish front lines than 
on previous days. This greater precision reflected a series of targeted aerial reconnaissance 
missions for that day that observed numerous signs of a consolidating Turkish defensive line 
including large camps, entrenched gun positions, and bodies of troops in defensive postures, and 
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also that British ground patrols were probing forward and making contact with their now-
stationary adversaries (GHQ IS 16/11/17). Two distinct fronts for the Turkish forces appeared on 
this edition, one anchored on the Mediterranean coast just north of Jaffa and oriented on an east-
west line parallel to the Auja River, and the other to the east on a north-south axis blocking the 
approaches to Jerusalem (Figure 5.29). Both of these deployments reflected intelligence gathered 
by RFC missions flown on the morning of the 16
th
. From this point onwards the general 
deployment of the Turkish army would change only incrementally and at a pace with which the 
EEF cartographic system could match, a trend highlighted by the 17 November operation map 
(not shown) on which the only significant difference from the previous day’s map was a 
northward shift of the Turkish line to the far side of the river Auja, a deployment that had been 
detected by aerial reconnaissance and confirmed by British ground patrols pushing north (GHQ 
IS 17/11/17; YMD WD 17/11/17). 
The Advance on Jerusalem, 18 November to 18 December 
 The month of operations following the reconsolidation of the front lines on the river Auja 
and before Jerusalem marked a return to the more stable multiple sources approach for 
Meinertzhagen and his staff. This period was similar to the processes they employed prior to 
printing the first operation map on 28 October. From 18 November until the end of this operation 
map series on 18 December
14
 the EEF cartographic system was able to create an increasingly 
precise picture of the Turkish deployments as the more stable front allowed Turkish deserters 
greater opportunity to give themselves up. Even so, the maps detailed yet another episode of 
faulty analysis by Meinertzhagen and his staff, illustrating the difficulty involved in attempting 
                                                             
14 The last edition of the operation maps present in the National Archives collection is the 18 December edition. However, the 
war diary of the 7th FSC records that they continued to print editions until at least middle of January. 
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to make sense of an enemy’s intentions using only the fragmentary data that operational 
intelligence-gathering could generate. 
 
Figure 5.31. Annotated facsimile of the 19 November operation mapping indicating a premature evacuation of Jerusalem. The 
Turks would not actually abandon the city until 9 December. The horizontal distance of this figure is approximately ten miles. 
(This figure is intended to be printed in color) 
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 The 18 to 20 November editions of the operation maps illustrated how fragmentary 
information combined with premature optimism could still conspire to cause the EEF’s 
cartographic system to portray an inaccurate picture of Turkish intentions, if not deployments. 
While the British XXI Corps pushed into the difficult terrain of the Judean hills in a deliberate 
advance against the Turkish line protecting Jerusalem (lower left in Figure 5.31), aerial 
reconnaissance provided the EEF GHQ with information that led them to believe—
prematurely—that the Turkish forces would evacuate the holy city without a fight. These aerial 
missions recorded a northward movement of troops and transport along the road between 
Jerusalem and Shechem, though the actual direction of travel was more a matter of conjecture 
than hard fact. The intelligence staff interpreted these data as an evacuation, screened by a 
defensive line protecting the exposed flank of the withdrawing columns (GHQ IS 18-20/11/17). 
The EEF cartographers communicated their analysis by placing text on the 18 to 20 November 
maps that noted “Considerable movement northward” on the road as well text identifying the 
Turkish defensive line as a “strong flank guard” (Figure 5.31). This analysis proved to be faulty, 
as the Turks would not actually evacuate Jerusalem until 9 December. Even so, this incident 
further reflected the trend of Meinertzhagen and his officers using text to differentiate their 
analysis from the solid symbols that denoted hard data. 
 The ensuing days’ maps dispensed with this prediction regarding Turkish intentions and 
acknowledged that the Ottoman Empire would not surrender one of its holiest sites so easily. The 
21 through 23 November editions of these maps illustrated a top-down approach for organizing 
the reemerging Turkish order of battle. The staff first identified corps sectors within the Turkish 
line before breaking these into subordinate divisional areas. This information was provided by a 
steady flow of prisoners and deserters and confirmed by signal intercepts that triangulated the 
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location of the corps and army headquarters. Furthermore, aerial and ground reconnaissance 
maintained contact with the Turkish front lines as the British XXI Corps continued advancing up 
the approaches to Jerusalem (GHQ IS 21/11/17; XXI IS 21/11/17). The map editions for these 
days reflected this top-down process by their progressively precise demarcations for the Turkish 
corps sectors. By 23 November the British had once again leveraged the information provided by 
Turkish prisoners and deserters to refine their operational picture down to the division and 
regiment level across the entire front line. 
 The 24 November operation map (not shown) was the first since the start of mobile 
operations on which the EEF intelligence officers were able to attach identification to each of the 
Turkish units depicted. This fact did not so much reflect new information as it did analysis by 
Meinertzhagen’s staff, which was finally able to begin collating and processing the large amount 
of information that had been arriving over the previous days from prisoners and deserters, aerial 
and ground reconnaissance, and signal intercepts. This process of analysis was reflected by an 
identification table in the GHQ intelligence summary entry for 24 November. The entries in this 
table corresponded to every Turkish unit portrayed on the operation map for that day (GHQ IS 
24/11/17). Even so, some formations still remained at large, a fact that continued to be 
communicated by a now standard text note listing un-located Turkish divisions, a list that 
consisted at this point of the Turkish 16
th
, 19
th
, and 20
th
 Divisions. Prisoner statements aided by 
wireless intercepts allowed the EEF intelligence staff to place these units on the map on 26, 27, 
and 28 November, respectively, leaving the list of unidentified enemy units to be replaced on the 
28 November edition by a single note about German and Turkish reinforcements possibly bound 
for this front (GHQ IS 26/11/17 and 28/11/17). 
167 
 
 The editions of the operation maps covering the days prior to capture of Jerusalem on 9 
December showed little variation to the deployments of either army other than the gradual 
northward transfer of the British XX Corps, which had remained around Beersheba and Gaza for 
logistical reasons throughout the mobile phase of the campaign. Other than slow and incremental 
eastward British advance on Jerusalem, the only major daily differences between the 
deployments depicted on these maps came from attempts by the mapmakers to communicate 
signal and agent information about new Turkish formations arriving to the front (GHQ IS 
1/12/17, 4/12/17, and 8/12/17).  
The precision of the maps suffered another temporary setback when the Turkish army—
under pressure from the steady advance of the British XX Corps—evacuated Jerusalem on 9 
December, ceding the city to the EEF without a protracted fight. From 9 to 16 December 
Meinertzhagen’s officers returned to the technique of using single large symbols to depict the 
unsure location of numerous Turkish units with which the EEF had lost contact after they 
withdrew beyond the city. These large rectangles were slowly broken up into divisional and 
regimental symbols as the deployments of each unit once again became clear through the 
statements of prisoners and deserters. By 17 December every Turkish unit on the map was once 
again individually located and identified, a state of affairs that would remain stable during the 
ensuing months (GHQ IS 12/12/17, DMC IS 16/12/17, XX IS 16/12/17, XXI IS 16/12/17).  
 Overall, this third period of operation mapping reflected a more casual approach by 
Meinertzhagen and the intelligence staff, which indicated a decline in the importance attached to 
the maps by the EEF command. Insofar as the operation mapping process was less vital to 
ongoing operations than in had been earlier on the campaign, this less rigid approach indicated a 
new purpose for the maps. Up to this point the operation maps had played an important role in 
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tracking the Turkish order of battle’s spatial deployment on the battlefield and in aiding the 
decision-making processes of the EEF commanders. However, the losses inflicted by the EEF on 
the Turkish army precluded the immediate threat of a strong Turkish counterattack, so much so 
that keeping track of the Turkish army became more a matter of informational housekeeping than 
a vital component of intelligence feeding into the British advance on Jerusalem. One indicator of 
this fact is that while the staff possessed information about the deployment of Turkish units 
down to the regimental level as early as 25 November, they did not actually plot any of these 
identifications on the operation maps until 12 December, nearly three weeks later, despite the 
stability of much of the front line during this time (GHQ IS 25/11/17).  
Mapping for History – A New Purpose for the Maps 
 Other evidence indicated that by this point in the campaign the purpose of the operation 
maps had shifted to communicating the exploits of the EEF to the rest of the British military 
establishment and to the broader public. Highlighting this new purpose was the fact that when 
the 7
th
 FSC changed the format of the operation maps to their final 1:500,000 scale sheets on 15 
November, they also reprinted all of the previous editions of the operation maps in this new 
format. These reprints of the original maps are what were preserved in Meinertzhagen’s diary 
and in Pirie-Gordon’s 1919 account of the campaign. This format was also what Dawnay 
dispatched to London in his summary of the EEF’s operations during 3rd Gaza (Dawnay, “Note 
on Operations on the Palestine Front for CIGS and DMO, 17 November 1917”). No plausible 
military justification existed for reprinting maps that showed deployments on battlefields long-
since abandoned by both armies. Therefore, the purpose must have been historical. 
Thus, the purpose of these new maps was at least in part to communicate the EEF’s story 
to an external audience in contrast to the internal audience these maps had served earlier. This 
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fact is unsurprising, given the relative drama and decisiveness of operations on this front as 
compared to the grinding stalemate on the Western Front, as well as the romance of the 
Palestinian setting that led the largely Christian-educated officers of the EEF (including 
Meinertzhagen) to compare their campaign to a modern-day crusade (Meinertzhagen Vol. 20, 
60-66). This new historical purpose was highlighted by the fact that Meinertzhagen preserved a 
complete set of these new format maps in his own diaries and that the 7
th
 FSC’s Indian 
draftsmen, Mr. Malama, deposited another complete set of this format with the British Army’s 
Historical Section after the war.
15
 The simple form of these maps was useful to the operational 
decision-making of the EEF in the heat of battle, and also lent itself to communicating the flow 
of the campaign to others outside of the EEF. Even so, as historical sources these maps present 
some challenges for researchers, which I will discuss in Chapter 6. 
In Retrospect 
 Overall, the sources and methods used by the EEF cartographic system to place symbols 
on the operation maps varied with the nature of the operations being conducted. The EEF was 
better able to leverage multiple sources of information to both locate and identify enemy units 
when the front was stable and when few units—both friendly and enemy—were in motion. This 
was because the cartographic process that created the operation maps required not only good 
information but also time for the EEF’s information-processors to transmit, analyze, and plot the 
data. During more stable periods of operations, particularly during the set-piece phase of the 
initial assault and then again in the final advance on Jerusalem, Meinertzhagen and his staff 
benefitted from sufficient time to analyze high-yield information sources like prisoner and 
deserter statements and signal intercepts. During these times, they could plot this information on 
                                                             
15 This set of maps is now located in the British National Archives in the collection WO 153/1041. 
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the operation maps with reasonable confidence that the situation on the ground had not changed 
significantly since the information was initially gathered.   
 By contrast, when the operational context became more dynamic during the northward 
pursuit of the Turkish army, the operation mapmakers were forced to rely on sources of 
intelligence that could be gleaned rapidly but that could only uncover limited types of 
information. During this period aerial and ground reconnaissance came to the fore as the primary 
sources of information represented on the operation maps. These methods could locate groups of 
enemy soldiers, but they could not identify them. This limitation resulted in an ever more 
confused picture of Turkish deployments. The rapidly changing nature of the battlefield during 
this time also meant that what information did arrive at EEF GHQ was often far out-of-date 
before it could be plotted by the intelligence staff. These difficult cartographic conditions led 
Meinertzhagen and the intelligence staff to experiment with ways to graphically differentiate 
uncertainty, fact, and speculation. These attempts led to some failures in the operation mapping 
process, most notably when the EEF lost communication with the Desert Mounted Corps. 
Meinertzhagen’s estimated position for this corps gave the impression that a large portion of the 
Turkish army had been surrounded when it was in fact escaping northward. Another failure 
occurred when the intelligence staff communicated a premature evacuation of Jerusalem by the 
Turkish army, though with less dire consequences than the earlier misstep.  
Even so, Meinertzhagen and his subordinate intelligence officers showed an impressive 
ability to adapt their mapping methods to changing conditions. They learned from their 
difficulties in trying to depict a chaotic situation within the rigid bounds of the standardized 
symbols that British military mapping initially offered them. When these symbols failed, the 
officers cast them aside, sometimes in favor of completely new techniques, or by replacing them 
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with methods learned from the Western Front, but always attempting to communicate to the 
command structure of the EEF what was known, what was speculated, and what was unknown 
about the opposing forces. How successful they were with these maps—in terms of accuracy, 
effectiveness, purpose, and use—I will discuss in the next chapter.     
 
Figure 5.32. Areas shown by the operation map facsimile excerpts that are figures in this chapter. 
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6. Findings and Conclusions 
In this chapter I will discuss my findings with regards to my two research questions. To review, 
the two questions were 1) how did the EEF leverage different sources of intelligence to create the 
operation maps? and 2) what was the intended purpose of the operation maps? I will also discuss 
my conclusions about the strengths and pitfalls of the operation mapping process and its products 
in relation to the maps’ intended purpose, and comment on the value of the maps as historical 
artifacts. I will then provide some commentary on the effectiveness of my research methodology. 
Finally, I will conclude by outlining areas of my research that have highlighted subjects in need 
of further study. Overall, the data I collected and analyzed proved to be more than sufficient for 
answering my research questions, and in many cases I was confronted by what seemed an 
embarrassment of riches in archival sources. This wealth of information allowed me to draw 
numerous conclusions, some of which went beyond the initial scope of my investigation. 
Research Question 1: Intelligence Sources for the Operation Maps 
 In determining which of the five general sources of intelligence available to the EEF were 
dominant in the operation mapping process, I came to the conclusions 1) that the answer to this 
question depended heavily upon the operational context in which the intelligence was gathered 
and analyzed, 2) some intelligence sources proved themselves valuable in all contexts, and 3) 
that the operation maps proved to be the most accurate and useful when the EEF’s intelligence 
staff had sufficient time to leverage multiple sources to triangulate the locations and identities of 
the Turkish units in the field. In general, the intelligence summaries compiled each day by the 
EEF and its subordinate commands allowed me to clearly identify what source or combination of 
sources prompted Meinertzhagen and his intelligence officers to place their symbols and text 
representing the positions and identities of Turkish formations on the daily maps. Over the 
course of the approximately six-week campaign between the start of the Gaza-Beersheba 
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offensive and the capture of Jerusalem, these numerous data points became recognizable patterns 
showing how the operation cartographers attempted to systematically map the battle. 
 As I described in the introduction chapter, the operational context of the 3rd Battle of 
Gaza campaign went through three distinct phases, each with its own unique challenges for the 
EEF’s cartographic system. During the initial phase, from 28 October to 6 November, which saw 
the meticulously planned set-piece assault by the British on the long-held Turkish defenses, the 
EEF’s intelligence and mapping systems benefitted from the ability to rely on multiple sources of 
information in most cases. The static nature of the front allowed the British the time and stability 
necessary to apply numerous reports to the task of pinpointing individual units. The most 
common source during this time was statements from Turkish deserters who crossed into British 
lines in the months and weeks prior to the offensive. Not a single Turkish division failed to 
provide deserters to the EEF intelligence officers, and this fact, along with Meinertzhagen’s 
effective interrogation techniques, ensured that deserters alone provided rich and abundant 
location, identity, and qualitative data about the units deployed in Palestine. 
 These human sources were ably complimented by aerial reconnaissance, wireless 
intercepts, and ground reconnaissance missions that confirmed the deserters’ statements and gave 
direction to the ongoing information-gathering process, though none of these sources appears to 
have been individually as versatile or complete as the enemy soldiers’ reports. Aerial 
reconnaissance, which provided location data for large bodies of troops, encampments, and 
entrenchments, never provided the identity data that the EEF intelligence staff required to make 
these troop deployments fit logically into the Turkish order of battle. Even so, aerial 
reconnaissance was superior to ground reconnaissance because it was more mobile and able to 
observe a far greater area. Nonetheless, ground reconnaissance missions often yielded prisoners 
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who could be interrogated. By contrast, wireless intercepts were useful in the position mapping 
process primarily as a source of identity data for enemy units in the line, though they also 
provided some location data about Turkish formations far behind the front. The reports of agents 
behind the lines sending information about Turkish units passing through the rail junctions of 
Palestine and Syria arrived at EEF GHQ too slowly to do anything but confirm data and analysis 
already gleaned from other sources. The result of this multi-source approach was a series of 
maps with a high—though not perfect—degree of accuracy regarding the dispositions of the 
Turkish army deployed on the Palestine front. 
 This clear picture broke down in the phase of pursuit and mobile operations that followed 
the Turkish evacuation of the Gaza-Beersheba line on the night of 6-7 November. The high 
tempo of operations and pace of events made it difficult to bring multiple sources and even 
single sources of information to bear against the problem of graphically tracking the Turkish 
order of battle. The conditions of this phase forced Meinertzhagen and his staff to rely more 
heavily on sources that could be directed from GHQ and that could yield information quickly but 
with far less fidelity and richness. More useful in this context were ground and aerial 
reconnaissance, as opposed to the more passive methods of deserter interrogations and wireless 
intercepts, which generally provided information too slowly to be operationally useful in this 
fast-paced context. The result was decreasing completeness and accuracy on the operations maps 
produced during this phase as each consecutive map built on the increasingly flawed product 
from the previous day. 
The repeated failure of even these sources, along with the strain placed on the EEF 
communication conduits by the rapid forward movement of the army, meant that the 
information-processing phase of the EEF cartographic system—and in particular the analysis of 
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ambiguous information by Meinertzhagen and his staff—assumed far greater influence on map 
content. This over-reliance on analysis and speculation caused predictably negative results for 
the maps’ quality. The lack of information available for plotting data on the operation maps 
during this phase meant I needed to add an additional seventh hypotheses to my possible 
explanations for the sources of unit positions on the operation maps: staff speculation. These 
conditions also prompted the mapmakers to add annotations indicating uncertainty. These 
annotations usually took the form of a list of enemy units whose whereabouts remained un-
located.  
 In the third and final phase of the Gaza campaign the opposing forces reestablished a 
stable front and the EEF began a slow but steady advance into the Judean hills to capture 
Jerusalem. These conditions fostered a gradual return to the multi-source methods practiced in 
the first operational phase of the campaign. Prisoner and deserter statements again reasserted 
their preeminence in the graphical depiction of the Turkish units on the map, but by this point in 
the campaign the urgency of purpose for the operation maps had declined along with the Turkish 
ability to counterattack or shift reserves to parry British thrusts. The Turkish army had suffered 
significant losses in soldiers and material in the preceding weeks, substantially curtailing its 
capabilities. Without a credible threat from the opposing Turkish army that needed to be tracked 
daily, Meinertzhagen’s staff and the 7th FSC were free to use the operation maps as a canvas to 
tell the story of the EEF’s successes to the broader world. This they proceeded to do with the 
1:500,000 scale operation maps produced after 15 November. 
Research Question 2: What was the purpose of the operation maps? 
 I initially found the simplicity and cartographic silences of the operation maps to be 
somewhat puzzling as they seemed at first glance to be far too general for detailed military 
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planning. However, in the context of all of the other tactical, logistical, and strategic maps 
produced by the EEF, as well as the daily intelligence summaries submitted by the various 
intelligence staffs, the purpose of these maps became apparent. The operation maps at their best 
allowed the EEF intelligence staff to provide the army’s senior commanders with a clear, un-
cluttered, and easily understood picture of the battlefield. The intent was to keep commanders 
abreast of the distribution of the enemy forces in the field and make them aware of major enemy 
troop movements, as well as the location of friendly formations. These maps’ simplicity would 
have allowed a commander to determine these facts at a glance and—along with other planning 
and cartographic products—decide how his forces should respond to them. 
 But were the operation maps actually used as intended? Indeed they were in the first 
operational phase of the battle; Dawnay’s concern about the influence of the maps on 
Chetwode’s and Chauvel’s deployments on the eastern flank of the battle line indicates that the 
maps may have had more influence than intended some cases (see Chapter 4). Also, the attention 
that Meinertzhagen paid to the map production process both during the campaign and 
subsequently in his diary indicates that he at least believed they were essential in communicating 
an accurate situational awareness of friendly and enemy deployments in the Palestine theater. 
Maule, the 7
th
 FSC’s commanding officer, recorded in his report on the activities of the 7th FSC 
that: 
The Headquarters were visited daily by Major R. Meinertzhagen, D.S.O. G.S.O.2(I) 
whose technical knowledge proved of very great help.  Besides keeping the section in 
close touch with the trend of affairs all ranks were greatly encouraged by the close 
interest taken in the work of the Company by the General Staff.  On September 27th, the 
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Headquarters was visited by the Commander-in-Chief, who remained some time with the 
different Sections (Maule 1919, 6). 
Meinertzhagen clearly thought the maps were important in their intended role, and the fact that 
they were similarly viewed by Allenby and his corps commanders during the course of the 
campaign speaks to their influence.  
 As decision-making aids in the second operational phase of the campaign the operation 
maps were hardly useful. The editions produced during this period were so lacking in any sort of 
consensus on the location of major portions of the Turkish army that at best they merely warned 
advancing British commanders about where un-located Turkish units might appear. Even so, it 
was during this period that the EEF cartographers demonstrated the most creativity in providing 
the army with a common operational picture (see chapter 5). The limitations of the operation 
mapping technique during this phase reflected the limits of technology and information available 
to the mapmakers, not lack of ability or motivation. In truth, the mapmakers’ ability to bring any 
sort of graphical clarity out of the chaos attending the EEF’s northward pursuit after the collapse 
of the Gaza defenses commends both these officers’ effort and intelligence. 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Operation Maps 
 The operation mapping technique as practiced by the EEF cartographic system was a 
thoroughly modern process analogous to the networked digital moving map displays in use by 
twenty-first century warriors such as the US military’s Blue Force Tracker/FBCB2 system.1 The 
major systematic differences between the modern mapping process and that employed by the 
EEF in the Palestine campaign in 1917 are that the modern systems not only shrink the length of 
                                                             
1 The US version of this networked digital moving map technology is a dual system alternately known as FBCB2 or Blue Force 
Tracker. It places a networked system relying on GPS in combat vehicles and headquarters. This system transmits the location of 
each unit to a central headquarters. Furthermore, units equipped with the system can mark locations on the map for observed 
enemy positions or obstacles. These reports are filtered through a headquarters staff intelligence officer and then re-sent to all 
units equipped with the system so that everyone has a common picture of the battlefield situation.   
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the mapping cycle from twenty-four hours to less than a minute, but also distribute the maps over 
digital radio and satellite networks. Moreover, these differences are complimented by the 
enhanced information-gathering capabilities of modern sensors. These differences underscore the 
obvious weaknesses of the EEF’s operation maps.  
 The operation maps were innovative not so much in the information that they attempted 
to communicate but rather in the short intervals over such a prolonged period of time over which 
they were updated and distributed. Theses maps were a modern product for a modern war, as the 
scale of conflict in World War I and the new technologies its belligerents employed precluded a 
commander from personally observing and understanding the entirety of the battlefield as had 
been possible as recently as the American Civil War and Franco-Prussian War. The operation 
maps produced by the EEF allowed the intelligence staff to distil the large amounts of data 
arriving at the headquarters into a simple and easily understandable picture that commanders 
could substitute for the panoramic vantages sought by earlier warriors.
2
 In addition, these 
centrally produced maps ensured that the entire army (or at least those parts of it that received 
the maps) possessed a common understanding of the battlefield situation, allowing for a greater 
unity of purpose exemplified by the skillful way in which Allenby launched his successive blows 
to break the Turkish defenses while still granting his subordinates the autonomy to maneuver 
their formations without undue micromanagement.    
 The major weakness of the operation mapping technique lay in its rigid twenty-four hour 
cycle, which often precluded the timely dissemination of incoming information. Although the 
mapmakers were resourceful and conscientious, the communication and printing technology 
                                                             
2 As battlefields have grown larger and combat more complicated, the importance of a commander’s staff has increased over the 
past century. Commanders do not have the time to analyze the huge amounts of raw data that modern military operations 
produce. They must instead rely on a staff of officers who distil the data into useful information that allows a commander to 
choose among a limited set of pre-determined options, much as Allenby did in this campaign (US Army 2010).  
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available to the EEF and the 7
th
 FSC did not permit them to print and distribute the maps at a 
faster pace. One minor example of this weakness was that the 31 October edition of the map 
series that failed to show the British capture of the town of Beersheba (see chapter 5). Indeed, the 
only fix available to Meinertzhagen and his staff may have actually been to slow down the 
mapping process to accommodate late developments, which would have delayed the distribution 
of the maps. 
 As with all maps, the operation maps were vulnerable to faulty data. As I have already 
discussed, the mobile pursuit phase of the campaign saw a marked decrease in the quality and 
currency of data arriving at GHQ each day, resulting in operation maps that were all but useless 
on particularly chaotic days. The staff was limited by what their forces in the field could see, and 
fields of view could be blocked by surprisingly minor terrain features that hid large enemy 
formations on numerous occasions, not the least of which was the low coastal ridge west of Gaza 
that facilitated the escape of the Turkish forces from the town on the night of 6-7 November. The 
low quality of incoming data initially prompted Meinertzhagen and his officers to depict 
speculation masquerading as fact on some of the operation map editions. GHQ’s loss of 
communication with Desert Mounted Corps for two entire days and Meinertzhagen’s resulting 
over-optimistic depiction of the extent of this units advance is a case in point for this pitfall of 
the operation mapping technique.  
The lack of data coming back from the Desert Mounted Corps meant both that its own 
position needed to be estimated on the 7 and 8 November operation maps and that whatever data 
its units were generating by ground reconnaissance and contact were lost to GHQ somewhere 
along the broken communication chain back between the two headquarters. Because the 
mapmakers lacked sufficient time to gather and analyze the data necessary for an accurate map, 
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the resulting product depicted a far faster advance for the British cavalry than was actually 
occurring on the ground. These maps also failed to depict the Turkish evacuation of the central 
sector of their line, an omission that likely helped facilitate the northward escape of these enemy 
forces (see Chapter 5). Even so, as the campaign progressed the EEF’s cartographers—to their 
credit—learned to graphically differentiate speculation from hard data, and also to portray 
uncertainty with map symbols. The relative advantages of the operation maps must have been 
sufficiently great for the purposes of the EEF staff because the technique reappeared in an 
improved form for Allenby’s final offensive that commenced in September 1918 (G.F. Bird 
Papers).  
Did the operation maps materially influence the outcome of the 3rd Battle of Gaza? Here 
the record is ambiguous. While these maps were certainly influential, they did not actually alter 
hard facts on the ground, such as the availability of drinking water or the tenacity of enemy 
resistance, which shaped the course of the campaign. The German commander of the Turkish 
army, General Kress von Kressenstein, who was well-regarded by his British opponents, 
published an article after the war in a British military journal in which he commented on the 
German and Turkish perspective of the battle and argued that the Turkish forces were actually 
far weaker than the British believed (Kressenstein 1922, 509-10). Sheffy (1998) and Nuno 
(2012) also ascribe to this interpretation of Turkish strength and British estimates. The 
implication of this interpretation of the battle is that the Turkish forces were likely too weak to 
stop the British offensive regardless of how the British responded to Turkish maneuvers. While I 
agree that the Turkish army was probably somewhat weaker than the British believed, I am 
skeptical of claims that British maneuvers, influenced by the operation maps, were unimportant 
to the ultimate outcome of the 3rd Gaza campaign.   
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Historical Value 
 As historical artifacts, the operation maps are a fascinating and valuable record of the 
Palestine campaign. Despite their biases and limitations, these maps are a depiction of the 
situation on the battlefield as known at EEF GHQ at 6pm each day. Even so, they are not an 
objective portrayal of where all the units on the battlefield actually were located at a given time. 
As such, the operation maps provide a valuable insight into the decision-making of the British 
command because they show what these officers believed at the time to be the situation on the 
ground. They are less valuable for interpreting how the campaign actually unfolded because of 
their inaccuracies and significant cartographic silences. However, I found that mapping out the 
problem by overlaying and combining the relatively simple operation maps with other charts, 
including digital elevation models and other historical maps, served to reveal important details 
about the course of the campaign and provided insight that would not otherwise be evident (see 
Chapter 4). 
 The operation maps also influenced the development of subsequent military mapping in 
the United States Army. James T. Kelly, an infantry officer in the US Army, wrote a paper for 
the Command and General Staff School (CGSS) in 1933 in which he indicated that copies of the 
operation maps were available to military researchers in America, and that the CGSS advocated 
modeling US intelligence maps after the 7th FSC’s operation maps (Kelly 1933, 39). Further 
investigation of American inter-war and World War II operational-level military maps may 
reveal how influential the operation maps were to the development of US military cartography, 
possibly providing a bridge to the already discussed present-day networked digital map systems.   
 Numerous individuals and units central to the Palestine campaign preserved these maps 
in various archives, including Meinertzhagen, Chetwode, and each of the EEF’s corps GHQs. 
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The continual reappearance of these maps in diverse archives and academic publications speaks 
to their value as historical resources. What made them valuable tools in an operational context 
also makes them useful as historical artifacts. They are a ready-made and easily digested means 
of understanding in broad terms the unfolding of the 3
rd
 Battle of Gaza and the Palestine 
campaign. Their use was sufficiently widespread and their influence sufficiently strong—at least 
in the early days of the battle—for me to assert that no historical understanding of this campaign 
is complete without including these maps.  
Value of the Woodward Framework 
 Woodward’s (1974) suggested framework for studying cartographic systems proved to be 
a valuable and appropriate resource for investigating the EEF’s production and use of the 
operation maps. A survey of scholars who have cited Woodward’s 1974 article reveals that it has 
been undeniably influential in cartographic scholarship but rarely as rigorously applied as I have 
attempted to do in this project. This framework is particularly well-suited for the study of 
military cartography because military units are in effect self-contained cartographic systems that 
produce and use their own maps at a prodigious rate to solve all manner of problems ranging 
from combined arms assaults to casualty evacuation to landscape beautification. A more 
widespread and rigorous application of this technique in cartographic scholarship would benefit 
the field and provide further insight into the subjects studied. 
 Furthermore, both Woodward’s framework and the operation mapping technique have 
application beyond the history of cartography and the study of military geography because any 
rapidly changing situation that needs to be mapped on an ongoing basis is appropriate for this 
method, and the Woodward framework is a recipe for designing organizations that both produce 
and use these maps. Certainly military applications come to mind, but also disaster relief 
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scenarios such as the Fukushima reactor disaster or the response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake (an 
operation in which I participated). Modern communications and sensors have mitigated many of 
the shortfalls experienced by the EEF cartographers, and the technique is already 
institutionalized in modern militaries around the world. An application of this framework to 
continuous mapping situations could help to streamline these cartographic processes by 
identifying and organizing key actors, phases, and information flows. 
Further Research 
 My examination of the EEF position maps—while built on the foundation of other 
scholars who have studied in depth other aspects of the cartography in this campaign—revealed 
other areas that would benefit from further study. Specifically, the operation map technique 
reappeared in 1918 briefly for the EEF’s abortive summer raids across the Jordan River and later 
in an improved form for Allenby’s final offensive that effectively and decisively destroyed the 
Turkish army on the Palestine front and resulted in the capture of Damascus. To date I have 
found no single collection of all these later maps as exists for the 3
rd
 Gaza map series, but I did 
find sufficiently numerous copies of these newer maps to lead me to believe that they too were 
produced on a daily basis during active operations. These maps were obviously a more 
thoroughly planned and improved evolution of the 1917 operation maps in that they were all 
printed on a single base map specifically meant for this purpose that was appropriate for 
covering the entire course of the campaign. These new base maps contained a locator inset to 
track strategic intelligence about enemy forces not actually in the theater but still near enough to 
intervene eventually, and they dedicated another inset for text notes about un-located units and 
qualitative data, a systematic improvement over the 1917 maps. Most of the copies of the 1918 
maps that I found are located in the G.F. Bird Papers collection at the Imperial War Museum. 
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 In addition, my investigation found that the EEF used maps for a broad range of 
purposes, ranging from trench maps of minute detail and organization, to maps of water 
resources and communication networks on the Palestine front. Additionally, the EEF used full-
sized terrain models—created from aerial photographs and direct observation—of important 
Turkish fortifications to both plan and rehearse their assault on the enemy line. This is another 
very modern application of military cartography practiced by the EEF, and dovetails nicely with 
Alistair Pearson’s (2002) research about World War II terrain models. Also, little is known of the 
parallel Turkish and German cartography on this front outside of the few scraps of captured 
material located in British archives. Indeed, the Turkish forces were certainly conducting their 
own parallel operation mapping effort. Meinertzhagen included in his diary a captured 
Turkish/German map of the Palestine front prior to the Gaza offensive that showed with 
disheartening detail (from the British perspective) that the Turkish headquarters possessed nearly 
as complete a picture of the British deployments as the British did of their own (Figure 6.1).   
 While many of the German records and archives were destroyed during World War II, 
the Turkish archives might be relatively complete, though the chaotic end to the Palestine 
campaign in 1918 and the destruction of the Turkish army on that front might have precluded 
complete records from ever reaching the archives. Regardless, someone with access to the 
Turkish archives might well discover a great deal about parallel Turkish cartographic activity on 
the Palestine front. Any of these subjects—and doubtless many others—could provide a rich and 
interest field for further historical research.  
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Figure 6.1. Facsimile of a German map of the Gaza front titled “Turkish Egyptian Border Area” that is remarkably similar in 
form and content to the British 7th FSC operation maps. This particular map was accidentally dropped by a German pilot while 
flying over the front and retrieved by Meinertzhagen, who preserved it in his diary (Meinertzhagen 1917, Vol. 20 35). 
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Appendix B: Multiple Hypothesis Results for Each Edition of the Operation Maps 
Date of 
Operation 
Map 
Unit or 
Annotation 
Primary Hypothesis Secondary Hypothesis Archival Source 
28-Oct XXII Corps Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
Signal Intercepts GHQ IS 10/8/17; GHQ IS 
4/10/17 
  53rd Division Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
GHQ IS 30/7/17; GHQ IS 
17/8/17; GHQ IS 13/10/17; 
GHQ IS 21/10/17 
  3rd Division Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 GHQ IS 30/7/17; GHQ IS 
17/8/17; GHQ IS 17/9/17; 
GHQ IS 27/10/17 
  7th Division Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
Aerial Reconnaissance GHQ IS 18/7/1; GHQ IS 
22/9/17; GHQ IS 21/10/17 
  19th Division Signal Intercepts Aerial Reconnaissance GHQ IS 25/8/17; GHQ IS 
20/10/17; GHQ IS 24/10/17; 
GHQ IS 26/10/17 
  XX Corps Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
Signal Intercepts GHQ IS 10/8/17; GHQ IS 
4/10/17 
  54th Division Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
Aerial Reconnaissance GHQ IS 2/8/17; GHQ IS 
6/8/17; GHQ IS 26/10/17 
  26th Division Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
Aerial Reconnaissance GHQ IS 10/7/17; GHQ IS 
11/7/17; GHQ IS 24/7/17; 
GHQ IS 31/8/17; GHQ IS 
3/10/17; GHQ IS 4/10/17; 
GHQ IS 26/10/17 
  16th Division Aerial Reconnaissance Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
RFC WD Vol. 1, 2; GHQ IS 
13/10/17 
  24th Division Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
Aerial Reconnaissance RFC WD Vol. 1 25/10/17; 
GHQ IS 26/9/17; GHQ IS 
21/10/17; GHQ IS 25/10/17; 
GHQ IS 26/10/17; GHQ IS 
27/10/17 
  27th Division Aerial Reconnaissance Signal Intercepts RFC WD Vol. 1 25/10/17; RFC 
WD 26/10/17; RFC WD 
27/10/17: GHQ IS 30/7/17; 
GHQ IS 1/8/17; GHQ IS 
19/9/17; GHQ IS 21/9/17; 
GHQ IS 27/10/17 
  3rd Cavalry 
Division 
Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
Aerial Reconnaissance GHQ IS 1/8/17: GHQ IS 
15/9/17; GHQ IS 16/10/17 
          
29-Oct 16th Division Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
  GHQ IS 29/10/17 
          
30-Oct 19th Division Signal Intercepts   GHQ IS 30/10/17 
          
31-Oct 27th Division Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
  XX WD Appendix I/35; GHQ IS 
31/10/17 
  3rd Cavalry 
Division 
Aerial Reconnaissance Conjecture RFC WD Vol. 1 31/10/17; 
GHQ IS 31/10/17 
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  "4 Div. 
Squadrons" 
Aerial Reconnaissance Conjecture RFC WD Vol. 1 31/10/17; 
GHQ IS 31/10/17 
          
1-Nov 24th Division Aerial Reconnaissance Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
GHQ IS 1/11/17; RFC WD 
Vol.2, 1/11/17 
  27th Division Aerial Reconnaissance Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
GHQ IS 1/11/17; RFC WD 
Vol.2, 1/11/17 
  "1 Battn." Aerial Reconnaissance  GHQ IS 1/11/17; RFC WD 
Vol.2, 1/11/17 
          
2-Nov 53rd Division Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
  54 Div. WD 2/11/17 
  19th Division Aerial Reconnaissance Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
XX WD Appendix I/78; GHQ IS 
1/11/17; GHQ IS 2/11/17; RFC 
WD Vol.2, 2/11/17 
  26th Division Aerial Reconnaissance Conjecture XX WD Appendix I/78; GHQ IS 
1/11/17; GHQ IS 2/11/17; RFC 
WD Vol.2, 2/11/17 
          
3-Nov 7th Division Aerial Reconnaissance   RFC WD Vol. 2, 3/11/17; GHQ 
IS 3/11/17 
  24th Division Conjecture Aerial Reconnaissance Meinertzhagen 1917, Vol. 20, 
6/11/17; RFC WD Vol. 2, 
3/11/17; GHQ IS 2/11/17 
  26th Division Conjecture Aerial Reconnaissance Meinertzhagen 1917, Vol. 20, 
6/11/17; RFC WD Vol. 2, 
3/11/17, GHQ IS 2/11/17 
  27th Division Conjecture Aerial Reconnaissance Meinertzhagen 1917, Vol. 20, 
6/11/17; RFC WD Vol. 2, 
3/11/17, GHQ IS 2/11/17 
  "Decrease 
T&S" 
Aerial Reconnaissance  RFC WD Vol. 2, 3/11/17 
  "Increase T&S" Aerial Reconnaissance  RFC WD Vol. 2, 3/11/17 
  "2 Cavalry 
Camps" 
Aerial Reconnaissance  RFC WD Vol. 2, 3/11/17 
          
4-Nov 16th Division Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
  GHQ IS 4/11/17 
  19th Division Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
XX IS 4/11/17; GHQ IS 
4/11/17 
  3rd Cavalry 
Division 
Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
 GHQ IS 4/11/17 
  "2,500 men?" Aerial Reconnaissance  GHQ IS 4/11/17; RFC WD Vol. 
2, 4/11/17 
  "1,500 men?" Aerial Reconnaissance  GHQ IS 4/11/17; RFC WD Vol. 
2, 4/11/17 
          
5-Nov 57th Regiment 
(19th Division) 
Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
  XX IS 4/11/17; GHQ IS 
4/11/17: GHQ IS 5/11/17 
  72nd Regiment 
(19th Division) 
Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 XX IS 4/11/17; GHQ IS 
5/11/17 
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  77th Regiment 
(19th Division) 
Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 XX IS 4/11/17; GHQ IS 
5/11/17 
  125th 
Regiment 
(19th Division) 
Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 XX IS 4/11/17; GHQ IS 
5/11/17 
  "500 T&S" Aerial Reconnaissance  GHQ IS 4/11/17; RFC WD Vol. 
2, 4/11/17 
  "250 T&S" Aerial Reconnaissance  GHQ IS 5/11/17; RFC WD Vol. 
2, 5/11/17 
  "300 T&S" Aerial Reconnaissance  GHQ IS 5/11/17; RFC WD Vol. 
2, 5/11/17 
  "Thick Camps" Aerial Reconnaissance  GHQ IS 5/11/17; RFC WD Vol. 
2, 5/11/17 
          
6-Nov 3rd Cavalry 
Division 
Aerial Reconnaissance   RFC WD Vol. 2 6/11/17; GHQ 
IS 6/11/17 
  16th Division Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 XX IS 6/11/17 
          
7-Nov 53rd Division Aerial Reconnaissance Conjecture RFC WD Vol. 2 7/11/17; GHQ 
IS 7/11/17 
  3rd Division Aerial Reconnaissance Conjecture RFC WD Vol. 2 7/11/17; GHQ 
IS 7/11/17 
  7th Division Aerial Reconnaissance Conjecture RFC WD Vol. 2 7/11/17; GHQ 
IS 7/11/17 
  16th Division Aerial Reconnaissance Conjecture RFC WD Vol. 2 7/11/17; GHQ 
IS 7/11/17 
  19th Division Aerial Reconnaissance Conjecture RFC WD Vol. 2 7/11/17; GHQ 
IS 7/11/17 
  24th Division Aerial Reconnaissance Conjecture RFC WD Vol. 2 7/11/17; GHQ 
IS 7/11/17 
  26th Division Aerial Reconnaissance Conjecture RFC WD Vol. 2 7/11/17; GHQ 
IS 7/11/17 
  27th Division Aerial Reconnaissance Conjecture RFC WD Vol. 2 7/11/17; GHQ 
IS 7/11/17 
          
8-Nov 26th, 54th, 3rd 
Cavalry 
Divisions 
Aerial Reconnaissance Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
RFC WD Vol. 2 8/11/17; GHQ 
IS 8/11/17 
  3rd, 7th, 53rd 
Divisions 
Aerial Reconnaissance Conjecture RFC WD Vol. 2 8/11/17; GHQ 
IS 8/11/17 
  16th, 19th, 
24th Divisions 
Aerial Reconnaissance Conjecture RFC WD Vol. 2 8/11/17; GHQ 
IS 8/11/17 
  27th Division Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
XX WD I/200, 203 
  12th Depot 
Regiment 
Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
Signal Intercepts XX WD I/200, 203; GHQ IS 
7/11/17 
  20th Division Aerial Reconnaissance Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
GHQ IS 7/11/17 
  VIII Army Signal Intercepts  GHQ IS 8/11/17 
  VII Army Conjecture    
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9-Nov 26th, 54th 
Divisions 
Aerial Reconnaissance Conjecture GHQ IS 9/11/17 
  3rd, 7th, 53rd 
Divisions 
Aerial Reconnaissance Conjecture GHQ IS 9/11/17 
  2000? Aerial Reconnaissance  RFC WD Vol. 2 9/11/17; GHQ 
IS 9/11/17 
  XX Corps Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
Conjecture GHQ IS 9/11/17 
  16th Division Aerial Reconnaissance Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
XX WD I/210, 213 
  19th, 20th 
Divisions 
Aerial Reconnaissance Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
XX WD I/210, 213 
  24th, 27th 
Divisions 
Aerial Reconnaissance Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
XX WD I/210, 213 
          
10-Nov REARGUARDS Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
  GHQ IS 9/11/17, 10/11/17 
  Unidentified 
units N of 
Hebron 
Aerial Reconnaissance  GHQ IS 10/11/17 
  16th Division Aerial Reconnaissance Conjecture GHQ IS 10/11/17 
  3rd Cavalry 
Division 
Aerial Reconnaissance Conjecture GHQ IS 10/11/17 
          
11-Nov FRESHLY DUG 
AND 
INCOMPLETE 
Aerial Reconnaissance   GHQ IS 11/11/17 
          
12-Nov VII Army Signal Intercepts   GHQ IS 12/11/17 
  VIII Army Signal Intercepts  Speculation 
  53rd Division Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 DMC IS 11/11/17 
  19th Division Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
AMD WD 12/11/17 
  20th Division Signal Intercepts Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
GHQ IS 13/11/17 
  3rd, 7th 
Division 
Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
52nd Div. WD 12/11/17 
  16th Division Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
52nd Div. WD 12/11/17 
  54th Division Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
Speculation 
  XX Corps Signal Intercepts  GHQ IS 13/11/17 
          
13-Nov 12th Depot 
Regiment 
Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
  GHQ IS 13/11/17 
          
14-Nov 3rd Division Aerial Reconnaissance   GHQ IS 14/11/17 
  16th Division Aerial Reconnaissance  GHQ IS 14/11/17 
191 
 
  136th 
Regiment 
Aerial Reconnaissance  GHQ IS 14/11/17 
  54th Division Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
Aerial Reconnaissance GHQ IS 14/11/17 
  7th Division Aerial Reconnaissance Signal Intercepts Speculation 
          
15-Nov "700 men" Aerial Reconnaissance   GHQ IS 15/11/17 
  7th Division Aerial Reconnaissance Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
GHQ IS 15/11/17 
  III Corps Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 GHQ IS 15/11/17 
  3rd Division Aerial Reconnaissance  GHQ IS 15/11/17 
          
16-Nov VII Army Aerial Reconnaissance Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
GHQ IS 16/11/17 
  III Corps Aerial Reconnaissance Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
GHQ IS 16/11/17 
  XV Corps Aerial Reconnaissance Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
GHQ IS 16/11/17 
  VIII Army Aerial Reconnaissance Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
GHQ IS 16/11/17 
  XX Corps Aerial Reconnaissance Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
GHQ IS 16/11/17 
  XXII Corps Aerial Reconnaissance Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
GHQ IS 16/11/17 
          
17-Nov VII Army Aerial Reconnaissance   GHQ IS 17/11/17 
  VIII Army Aerial Reconnaissance Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
GHQ IS 17/11/17 
  24th Division Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 GHQ IS 17/11/17 
          
18-Nov "Considerable 
Movement N." 
Aerial Reconnaissance   GHQ IS 18/11/17 
  26th Division? Aerial Reconnaissance  GHQ IS 18/11/17 
  6th Cavalry 
Regiment 
Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
 Speculation 
          
19-Nov "Probably a 
Strong Flank 
Guard…" 
Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
Aerial Reconnaissance GHQ IS 19/11/17 
          
20-Nov 24th Division Aerial Reconnaissance   GHQ IS 20/11/17 
  12th Depot 
Regiment 
Aerial Reconnaissance  GHQ IS 20/11/17 
  VII Army Conjecture Aerial Reconnaissance GHQ IS 20/11/17 
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21-Nov III Corps Aerial Reconnaissance Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
GHQ IS 21/11/17 
  XXII Corps Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
Signal Intercepts GHQ IS 21/11/17, XXI IS 
21/11/17 
          
22-Nov No Changes       
          
23-Nov VIII Army Signal Intercepts   GHQ IS 23/11/17 
  3rd Cavalry 
Division 
Aerial Reconnaissance Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
GHQ IS 23/11/17 
          
24-Nov 3rd Division Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
  GHQ IS 24/11/17 
  7th Division Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 GHQ IS 24/11/18 
  3rd Cavalry 
Division 
Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 GHQ IS 24/11/19 
  24th Division Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 GHQ IS 24/11/20 
  54th Division Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 GHQ IS 24/11/21, DMC IS 
24/11/17 
  28th Division Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 GHQ IS 24/11/22 
  53rd Division Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 GHQ IS 24/11/23 
  27th Division Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 GHQ IS 24/11/24 
          
25-Nov No Change       
          
26-Nov 19th? Division Aerial Reconnaissance   GHQ IS 26/11/24 
          
27-Nov No change       
          
28-Nov 3rd Cavalry 
Division 
Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
  GHQ IS 27/11/24 
  24th Division Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 GHQ IS 27/11/24 
  16th Division Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
 GHQ IS 28/11/24 
  20th Division Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 GHQ IS 28/11/24 
          
29-Nov 7th Division Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
GHQ IS 29/11/24 
  16th Division Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 GHQ IS 29/11/25 
  20th Division Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 GHQ IS 29/11/26 
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  77th Regiment Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 GHQ IS 29/11/27 
          
30-Nov 154th 
Regiment 
Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
  GHQ IS 30/11/27 
          
1-Dec No change       
          
2-Dec No Change       
          
3-Dec 19th Division Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
  Speculation 
          
4-Dec No change       
          
5-Dec No change       
          
6-Dec 3rd Cavalry 
Division 
Signal Intercepts   Speculation 
          
7-Dec No change       
          
8-Dec No change       
          
9-Dec XX Corps Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
  GHQ IS 9/12/27 
          
10-Dec 24th Division Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
  GHQ IS 10/12/17 
  26th Division Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 GHQ IS 10/12/18 
  53rd Division  Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 GHQ IS 10/12/19 
  48th Division Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 GHQ IS 10/12/20 
  27th Division Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 GHQ IS 10/12/21 
  54th Division Conjecture  Speculation 
  7th Cavalry 
Regiment 
Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 GHQ IS 10/12/19 
  19th Division Ground Recon. and 
Contact 
 GHQ IS 10/12/19 
          
11-Dec 16th Division Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
  GHQ IS 11/12/19 
  54th Division Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 GHQ IS 11/12/19 
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12-Dec 32nd Regiment Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
  GHQ IS 11/12/19, 12/12/17; 
XX IS 12/12/17 
  136th 
Regiment 
Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 GHQ IS 11/12/19, 12/12/17; 
XX IS 12/12/18 
  57th Regiment Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 GHQ IS 11/12/19, 12/12/17; 
XX IS 12/12/19 
  59th Regiment Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 GHQ IS 11/12/19, 12/12/17; 
XX IS 12/12/20 
          
13-Dec Little change       
          
14-Dec No change       
          
15-Dec 59th Regiment Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
  GHQ IS 15/12/17 
  164th 
Regiment 
Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 GHQ IS 15/12/18 
  19th Regiment Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 GHQ IS 15/12/19 
  185th 
Regiment 
Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 GHQ IS 15/12/20 
  57th Regiment Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 GHQ IS 15/12/21 
          
16-Dec 77th Regiment Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
  DMC IS 16/12/17; XX IS 
16/12/17; XXI IS 16/12/17 
  72nd Regiment Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 DMC IS 16/12/17; XX IS 
16/12/17; XXI IS 16/12/18 
  2nd Regiment Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 DMC IS 16/12/17; XX IS 
16/12/17; XXI IS 16/12/19 
  6th Cavalry 
Regiment 
Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 DMC IS 16/12/17; XX IS 
16/12/17; XXI IS 16/12/20 
  143rd 
Regiment 
Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 DMC IS 16/12/17; XX IS 
16/12/17; XXI IS 16/12/21 
  58th Regiment Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 DMC IS 16/12/17; XX IS 
16/12/17; XXI IS 16/12/22 
  32nd Regiment Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 GHQ IS 11/12/19, 12/12/17; 
XX IS 12/12/17 
  136th 
Regiment 
Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 GHQ IS 11/12/19, 12/12/17; 
XX IS 12/12/18 
  150th 
Regiment 
Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 DMC IS 16/12/17; XX IS 
16/12/17; XXI IS 16/12/17 
  78th Regiment Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 DMC IS 16/12/17; XX IS 
16/12/17; XXI IS 16/12/18 
  151st 
Regiment? 
Deserter/Prisoner 
Statements 
 DMC IS 16/12/17; XX IS 
16/12/17; XXI IS 16/12/19 
          
17-Dec No change       
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18-Dec No change       
          
19-Dec No change       
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Appendix C. Archival Methods and Reproducing Maps 
Several scholars had told me that “weird things happen in the archives,” that you just cannot 
predict what sort of archive rules, equipment challenges, or acts of god might conspire to upset 
your well-planned research agenda. Furthermore, I had also been told that “research is messy,” 
even though finished products of research are usually neat, even sterile. I found this to be true in 
my own archival research while photographing the most central and important documents for 
this thesis: the original 7
th 
FSC operation maps. In this appendix I will relate my difficulties 
photographing these maps in the archives, and also in digitally reproducing them for this thesis. I 
hope this brief discussion of my processes and methods, both in the archives and later during my 
data analysis, may be of use to other researchers who find themselves in similar circumstances.  
Photographing the Operation Maps 
As I noted in Chapter 3, my equipment and I were thoroughly prepared upon arriving at 
the British National Archives at Kew, London. Furthermore, those archives and the people who 
run them are thoroughly efficient, friendly, and accommodating. I was provided with an assigned 
desk of sufficient size with a built-in outlet and, more importantly, an attached camera stand for 
photographing documents. These conditions, along with an efficient system for ordering up 
records, meant that I was able to conduct my research with minimal wasted time or energy. The 
one exception to this positive experience lay in my attempts to photograph the operation maps. 
The 7
th
 FSC operation maps are physically large documents, measuring approximately a 
yard by a yard and a half. As such, I was required to go to the archive’s map reading room to 
examine them. This was another well-equipped and fully-staffed area, with larger tables that also 
held built-in camera stands. Unfortunately the operation maps were slightly larger even than 
these tables, and the archive rules state that researcher may not allow parts of documents to hang 
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off the edge of the table. Even so, I decided that four or five inches of overhang must not be too 
important, and so I placed the maps on one of these tables, screwed my camera into the stand, 
and began photographing. These captures produced some very high quality pictures of the first 
several operation maps before the “weird thing” happened. 
One of the archive’s blue-coated attendants came over and informed me politely but 
firmly that my documents were hanging off the edge of the table and would I please move them 
to the larger table over there, yes that one without the camera stand. Obviously I complied, and 
since the rules also precluded me from placing any items (including my own camera stand) 
directly on the documents, I was relegated to standing on a chair, leaning as far as I could over 
the maps, and attempting capture as clear of a picture of the map as possible. Unsurprisingly, the 
maps I photographed in this way were of noticeably lower quality than the ones I had 
photographed using the camera stand. One way I tried to compensate for this was by 
photographing the maps in sections instead of whole. This worked for some of the maps, but not 
for all, particularly not for those editions printed on the 1:250,000 and 1:168,960 scale base 
maps. At the time I didn’t think much of the differing quality of these captures, but they became 
much more important as I began to write my thesis. 
Reproducing the Operation Maps 
 The size and scale of the operations maps precluded including them whole as figures in 
this thesis, and the quality of the later photographs made this impractical anyway. Therefore, I 
considered three different methods for reproducing portions of these maps to illustrate the points 
I was discussing. These were: 1) using an essentially un-enhanced facsimile of the map, 2) using 
Adobe Photoshop to enhance the maps’ legibility and attractiveness, and 3) completely 
reinterpreting the maps by creating my own reproductions using Adobe Illustrator. These 
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alternatives forced me to weight the relative importance of showing the original maps about 
which I was writing, maintaining the clear flow of my narrative with legible maps, and adding 
my own interpretations and analysis to the original charts. In the end I settled on a compromise 
between the latter two options. I will discuss each of these methods below.    
 
Figure C.1. Example of an unenhanced portion of a facsimile of the 28 October Operation map. Approximately original size. 
The first method I considered was to include excerpts of the operation maps that were 
essentially un-altered from the photographs I had captured in the archives. To do this, I first took 
the original digital photograph and used the perspective crop tool in Adobe Photoshop to remove 
the distortion caused by the angle at which the photograph had been taken. I then cropped the 
photo to the area I wanted to highlight and adjusted the size of the image to fit on a page. This 
process resulted in products that contained some shadows and blurred or illegible text, and were 
generally unsightly (Figure C.1). 
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Figure C.2. Example of an enhanced portion of a facsimile of the 28 October Operation map. 
The second method I employed was to enhance the original images using Adobe 
Photoshop to improve legibility and ascetics. I used two different processes to do this, depending 
on the quality and area of the original photograph, which I was trying to enhance. The first 
process was to adjust the color levels to remove the background shadows from the image and 
increase the contrast of the symbols. Unfortunately, this would usually “wash out” many of the 
map symbols, and so I was forced in most cases to laboriously touch up many or all of the map 
symbols in black, red, and green, darkening them to prevent this washout effect (see Figure C.2).  
The second process was to use Photoshop’s magic wand tool to select the variously 
colored symbols in turn and re-color them with uniform shades of black, green, or red. I then 
used the magic wand tool to select the background color and replace it with white. This process 
had its own pitfalls insofar as the tool would often select (or fail to select) pixels other than the 
ones I had intended, forcing me to still go in and retrace much of the map’s text and symbology. 
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Even so, this process was essential on larger examples and the later maps that contained far more 
black background symbols. I also added text to the resulting images to indicate my analysis and 
interpretation. This method generally produced legible and attractive maps.  
I decided employ these enhanced maps as figures in the body of my thesis because they 
preserved the original form of the operation maps, which I considered important. However, the 
quality of the original photo captures and the labor involved in enhancing them meant that I 
could generally include only small areas of the original maps as figures, which I believe could be 
somewhat disorienting for a reader who is unfamiliar with the geography of this campaign, as I 
was when I began this project. Furthermore, the original operation maps omitted information 
important for understanding the progress of the campaign, particularly topography. Therefore, I 
employed a third method of reproduction, which would allow me to legibly show the entire area 
of the original maps and also add some additional relevant information.    
In this third method I used Adobe Illustrator to superimpose the original operation map 
captures onto topographical maps (see Chapter 3). I first traced the maps’ limited terrain features 
into one layer of the file. I then traced the unit and text symbols for each day into individually 
separate layers. This allowed me to turn layers on or off to compare unit positions, analyze the 
importance of terrain (rough view-shed analysis in Chapter 3), and track the daily progress of the 
battle. This produced a series of maps that approximated the information content of the original 
operation maps but that could be reproduced in whole within the page-size constraints of this 
thesis. I decided to include these reinterpreted operation maps as a series in Appendix D. 
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Figure C.3. Reinterpretation of the Beersheba sector of the 28 October operation map, enlarged from the Adobe Illustrator file 
used to create several other figures in this thesis. 
 Each methods had drawbacks, which imposed a tradeoff between remaining true to the 
original material and enhancing and reinterpreting key details to increase legibility. The results 
show that a combination of methods that enhance and reinterpret original documents may 
sometimes be necessary in order to study a digitally captured document and to clearly 
communicate findings of the research. Furthermore, as others have told me, researchers need to 
be thoroughly prepared and also flexible when approaching archival research. Even the 
friendliest archives can pose unanticipated problems that require creativity to overcome.  
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Appendix D. Operation Map Reproductions 
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